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1 Introduction
1.1 Topics and Literature Review
Intertemporal general-equilibrium models with Keynesian features such as imperfect com-
petition and imperfectly flexible prices have become the workhorse model for monetary
macroeconomics.1 These type of models combine elements of the real business cycle litera-
ture initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1982) with Keynesian features proposed by, among
others, Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982), Calvo (1983), or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
These New Keynesian or New Neoclassical Synthesis models describe the rational behavior
of utility-maximizing households and profit-maximizing firms which act in monopolistically
competitive markets. The optimal price setting behavior of firms and/or the optimal wage
setting behavior of labor suppliers are constrained by mechanism that leads to a stickiness
of prices and/or wages. The assumption of fairly representative agents makes it possible to
aggregate the individual optimality conditions of households and firms. As a consequence,
the model finally yields typical macroeconomic variables like aggregate production (output),
aggregate absorption, aggregate employment, inflation, and nominal and real interest rates.
Market clearing conditions for each individual type of good and each type of labor finally
explain the description of these class of models as a general-equilibrium framework.2
The consideration of nominal rigidities leads to a (at least) short-run non-neutrality of
monetary policy. The question then naturally arises how the monetary policy should be
conducted in order to maximize overall welfare.3
An optimal monetary policy is thereby either the commitment to a policy plan which is
derived from the intertemporal optimization of the policy-maker’s objective function (policy
under commitment), the solution of the optimization of the parameters of a given simple
monetary instrument rule (optimal simple rule), or the solution of a sequential optimization
problem without committing to future policies (policy under discretion).4
It is well-known that the solution of dynamic optimal control problems with forward-looking
rational agents is dynamic inconsistent or strategic incoherent (see, for example, Wohltmann
and Kro¨mer (1989), Currie and Levine (1993), or McCallum (2005)). In order to overcome
the problem of the dynamic inconsistency of optimal policy under commitment, Woodford
(1999a) proposes the concept of timeless perspective policy-making.5
1Woodford (2009) reviews the development of the new synthesis in macroeconomics and outlines the main
elements of the new macroeconomic workhorse model.
2An introduction to the New Keynesian framework is provided by Walsh (2003b), Gal´ı (2008), or for German
readers, Wohltmann and Winkler (2008c).
3In the current literature welfare is defined as the aggregate utility of households. In earlier studies, however,
welfare is often represented by an ad-hoc (quadratic) social loss function.
4An introduction to the problem of optimal monetary policy-making in the New Keynesian framework can be
found in Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2003b), Gal´ı (2008), or for German readers, Wohltmann
and Winkler (2008d).
5Dennis (2001), McCallum and Nelson (2004), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), and McCallum (2005) exten-
sively discuss the timeless perspective policy approach.
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The widely recognized shortcomings of policy-making from a timeless perspective are that
the problem of time-inconsistency in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) is in fact not solved and that the policy generally fails to globally maximize
the policy makers’ objective function (see, among others, Jensen and McCallum (2002)).
Nevertheless, the concept of timeless perspective commitment achieved a lot of attention
and is widely considered as a good approximation of the globally optimal policy under
commitment.
From a methodological point of view, the New Keynesian literature on optimal monetary
policy can be divided into the linear-quadratic approach and the Ramsey approach. The
first is widely applied and is based on a second-order approximation of the households’
utility function.6 Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003) show that, under
certain circumstances, this leads to a quadratic loss function in inflation and the output
gap.7 However, the assumptions which must be made to derive this function are restrictive.8
Thus, Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) propose to use the Ramsey approach for the analysis
of optimal monetary policy since it does not rely on any approximation of the utility function.
Instead, the optimal policy is derived by maximizing the utility of households subject to the
non-linearized model equations.9
This thesis now adds to the literature on the optimal design of monetary policy by demon-
strating the possible inferiority of Ramsey monetary policy under timeless perspective com-
mitment to simple (non-optimized) monetary policy rules. More precisely, we show that the
Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment is identical to the globally optimal
policy under commitment only if the government optimally subsidizes the cost of production.
This fiscal policy instrument leads to the efficiency of the model without nominal rigidities
as well as to the efficiency of the steady state. However, if we abandon the assumption that
optimal subsidies are in place, there exist monetary instrument rules which are superior to
the optimal policy under timeless perspective commitment.
In particular, we do find non-optimized but welfare-enhancing instrument rules in the pres-
ence of cost-push shocks (wage mark-up shocks, price mark-up shocks) and technology shocks
(Chapter 4) as well as in the presence of oil price shocks (Chapter 5).
A similar result is reported by Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) who show
within the linear-quadratic framework that simple policy rules deliver superior welfare results
compared to the optimal policy under timeless perspective commitment. However, these
studies apply the canonical New Keynesian model with a quadratic and ad-hoc loss function
which does not rely explicitly on the utility of households. We are able to show the inferiority
of policy-making from a timeless perspective for the Ramsey-type monetary policy with a
utility-based welfare criteria.
Hence, our findings strongly support and generalize the results of Blake (2001) and Jensen
and McCallum (2002) and call into question the appropriateness of the proposed Ramsey
6See, among others, Woodford (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2004), or Gal´ı (2008).
7The output gap is thereby defined as the deviation of actual output from the natural level of output which,
in turn, is defined as the output that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities.
8Note that a lot of studies use a quadratic objective function which does not rely explicitly on the utility
of households. See, among others, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Woodford (1999b), Svensson (1999,
2000), Steinsson (2003), Walsh (2003a), Wollmersha¨user (2006), Adolfson (2007), or Wohltmann and Winkler
(2008a).
9The Ramsey approach is applied by, among others, Yun (2005), Faia (2008a, 2008b), Faia and Monacelli
(2004, 2007, 2008), or Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004b, 2005, 2007b).
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policy under timeless perspective commitment as a guideline for the conduct of monetary
policy.
After pointing out the contribution to the literature on the optimal design of monetary
policy, we now turn to the second novel contribution of this thesis, namely the (welfare)
analysis of anticipated shocks under (optimal) monetary policy.
A characteristic of dynamic general equilibrium models of the New Neoclassical Synthesis,
established since the real business cycle revolution of Kydland and Prescott (1982), is that
unanticipated random disturbances are considered as the main driving force in explaining
business cycles.10 As a consequence, the literature on the optimal design of monetary policy
usually considers only unanticipated shocks (see, among others, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler
(1999), Svensson (1999), King, Khan, and Wolman (2003), or Woodford (2003)).
However recently, a number of macroeconometric studies emphasize the role of anticipated
shocks as sources of macroeconomic fluctuations. Beaudry and Portier (2006) find that more
than one half of business cycle fluctuations are caused by news about future technological op-
portunities. Davis (2007) and Fujiwara, Hirose, and Shintani (2008) analyze the importance
of anticipated shocks in large scale DSGE models closely related to the model of Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and report that these disturbances are important
components of aggregate fluctuations. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008) conduct a Bayesian
estimation of a real business cycle model and find that anticipated shocks are the most im-
portant source of aggregate fluctuations. In particular, they report that anticipated shocks
explain two thirds of the volatility in consumption, output, investment, and employment.11
In light of these findings, this thesis analyzes optimal monetary policy in the presence of an-
ticipated shocks and systematically investigates the welfare consequences of the anticipation
of future shocks.
The welfare effects of anticipated shocks were so far ignored by the literature. To the best
of our knowledge, the only exception is the study of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a) that
compares the welfare effects of anticipated and unanticipated energy price shocks under
different monetary policy regimes. However, this study applies a stylized New Keynesian
model without rigorous micro-foundations.
This thesis, however, conducts an analysis of the welfare effects of anticipated shocks under
different (optimal) monetary policy regimes within several fully micro-founded New Key-
nesian models. In particular, we investigate whether the anticipation of a future cost-push
shock enhances welfare compared to an unanticipated shock of equal size. Or, to put it dif-
ferently, we pose the question: Is the additional information about future cost disturbances
a source of additional welfare? This thesis claims: Generally not!
10An exception is the stream of literature that analyzes anticipated disinflations going back to Ball (1994)
who shows that a simple variant of the New Keynesian model predicts a boom in response to an anticipated
disinflation.
11Recent theoretical studies on the role of anticipations for business cycle fluctuations include Beaudry and
Portier (2004, 2007), Beaudry, Collard, and Portier (2006), Jaimovich and Rebelo (2006, 2008), Den Haan
and Kaltenbrunner (2007), or Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008). Contributions which do not
utilize general equilibrium models are, among others, Brock’s (1975) analysis of anticipated inflations and
deflations in a monetary model with utility-maximizing agents, Wilson’s (1979), Gray and Turnovsky’s
(1979), Turnovsky’s (1986) and Clausen and Wohltmann’s (2005) extensions of the celebrated Dornbuch
(1976) overshooting model, or Bhandari and Turnovsky’s (1984), Wohltmann’s (1994b), Wohltmann and
Clausen’s (2003) and Wohltmann and Winkler’s (2005a, 2005b, 2005c) investigations of anticipated shocks
in oil-dependent economies. German readers are also referred to Wohltmann (1994a, 2000), Wohltmann and
Bulthaupt (1999), or Wohltmann and Clausen (2001, 2002). However, none of these studies considers the
welfare effects of the anticipation of future shocks.
1.1 Topics and Literature Review 4
More precisely, we find that anticipated cost-push shocks generally entail higher welfare
losses than unanticipated cost-push shocks of equal size. We are able to analytically show
this result within the canonical purely forward-looking New Keynesian model (Chapter 2).
In particular, we find that – for empirically plausible degrees of nominal rigidity – the
anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads to a higher welfare loss than an analogous
unanticipated shock. A welfare gain from the anticipation of a future cost shock may only
occur if prices are sufficiently flexible. These results, which are independent of the monetary
policy regime, are consistent with the findings of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008). They show
that the anticipation of future shocks has a stabilizing effect on an economy without nominal
rigidities. We point out that precisely the degree of nominal rigidity plays an important role
for the evaluation of the welfare effects of anticipations.
The result that the anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads to a higher welfare loss
than an unanticipated shock of equal size is then confirmed within a micro-founded and
numerically calibrated hybrid New Keynesian model. It includes the features of habit for-
mation in consumption preferences and of a variant of the Calvo (1983) mechanism with
partial indexation of non-optimized prices to past inflation (Chapter 3). The results we ob-
tained from our simulations show that the welfare loss of anticipated cost-shocks exceeds
the welfare loss of unanticipated cost-shocks of equal magnitude for plausible lengths of the
time span between the anticipation and the realization of the shock, henceforth denoted as
anticipation period.
Furthermore, we are able to confirm this finding within a non-linearized model for an oil-
dependent economy (Chapter 5). We numerically demonstrate that the anticipation of typi-
cal cost-push shocks such as wage and price mark-up shocks enhances their welfare-reducing
effects. This result holds under the globally optimal Ramsey-type monetary policy as well
as under simple (non-optimized) monetary policy rules.
Chapter 5 contains a further novel contribution of this thesis. It adds to the literature on
the interplay between monetary policy and oil price shocks by deriving the globally optimal
Ramsey-type monetary policy for an oil-dependent economy.12 Moreover, we compare the
optimal monetary policy to simple (non-optimized) monetary policy rules.
Among the numerous empirical contributions that studies the interaction between oil price
shocks and monetary policy see, for example, Hamilton (1983), Hamilton and Herrera (2004),
Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, 2004), or Barsky and Kilian (2002). Theoretical con-
tributions are, among others, Leduc and Sill (2004), Medina and Soto (2005), Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2006), and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007).
Leduc and Sill (2004), Medina and Soto (2005), and Calstrom and Fuerst (2006) seek to
answer the question whether the recessionary consequences of oil price shocks are caused by
the oil price hike or by the monetary response to the rise in oil prices. However, these studies
concentrate on the recessionary consequences and do not, as we do, investigate the welfare
effects of oil price shocks under different monetary policy regimes, in particular optimal
12Thus, this thesis is also related to the strand of literature that deals in general with the macroeconomic
effects of oil price shocks. Contributions which utilize models without rigorous micro-foundations include,
among others, Buiter (1978), Bhandari (1981), Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985),
Wohltmann (1994b), Wohltmann and Clausen (2003), and Wohltmann and Winkler (2005a, 2005b, 2005c,
2006, 2008a). German readers are also referred to Jarchow (1992) or Wohltmann (1987, 1993). In contrast,
Kim and Loungani (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Finn (2000) analyze the effects of oil price
shocks in micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium models of closed economies. Backus and Crucini (2000)
consider an open-economy real business cycle model to study the effects of oil on the economy. The latter
studies are based on the assumption of completely flexible prices. Hence, there is no role for monetary policy.
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monetary policy of Ramsey-type.
The only studies, we are aware of, that analyze optimal monetary policy in the presence of oil
shocks are De Fiori, Lombardo, and Stebunovs (2006), Montoro (2007), and Wohltmann and
Winkler (2008a). De Fiori, Lombardo, and Stebunovs (2006) consider a three-country frame-
work and search for optimal parameters of a simple monetary policy rule. Montoro (2007)
considers a closed and oil-dependent economy with staggered price setting and investigates
optimal monetary policy under commitment by conducting a second-order approximation of
the utility function according to Benigno and Woodford (2005). Hence, this study is based
on the linear-quadratic approach. This approach is also applied by Wohltmann and Winkler
(2008a) who consider a stylized small-open economy framework with a loss function that
reflects, according to Svensson (2000), the policy objective of flexible domestic inflation tar-
geting. They derive the optimal policy under commitment and search for optimal simple
policy rules. This thesis, for the first time, derives the globally optimal Ramsey monetary
policy under commitment for an oil-dependent economy.
Our results contribute to the ongoing discussion whether the monetary policy amplifies
or dampens the recessionary effects of oil price shocks by pointing out that the welfare-
maximizing policy in fact calls for a sharp and prolonged output slump. In contrast, simple
rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993) lead to a dampening of the output drop that is welfare-
reducing.
1.2 Outline
The thesis is organized in two methodologically different parts. The first one, which con-
sists of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, is devoted to analyze linear dynamic systems with overall
welfare measured by quadratic loss functions. The second part of the thesis, which com-
prises Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, deals with nonlinear dynamic systems. Thereby, we apply
the Ramsey approach to the analysis of optimal monetary policy. In contrast to existing
literature, the models of this part are solved without any approximation. Note that a log-
linear approximation of the intrinsically nonlinear New Keynesian models leads to at least
qualitatively inaccurate dynamic adjustment paths and welfare results. The reason is that
variables which measure the distortions due to nominal rigidities (quadratic wage and price
adjustment costs or measures of price and wage dispersion) can be ignored up to a first-order
approximation of the respective system.
In more detail, the remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 compares
the welfare effects of unanticipated and anticipated cost-push shocks in the canonical New
Keynesian model with a monetary authority which minimizes a quadratic loss function that
weights the volatility of inflation and the output gap. It presents an analytical solution to
dynamics and welfare in the case of optimal monetary policy under both timeless perspective
commitment and discretion. Furthermore, a solution of welfare as a function of the time span
between the anticipation and the realization of the shock is derived. This allows to discover
the dependency of welfare on the length of the anticipation period. Moreover, a systematic
investigation of the role of nominal rigidities for the welfare impacts of anticipations is
conducted.
In order to analyze the (welfare) effects of anticipated shocks in more elaborate models,
Chapter 3 presents a general solution method for linear dynamic rational expectations mod-
els with anticipated shocks and optimal policy. This method extends the work of So¨derlind
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(1999) who uses the generalized Schur decomposition method, advocated by Klein (2000),
to solve linear rational expectations models with optimal policy. However, So¨derlind (1999)
only considers stochastic models with white noise shocks which are, by definition, unpre-
dictable. In the case of anticipated shocks, the occurrence of all future shocks is known
exactly at the time when the solution of the model is computed. The method presented in
this thesis also contains unanticipated shocks as a limiting case.13
As an economic example, Chapter 3 presents a calibrated New Keynesian model for a closed
and cashless economy with internal habit formation in consumption preferences, a variant of
Calvo price staggering with partial indexation to past inflation, a time-varying wage mark-
up which represents a typical cost-push shock and a monetary authority which seeks to
minimize a quadratic loss function. The model is numerically simulated and the effects of
mark-up shocks for different lengths of the anticipation period are compared.
Chapter 4 turns to the nonlinear Ramsey approach and studies optimal monetary policy in
a standard New Keynesian model for a closed and cashless economy with price and wage
rigidities resulting from quadratic adjustment costs. In particular, it derives the Ramsey-
type optimal monetary policy in the presence of cost-push shocks such as wage and price
mark-up shocks for the case of an inefficient and efficient steady state. Subsequently, welfare
implications of Ramsey policy and simple monetary policy rules are discussed.
Chapter 5 analyzes the optimal monetary policy in an oil-dependent economy with staggered
price and wage setting. This chapter picks up the two main topics of this thesis, namely the
analysis of the welfare effects of anticipated shocks and the welfare analysis of Ramsey
monetary policy under timeless perspective commitment in comparison to simple monetary
policy rules. Furthermore, it raises the problem of optimal policy-making in the presence of
energy price shocks.
More precisely, Chapter 5 compares the optimal Ramsey-type monetary policy under time-
less perspective commitment to simple monetary policy rules for both the case of unan-
ticipated and anticipated energy price shock. Thereby, we again study the performance of
different monetary policy regimes in the case of an efficient and inefficient steady state.
Moreover, we investigate the welfare effects of the anticipation of future shocks and ana-
lyze whether the findings reported in Chapter 2 and 3 are robust when we do not consider a
linear-quadratic approach and instead utilize a non-linearized framework. Finally, we discuss
what will be the best or optimal monetary policy in response to an increase in oil prices.
In the last chapter, our main results are summarized and an outlook for future research is
given.
13Matlab codes that compute impulse response functions and the minimal value of the loss function for the
policy regimes commitment, discretion and (optimal) simple rules can be downloaded from the authors’
webpage at: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/vwlinstitute/Wohltmann/REAS solution.zip.
Part I: Anticipated Shocks and Optimal
Monetary Policy in Linear Dynamic
Systems
2 Welfare Effects of Anticipated
Shocks in the Canonical New
Keynesian Model
2.1 Introduction
Does the anticipation of future shocks have a stabilizing and thus welfare-enhancing effect
on the economy compared to unanticipated shocks? In this chapter1, we seek to answer
this question by comparing the welfare effects of unanticipated and anticipated cost-push
shocks in the canonical New Keynesian model with a monetary authority which minimizes
a quadratic loss function that weights the volatility of inflation and the output gap. In
particular, we analytically solve for dynamics and welfare in the case of optimal monetary
policy under timeless perspective commitment and discretion. We distinguish the usual case
of unanticipated cost-push shocks and the case of future cost-push shocks that are known
in advance. We derive a solution of welfare as a function of the time span between the
anticipation and the realization of the shock which enables us to discover the dependency of
welfare on the length of the anticipation period. Furthermore, we systematically investigating
the role of nominal rigidities for the welfare impacts of anticipations.
To the best of our knowledge, Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a) is the only study that
compares the welfare effects of anticipated and unanticipated shocks. They analyze energy
price shocks under different monetary policy regimes including optimal monetary policy.
However, this study relies on numerical simulations and do not, as we do in this chapter,
investigate the role of nominal rigidities.
The main results of this chapter are the following. For empirically plausible degrees of
nominal rigidity, the anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads to a higher welfare loss
than an analogous unanticipated shock. A welfare gain from the anticipation of a future
cost shock may only occur if prices are sufficiently flexible. This result is consistent with
the findings of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2008) who show that the anticipation of future
shocks has a stabilizing effect on an economy without nominal rigidities. We point out that
precisely the degree of nominal rigidity plays an important role for the evaluation of the
welfare effects of anticipations.
Our results are driven by two opposing effects. On the one hand, we obtain the well-known
result that the anticipation of a future shock dampens its impact effect. On the other hand,
we show that the anticipation of future cost-push shocks enhances the persistence of output
and inflation and thus enhances the welfare loss. This persistence effect, in turn, is amplified
by the degree of price stickiness.
Nevertheless, at a first glance, our finding seem to be puzzling since it suggests that the
information about the occurrence of future shocks is in general welfare-reducing. But then the
1For a different version of this chapter see Wohltmann and Winkler (2008b).
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question arises, why rational agents do not ignore the knowledge about future disturbances.
In the remainder of this chapter, we will seek to shed more light on this question.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the canonical New Keynesian model
and its solution under the policy regimes timeless perspective commitment and discretion.
In Section 3, we report and discuss our main findings. Furthermore, we provide analytical
proofs and, for the sake of illustration, numerical simulations. Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The Framework
We consider the canonical New Keynesian model. It consists of an optimizing IS-type rela-
tionship of the form
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) (σ > 0) (2.1)
and a price adjustment equation of Calvo-Rotemberg type, often referred to as New Keyne-
sian Phillips Curve (NKPC)
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt + kt (0 < β < 1, κ > 0) (2.2)
xt denotes the output gap, pit is inflation, and it is the nominal interest rate. Et is the
expectations operator conditional on information up to date t. β is the discount factor and
1/σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is well-known that under the
assumptions of Calvo (1983) price setting, a constant returns to scale production function
with labor as single input, and perfect labor markets, the slope parameter κ is given by
κ = (η + σ) (1−ω)(1−βω)ω , where η is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
2 Obviously,
κ is negatively correlated with the degree of price rigidity ω. According to the Calvo price
adjustment mechanism, a fraction 1−ω of firms can adjust their price in period t. Simulta-
neously, ω is the probability that a single price which is reoptimized in period t, also holds
in the next period t+1. The Calvo parameter ω is therefore a measure of the degree of price
rigidity on the goods markets.
In the NKPC, kt represents a temporary cost-push shock that is assumed to be autoregressive
of order one with AR parameter ϕ ∈ [0, 1) and a one-unit cost shock εt
kt = ϕkt−1 + εt (t ≥ T > 0) (2.3)
Since we consider anticipated cost-push shocks, the one-unit cost shock εt is not white noise,
but known to the public before the shock actually occurs.3 Assume that at time t = 0 the
public anticipates the cost-push shock to take place at some future time T > 0. Then,
εt =
{
1 for t = T > 0
0 for t 6= T
(2.4)
The adjustment dynamics induced by anticipated shocks involve two phases, the time span
between the anticipation and the realization of the shock (0 ≤ t < T ) and the time span
after the implementation of the shock (T ≤ t ≤ ∞). The lead time T up to the realization
2See, for example, Walsh (2003b) for a derivation of the NKPC under Calvo pricing.
3Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007c) study the impacts of anticipated cost shocks on the pass-through to prices.
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of the shock is equal to the length of the anticipation phase 0 ≤ t < T . An implication of
our definition of anticipated shocks is that rational expectations are equivalent to perfect
foresight so that we can omit the expectations operator.
The policy maker’s objective at the time of anticipation t = 0 is to minimize the intertem-
poral loss function
V = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(α1pi
2
t + α2x
2
t ) (α1 > α2 > 0, 0 < β ≤ 1) (2.5)
which reflects the objective of flexible inflation targeting (see, for example, Svensson (1999)).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003) show that, under certain conditions,
a quadratic loss function in inflation and the output gap is the correct approximation to the
representative agent’s utility function.
The first-order conditions of the policy problem under timeless perspective precommitment
monetary policy as well as under discretion are well known and need not to be derived here
(see, for example, Walsh (2003b)). Under the optimal timeless perspective precommitment
policy, inflation satisfies the targeting rule
pit = −
α2
α1κ
(xt − xt−1) (2.6)
while the output gap is described by the second-order difference equation(
1 + β +
α1κ
2
α2
)
xt − xt−1 − βEtxt+1 = −
α1κ
α2
kt (2.7)
where the expectational operator can be omitted in the case of anticipated shocks.
To solve the difference equation for xt, write equation (2.7) as(
xt+1
wt+1
)
= C
(
xt
wt
)
+
(α1κ
α2β
0
)
kt (2.8)
where wt = xt−1 and
C =
(
1
β
(
1 + β + α1κ
2
α2
)
− 1β
1 0
)
(2.9)
The auxiliary variable wt is backward-looking (with the initial value w0 = 0, while the
output gap xt is forward-looking. The system matrix C has two real eigenvalues r1 and r2
with r1 > 1 > r2 > 0 so that the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) saddlepath stability condition
is satisfied.
The solution for the output gap over the anticipation phase is given by
xt = −
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
α1κ
α2β
r−T1 (r
t+1
1 − r
t+1
2 ) for t < T (2.10)
with the initial values
x0 = −
1
r1 − ϕ
α1κ
α2β
r−T1 , x−1 = 0 (2.11)
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while the solution for t ≥ T is defined by
xt =
α1κ
α2β
1
(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
[
ϕt+1−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r
−T
2 − (r2 − ϕ)r
−T
1
r1 − r2
rt+12
]
for t ≥ T (2.12)
In the limiting case of unanticipated shocks (T = 0), the term in brackets in equation (2.12)
simplifies to ϕt+1−rt+12 . Note that the solution formula (2.10) also holds in the shock period
t = T .
Using (2.6), the solution time path of the inflation rate follows
pit =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
r−T1
[
(r1 − 1)r
t
1 − (r2 − 1)r
t
2
]
for t ≤ T (2.13)
with the initial value
pi0 =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
r−T1 (2.14)
and
pit =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r2 − ϕ
[
(1− ϕ)ϕt−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r
−T
2 − (r2 − ϕ)r
−T
1
r1 − r2
(1− r2)r
t
2
]
for t ≥ T
(2.15)
In the limiting case T = 0, the term in brackets simplifies to (1− ϕ)ϕt − (1− r2)r
t
2.
To determine the welfare loss under the optimal precommitment policy, write the loss func-
tion V as V1 + V2, where
V1 = E0
T−1∑
t=0
βt
(
α1pi
2
t + α2x
2
t
)
(2.16)
is the loss in the anticipation period and
V2 = E0
∞∑
t=T
βt
(
α1pi
2
t + α2x
2
t
)
(2.17)
is the loss caused by the realization of the shock.
By inserting the solution for xt and pit, the loss V1 can be rewritten as
V1 = α1λ
2r−2T1
(
rT1 − r
T
2
)(r1 − 1
rT2
+
1− r2
rT1
)
(2.18)
where
λ =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
(2.19)
Accordingly, the loss V2 can be rewritten as
V2 =
α1β
T
β2(r1 − ϕ)2
{(
rT2 − r
T
1
)2
(1− r2)
(r1 − r2)2r2T1
+
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
}
(2.20)
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The total loss V is then simply given by V = V1 + V2.
Under the policy regime discretion (D), the central bank is unable to make a commitment
to future policies. Now private expectations are given for the central bank and the reduced
form of the first-order conditions reads as
pit = −
α2
α1κ
xt (2.21)
Etxt+1 =
1
β
[
1 +
α1κ
2
α2
]
xt +
α1κ
α2β
kt (2.22)
with Etxt+1 = xt+1 in the case of anticipated shocks. The difference equation in xt has the
unstable eigenvalue
rD =
1
β
[
1 +
α1κ
2
α2
]
=
1
α2β
[
α2 + α1κ
2
]
> 1 (2.23)
and the forward solution
xt = −
∞∑
s=0
r−sD
1
rD
α1κ
α2β
kt+s (2.24)
Since
kt+s =
{
ϕt+s−T for t+ s ≥ T
0 for t+ s < T
(2.25)
we obtain for t ≥ T
xt = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T (2.26)
and for t < T
xt = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
rt−TD (2.27)
Due to rt−TD = 1 for t = T , the solution formula (2.27) also holds in the shock period t = T .
For t = 0 we obtain
x0 = −
α1κ
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
r−TD (2.28)
so that the size of the initial jump of xt decreases with increasing T .
For the inflation rate pit we obtain the solution time path
pit =

α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
rt−TD if 0 ≤ t ≤ T
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
ϕt−T if t ≥ T
(2.29)
Note that the limiting case ϕ = 0 implies pit = xt = 0 for t > T .
It is well-known that the loss under discretion (VD) is greater than the total loss under the
optimal precommitment policy. By inserting the solution time paths for pit and xt in the
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loss function, we obtain
VD = V
D
1 + V
D
2 =
T−1∑
t=0
βt
[
α22
α1κ2
+ α2
]
x2t +
∞∑
t=T
βt
[
α22
α1κ2
+ α2
]
x2t (2.30)
=
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
(
r−2TD − β
T
1− βr2D
+
βT
1− βϕ2
)
=
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
1
1− βr2D
(
r−2TD −
β(r2D − ϕ
2)
1− βϕ2
βT
)
where
1
1− βr2D
=
α22β
α22β − (α2 + α1κ
2)2
< 0 (2.31)
2.3 Main Results
In this section, we compare the welfare loss induced by anticipated shocks (T > 0) to the
corresponding loss if the same deterministic shock is not anticipated in advance (T = 0). In
particular, we investigate the properties of the welfare loss V considered as function of the
lead time T .
Since the size of the initial jumps of the forward-looking variables xt and pit are negatively
correlated with the lead time T , we can conjecture that the loss function V = V (T ) is a
decreasing function in T . In the following, we will demonstrate that this conjecture is false
in general. It is only true, if the degree of price flexibility is very high.
Our main results can be summarized in the form of four propositions.
Proposition 1. Without discounting (i.e. β = 1) the welfare loss induced by an anticipated
cost-push shock is greater than the corresponding loss in the case of an unanticipated shock.
This result is independent of the length of the lead time T and the degree of price rigidity ω:
If β = 1, then V (0) < V (T ) for all T > 0 (2.32)
and all ω > 0 .
A similar result holds with discounting (β < 1) provided the degree of price rigidity ω is
sufficiently high and the time span between anticipation and realization of the shock is not
too large.
Proposition 2. If β is less than unity and the degree of price flexibility 1 − ω low, there
exists a positive upper bound T ∗c for the lead time T , positively depending on ω, such that
V (0) < V (T ) for all 0 < T < T ∗c . (2.33)
Proposition 3. If the degree of price flexibility is very high (i.e. ω very small) then T ∗c = 0
so that
V (T ) < V (0) for all T > 0 . (2.34)
Only in this case (which seems empirically not very realistic), the welfare loss under antici-
pated cost-push shocks is always smaller than under unanticipated shocks.
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Proposition 4. The propositions 1, 2, and 3 hold under the optimal monetary policy regimes
timeless perspective commitment and discretion. They also hold under (optimal) simple rules
of Taylor-type.
Sketch of Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Consider the partial loss function V1 (given
by (2.18)) as function of T (the time span between the anticipation and realization of the
cost-push shock).
The function V1 = V1(T ) has the following properties:
V1(0) = 0, lim
T→∞
V1(T ) =
{
0 for β < 1
V 1 > 0 for β = 1
(2.35)
where
V 1 =
α1(r1 − 1)
(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
(2.36)
The derivative of V1 with respect to T , i. e.
dV1
dT
= α1λ
2
{
2 ln r1 · r
−2T
1 [r1 + r2 − 2]− (r1 − 1) ln(r1r2) · (r1r2)
−T (2.37)
− (1− r2) ln
(
r2
r31
)
·
(
r2
r31
)T }
is positive at time T = 0:
dV1
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
= α1
1
β2
1
(r1 − ϕ)2
1
r1 − r2
[ln r1 − ln r2] > 0 (2.38)
Therefore, V1(T ) starts to rise with increasing T (although the size of the initial jumps of
xt and pit is decreasing in T ). For β < 1, the limit value limT→∞ V1(T ) is equal to zero.
Therefore, V1(T ) must decrease if T is sufficiently large.
The loss function V2 = V2(T ) (given by (2.20)) has the following properties:
V2(0) =
α1
β2(r1 − ϕ)2
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
> 0 (2.39)
lim
T→∞
V2(T ) =
0 if β < 1V 2 > V2(0)∣∣∣
β = 1
=
α1r1
(r1 − ϕ)2(1− ϕ2)
if β = 1
(2.40)
where
V 2 =
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2
{
1− r2
(r1 − r2)2
+
r1
1− ϕ2
}
(2.41)
The first derivative of V2 with respect to T
dV2
dT
=
α1
β2(r1 − ϕ)2
βT
{
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
lnβ (2.42)
+
1− r2
(r1 − r2)2
[
(ln r2 − 3 ln r1)
(
r2
r1
)2T
+ 4 ln r1
(
r2
r1
)T
+ lnβ
]}
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implies for β < 1 and T = 0
dV2
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
=
α1
β2(r1 − ϕ)2
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
lnβ < 0 (2.43)
since β = 1/(r1r2). For β < 1, the derivative dV2/dT is also negative if T is sufficiently
large. In the limiting case β = 1, the loss function V2(T ) is an increasing function in T with
a limit value V 2 > V2(0).
We can now investigate the development of the total loss V = V1 + V2.
In the limiting case β = 1, the total loss V (T ) is an overall increasing function in T with
V (0) = V2(0) > 0 and
lim
T→∞
V (T ) =
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2
{
1
r1 − r2
+
r1
1− ϕ2
}
> V2(0)
∣∣∣
β=1
> 0 (2.44)
If β = 1, we can write V (T ) as V1(T ) + V2(T ), where
V1(T ) =
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
[
(r1 − 1) + (2− r1 − r2)r
−2T
1 − (1− r2)
(
r2
r31
)T]
(2.45)
V2(T ) =
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2
 1− r2(r1 − r2)2
[
1−
(
r2
r1
)T]2
+
r1
1− ϕ2
 (2.46)
Then
dV1
dT
=
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2(r1 − r2)2
{
2[r1 + r2 − 2] ln r1 (2.47)
+[3 ln r1 − ln r2](1− r2)
(
r2
r1
)T}
r−2T1 > 0 for all T ≥ 0
(due to r1 + r2 = tr C > 2 and ln r2 < 0) and
dV2
dT
=
α1
(r1 − ϕ)2
1− r2
(r1 − r2)2
{
−2
(
1−
(
r2
r1
)T)
ln
(
r2
r1
)}(
r2
r1
)T
(2.48)
>
(=)
0 if T >
(=)
0
(because 0 < r2 < 1 < r1). Therefore, dV/dT > 0 for all T ≥ 0 so that V is a monotonically
increasing function in T . This result holds independently of the degree of price rigidity ω.
For β < 1, V (0) = V2(0) > 0 (with V2(0) defined in (2.39)) and limT→∞ V (T ) = 0. For small
values of ω, i.e. a high degree of price flexibility, the total loss V is a decreasing function in
T implying V (T ) < V (0) for all T > 0. With high price flexibility, the welfare loss under
anticipated shocks is smaller than under unanticipated shocks.
For the derivative dV/dT at time T = 0 we obtain
dV
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
=
α1
β2(r1 − ϕ)2
{[
1
r1 − r2
−
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
]
ln r1 −
[
1
r1 − r2
+
r1
r1r2 − ϕ2
]
ln r2
}
(2.49)
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Then
dV
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
> 0 ⇔ 2
(
1
β
− ϕ2
)
ln r1 +
(
r21 − ϕ
2
)
lnβ > 0 (2.50)
A rising ω induces a fall in the unstable eigenvalue r1 since dκ/dω < 0. Since the fall in
r21 is stronger than the decrease in ln r1, and 1/β − ϕ
2 > 0, inequality (2.50) is fulfilled if
the degree of price rigidity ω is sufficiently large. In this case, V (T ) starts to rise and due
to limT→∞ V (T ) = 0 its development must be hump-shaped implying the existence of an
upper bound T ∗c > 0 such that V (T ) > V (0) > 0 for all T < T
∗
c .
The value of the upper bound T ∗c is the positive solution of the equation V (T ) = V (0),
where V (0) = V2(0) is given by (2.39). This leads to the equation
1−
(
r2
r1
)T
=
[
(r1r2)
T − 1
] r1(r1 − r2)
r1r2 − ϕ2
(2.51)
Equation (2.51) can be written as
βT r2T1
[
βr21
(
1−
1
βT
)
+
1
βT
− βϕ2
]
= 1− βϕ2 ⇔ (2.52)
r2T1
[
βT+1
(
r21 − ϕ
2
)
+
(
1− βr21
)]
= 1− βϕ2 (2.53)
so that T ∗c is also the positive solution of (2.52) and (2.53). The value of T
∗
c is dependent on
ω and β. A rising ω (a higher degree of price rigidity) decreases the unstable eigenvalue r1
so that the left-hand side of equation (2.52) is decreased while the right-hand side remains
unchanged. Since βT r2T1 = (r1/r2)
T is increasing in T , equation (2.52) implies that the
solution value T ∗c must increase if ω rises. Conversely, a higher degree of price flexibility
induces a fall in T ∗c . For sufficiently small values of ω, the only solution of (2.53) is T
∗
c = 0
(so that V (T ) < V (0) for all T > 0). If a positive solution T ∗c of (2.53) exists, then it is also
an increasing function in the discount factor β with T ∗c =∞ if β = 1.
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 4. Consider VD (given by (2.30)) as function in T .
Then
VD(0) =
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
1
1− βϕ2
> 0 (2.54)
and
lim
T→∞
VD(T ) =
{
0 if β < 1
α1α2[α2+α1κ
2]
[α2(1−βϕ)+α1κ2]2
(
1
r2
D
−1
+ 11−ϕ2
)
> VD(0) > 0 if β = 1
(2.55)
The partial loss function
V D2 (T ) =
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
βT
1− βϕ2
(2.56)
has the properties
V D2 (0) = VD(0) (2.57)
lim
T→∞
V D2 (T ) = 0 if β < 1 (2.58)
2.3 Main Results 17
dV D2
dT
= (lnβ)V D2 (T ) < 0 if β < 1 for all 0 ≤ T <∞ (2.59)
For β = 1, the function V D2 (T ) is constant (independent of T ).
The partial loss function V D1 (T ) given by
V D1 (T ) =
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
r−2TD − β
T
1− βr2D
(2.60)
has similar properties as the corresponding function V1(T ) under the policy regime timeless
perspective commitment:
V D1 (0) = 0 (2.61)
lim
T→∞
V D1 (T ) =
0 if β < 1α1α2[α2 + α1κ2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
1
r2D − 1
> 0 if β = 1
(2.62)
The first derivative with respect to T
dV D1 (T )
dT
=
α1α2[α2 + α1κ
2]
[α2(1− βϕ) + α1κ2]2
1
1− βr2D
[
−2(ln rD)r
−2T
D − (lnβ)β
T
]
(2.63)
is positive at time T = 0, since 1− βr2D < 0 and −2 ln rD − lnβ < 0 due to rD > 1 ≥ β.
In the case β < 1, the development of V D1 (T ) is hump-shaped with the maximum value at
time T ∗d which is the solution of the equation
2(ln rD)r
−2T
D + (lnβ)β
T = 0 (2.64)
Equation (2.64) is equivalent to
−
2 ln rD
lnβ
= (βr2D)
T (2.65)
with the solution
T ∗d =
ln
[
−
2 ln rD
lnβ
]
ln(βr2D)
> 0 (2.66)
The total loss function VD(T ) = V
D
1 (T ) + V
D
2 (T ) has a similar development as the corre-
sponding function V (T ) under timeless perspective commitment. In the limiting case β = 1,
it is overall increasing. For β < 1, it is hump-shaped, if the degree of price flexibility is not
too large, while it is monotonically decreasing in T if the value of ω is small. For small values
of ω, the derivative of VD at time T = 0 is negative, while it is positive if ω is sufficiently
large. For the sake of brevity, the proof for the case of simple (optimal) Taylor rules is
presented in Appendix A.
The propositions 1 to 3 follow from two opposing effects on the welfare loss which change
in opposite directions with increasing lead time T . On the one hand, the size of the initial
jumps of the forward-looking variables xt and pit taking place at the time of anticipation,
is inversely related to the time span between anticipation and realization of the cost-push
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shock. The longer the lead time T , the smaller is the response of output and inflation on
impact so that the contribution of this anticipation effect to the welfare loss V decreases
with increasing T . On the other hand, the persistence effect of the cost-push shock on the
target variables xt and pit is increasing in T . Thereby, persistence is measured as the total
variation of a variable over time, i.e. its intertemporal deviation from the respective initial
steady state. For example, the persistence of the price level pt is given by
∑
∞
t=0 |pt − p0|
where the initial steady state can be normalized to zero. In Appendix A, we derive the
persistence of pt, xt, and pit under the optimal monetary policy regimes commitment and
discretion and show that persistence is smaller in the case of unanticipated shocks than in
the case of anticipated shocks.
For the sake of illustration, we numerically simulated our solutions by using a standard
calibration. The time unit is one quarter. The discount rate is equal to β = 0.99 implying
an annual steady state real interest rate of approximately 4 percent. The inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is set to σ = 2. We set η = 1 implying a quadratic
disutility of labor. The Calvo parameter ω is either set to 0.25 implying an average duration
of price contracts of four months or to 0.75 implying an average duration of price contracts
of one year. The weights in the loss function are set to α1 = 1 and α2 = 0.5 reflecting
the objective of flexible inflation targeting. Finally, we assume the cost-push shock to be
persistent and choose ϕ equal to 0.5.
Figure 2.1 depicts impulse response functions of inflation, output gap, and price level in
the case of low (ω = 0.25, left column) and high (ω = 0.75, right column) price rigidity
under the optimal monetary policy with timeless perspective commitment. Solid lines with
triangles denote responses to a cost-push shock that unexpectedly emerges in period t = 0,
solid lines with circles denote responses to a cost-push shock whose realization in period
T = 2 is anticipated in period t = 0.
We first consider the empirically plausible case of high price rigidity. In the case of an
unanticipated cost-shock, both the price level and inflation rise whereas output falls in
response to the realization of the increase in the costs of production.4 Subsequently, all
variables converge in a hump-shaped fashion to their respective steady state values.
Anticipated cost shocks have two effects, namely the anticipation effect which reflects the
change in xt, pit, and pt in response to the anticipation of a future change in costs, and the
realization effect which occurs when the anticipated change in costs actually takes place.
Under the optimal monetary policy with commitment, output starts to decline and prices
begin to increase in response to the anticipation of a future rise in the costs of production.
Both variables respond in a hump-shaped fashion peaking at the date of realization. The
increase in prices causes inflation to jump at the time of anticipation, peaking at the date
of realization and then returning in a hump-shaped fashion to its initial steady state level.
In the case of low price rigidity, an unanticipated cost shock causes an immediate rise in
prices and an immediate drop in output. Subsequently, both variables converge monoton-
ically to their initial steady state levels. After the initial jump, inflation falls sharply and
converges from below to its pre-shock level. The announcement of a future rise in costs has
negligible anticipation effects when prices are highly flexible. The reason is that the price
setting problem of firms becomes more of an atemporal (static) nature when the Calvo
parameter ω decreases. In this case firms know that, with a high probability, they will be
4We could think about this cost-push shock as an exogenous rise in wage mark-ups (see Chapter 3 or, for
example, Gal´ı (2008)).
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Figure 2.1: Impulse response functions under optimal policy with timeless perspective commitment.
Notes: Solid lines with triangles denote responses to an unanticipated cost-push shock, solid
lines with circles denote responses to an anticipated cost-push shock. In the case of low price
rigidity, the Calvo parameter ω is set to 0.25; in the case of high price rigidity, ω is set to 0.75.
able to raise their price when the anticipated shock actually materializes in period T . Thus,
output and prices change only slightly in response to an announcement or anticipation of
future cost-push shocks.
Regardless of the degree of price rigidity, Figure 2.1 illustrates that the initial jumps of
inflation, output gap and price level are greater in the case of unanticipated (T = 0) than in
the case of anticipated shocks (T = 2). On the other hand, anticipated shocks amplify the
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persistence of pt, xt, and pit compared to unanticipated shocks.
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Figure 2.2: Welfare loss for different lengths of the anticipation period under optimal timeless
perspective commitment policy in the case β = 1.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the welfare loss V = V (T ) in the case β = 1. Without time discounting
in the intertemporal loss function, the persistence effect always dominates the anticipation
effect so that proposition 1 holds. In Figure 2.2, the total loss V = V (T ) is overall increasing
in T if β = 1.
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Figure 2.3: Welfare loss for different lengths of the anticipation period under optimal timeless
perspective commitment policy in the case β = 0.99.
If future deviations of the state variables from their initial steady state levels are discounted,
the contribution of the initial jumps of output and inflation for the determination of the total
loss becomes more important. The same holds for increasing degree of price flexibility 1−ω,
since the persistence of prices, output and inflation is a decreasing function of 1− ω. If the
degree of price flexibility is high, the value of the total loss is almost completely determined
by the size of the initial jumps of xt and pit which in turn is inversely proportional to the lead
time T . With a sufficiently high degree of price flexibility, the total loss under unanticipated
cost-push shocks is greater than the loss under anticipated shocks so that proposition 3
holds. This result is also illustrated in Figure 2.3, where V (T ) is a monotonically decreasing
function in the lead time T if the degree of price rigidity ω is very small.
5This result also holds in the special case ϕ = 0, i.e. if the shock exhibits no serial correlation. It is well-known
that even in this case the optimal precommitment policy introduces inertia in the impulse response functions.
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From an empirical point of view, the parameter ω is not that small so that the development
of the impulse response functions displays inertia or strong serial correlation. Then, if the
time span between the anticipation and the implementation of the cost-push shock is not
too long, the persistence effect dominates and the value of the total loss V (T ) is greater than
V (0). This is illustrated in Figure 2.3, where the development of the loss function V (T ) is
hump-shaped and monotonically increasing for small values of T .
Propositions 1 to 3 are independent of the chosen optimal monetary policy regime. They
hold under timeless perspective commitment as well as under discretion (see Figure 2.4 and
2.5 for a numerical visualization). They also hold under simple monetary policy rules (such
as Taylor-type rules or money growth peg).
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Figure 2.4: Welfare loss for different lengths of the anticipation period under optimal discretionary
policy in the case β = 1.
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Figure 2.5: Welfare loss for different lengths of the anticipation period under optimal discretionary
policy in the case β = 0.99.
In order to check whether the welfare-reducing effects of anticipations hold for empirically
plausible degrees of nominal rigidity, we compute the critical anticipation values T ∗c (com-
mitment) and T ∗d (discretion). Table 1 depicts the values of T
∗
c and T
∗
d for a persistent
(ϕ = 0.5) and a one-off cost-push shock (ϕ = 0).
Table 1 shows that the anticipation of cost-push shocks dampens the welfare loss induced
by such shocks only for empirically unrealistic degrees of nominal rigidity. For the widely
applied values of ω = 0.75 or ω = 0.66, the anticipation period or lead time T must be
extremely large to obtain a welfare gain from anticipation. Under commitment and a value
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ω = 0.75, the loss under an anticipated shock is smaller than the loss under an unanticipated
shock of same size when the shock is anticipated to take place in T ∗c = 54 (for ϕ = 0.5) or
T ∗c = 66 (for ϕ = 0) quarters. Even larger values are obtained under optimal discretionary
policy. A Calvo parameter of 0.5 represents the lower bound in the range of values that are
reported in the literature. In this case and under the monetary policy regime commitment,
the anticipation of future cost shocks has a welfare-enhancing effect if the lead time is larger
or equal to two quarters for persistent and three quarters for one-off shocks, respectively.
Under discretionary monetary policy, these critical values are three and four quarters.
Our simulations illustrate that for a wide range of empirically realistic degrees of nominal
rigidities (i.e., ω ≥ 0.5) in conjunction with a plausible length of the anticipation period, the
welfare loss of anticipated cost shocks exceeds the welfare loss of unanticipated cost shocks.
Table 2.1: Values of the critical lead time T ∗c and T
∗
d
Degree of price rigidity ω
Monetary policy 0.75 0.66 0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.25
With ϕ = 0.5
Commitment 53.09 19.82 9.00 4.23 1.82 0.69 0.16 0
Discretion 125.90 40.41 15.61 6.37 2.42 0 0 0
With ϕ = 0
Commitment 65.78 25.57 11.79 5.59 2.41 0.95 0.28 0
Discretion 146.99 50.77 20.25 8.38 3.20 0 0 0
Note: For an anticipation period 0 < T < T ∗i it is true that V |T > V |T=0, for T > T
∗
i it is true that
V |T < V |T=0 where i = c, d.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we investigated the welfare effects resulting from the anticipation of future
shocks. In particular, we analyzed the welfare loss for different lengths of the time span
between the anticipation and the realization of cost-push shocks. This includes the widely
applied case of unanticipated cost-push shocks. Our analysis was based on the canonical
New Keynesian model with optimal monetary policy.
We emphasized the role of nominal rigidities for the welfare effects of anticipations. We have
shown that for empirically plausible degrees of nominal rigidity, anticipated cost shocks entail
higher welfare losses than unexpected cost shocks. The anticipation of a future cost-push
shock dampens the volatility of output and inflation only if prices are highly flexible. These
results hold independently of the monetary policy regime (timeless perspective commitment,
discretion, (optimal) simple rules).
Our results imply that the knowledge about the realization of future cost shocks is in gen-
eral welfare-reducing. The question remains why rational agents do not simply ignore this
information. However, this would be inconsistent with the profit-maximizing behavior of
individual firms and the utility-maximizing behavior of individual households on which our
model is based. The firm’s optimality condition in fact calls for an increase in prices in
response to the anticipation of a future rise in costs. By simply ignoring this information,
the firm would make a loss.
Hence, our results reveal a contradiction between the optimal behavior of individuals and
the optimum from a social point of view.
3 Anticipated Shocks and Optimal
Policy: A General Solution Method
and a New Keynesian Example
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we investigated whether the anticipation of future cost-push shocks has a
stabilizing effect on the economy and thus reduces the welfare loss compared to unanticipated
shocks. In order to provide analytical results which do not rely on calibrations, we considered
the baseline New Keynesian model with purely forward-looking IS and Phillips curves. This
has enabled us to derive an analytical solution of welfare as a function of the time span
between the anticipation and the realization of the shock. We found that – for empirically
plausible degrees of nominal rigidity – the anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads to
a higher welfare loss than an analogous unanticipated shock.
In order to conduct an analysis of the (welfare) effects of anticipated shocks in more elab-
orate models, this chapter1 presents a general solution method for linear dynamic rational
expectations models with anticipated shocks and optimal policy. Our method extends the
work of So¨derlind (1999) who uses the generalized Schur decomposition method, advocated
by Klein (2000), to solve linear rational expectations models with optimal policy. However,
So¨derlind (1999) only considers stochastic models with white noise shocks which are, by def-
inition, unpredictable. In the case of anticipated shocks, the occurrence of all future shocks
is known exactly at the time when the solution of the model is computed. Our method also
contains unanticipated shocks as a limiting case.
As an economic example, we lay out a calibrated New Keynesian model for a closed and
cashless economy with internal habit formation in consumption preferences, a variant of
Calvo price staggering with partial indexation to past inflation, and a time-varying wage
mark-up which represents a typical cost-push shock. We compare the effects of mark-up
shocks under optimal monetary policy for different lengths of the anticipation period. Our
results confirm the finding reported in Chapter 2, that anticipated cost-push shocks entail
higher welfare losses than unexpected cost shocks.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses optimal policies in RE models with
anticipated temporary shocks. We first determine the optimal unrestricted policy under
precommitment and calculate the minimum value of the intertemporal loss function. We
then consider (optimal) simple rules and demonstrate how the Schur decomposition can be
used to solve the model under these conditions. Section 3 derives the hybrid New Keynesian
model, presents the welfare-theoretic loss function and discusses the effects of anticipated and
unanticipated cost-push shocks. Finally, Section 4 provides concluding remarks. In Appendix
B, we present a short discussion of the well known stochastic case with white noise shocks.
1For a different version of this chapter see Wohltmann and Winkler (2009).
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3.2 The Model
In this chapter we discuss the following linear expectational difference equations
A
(
wt+1
Et vt+1
)
= B
(
wt
vt
)
+ Cut +Dνt+1 (3.1)
where wt is an n1 × 1 vector of predetermined variables, assuming w0 given, vt an n2 × 1
vector of non-predetermined variables, ut an m × 1 vector of policy instruments, and νt+1
an r× 1 vector of exogenous shocks. The matrices A and B are n× n (where n = n1 + n2),
while the matrices C and D are n×m and n× r respectively. We allow matrix A to be sin-
gular which is the case if static (intratemporal) equations are included among the dynamic
relationships. The vector w, composed of backward-looking variables can include exogenous
variables following autoregressive processes. Et vt+1 denotes model consistent (rational) ex-
pectations of vt+1 formed at time t. We assume that the shocks are anticipated by the public
in advance and take the following form
νt =
{
ν for t = τ > 0
0 for t 6= τ
(3.2)
where ν = (ν1, . . . , νr)
′ is a constant non-zero r× 1 vector. It is assumed that at time t = 0
the public anticipates a shock of the form outlined in (3.2) to take place at some future date
τ > 0. Note that τ also defines the lengths of the anticipation period. Since the shocks are
anticipated by the public we have Et νt+1 = νt+1. For notational convenience, we define the
n× 1 vector kt = (w
′
t, v
′
t)
′ and the n3 × 1 target vector st = A˜kt + B˜ut, where the matrices
A˜ and B˜ are n3 × n and n3 ×m respectively. Assume that the policy maker´s welfare loss
at time t is given by
Jt =
1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
λi{s′t+iW1st+i + u
′
t+iW2ut+i} (3.3)
where W1 and W2 are symmetric and non-negative definite matrices and λ is a discount
factor with 0 < λ ≤ 1. We can rewrite Jt as
Jt =
1
2
Et
∞∑
i=0
λi{k′t+iW˜kt+i + 2k
′
t+iPut+i + u
′
t+iRut+i} (3.4)
where W˜ = A˜′W1A˜ and R = W2 + B˜
′W1B˜ are symmetric and non-negative definite and
P = A˜′W1B˜.
3.2.1 Optimal Policy with Precommitment
In the following, the policy maker´s optimal policy rule at time t = 0 is developed. It is
assumed that the policy maker is able to commit to such a rule. From the Lagrangian
L0 =
1
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
λt{k′tW˜kt + 2k
′
tPut + u
′
tRut + 2ρ
′
t+1[Bkt + Cut +Dνt+1 −Akt+1]} (3.5)
with the n×1 multiplier ρt+1, we get the first-order conditions with respect to ρt+1, kt, and
ut:  A 0n×m 0n×n0n×n 0n×m λB′
0m×n 0m×m −C
′
kt+1ut+1
ρt+1
 =
 B C 0n×n−λW˜ −λP A′
P ′ R 0m×n
ktut
ρt
+
 D0n×r
0m×r
 νt+1 (3.6)
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To solve the system of equations (3.6), expand the state and costate vector kt and ρt as
(w′t, v
′
t)
′ and (p′wt, p
′
vt)
′ respectively and re-order the rows of the (2n+m)×1 vector (k′t, u
′
t, ρ
′
t)
′
by placing the predetermined vector pvt after wt. Since vt is forward-looking with arbitrarily
chosen initial value v0, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier pvt is predetermined with
initial value pv0 = 0. Re-order the columns of the (2n + m) × (2n + m) matrices in (3.6)
according to the re-ordering of (k′t, u
′
t, ρt)
′ and write the result as
F
(
w˜t+1
v˜t+1
)
= G
(
w˜t
v˜t
)
+
 D0n×r
0m×r
 νt+1 (3.7)
where w˜t = (w
′
t, p
′
vt)
′ and v˜t = (v
′
t, u
′
t, p
′
wt)
′. The n × 1 vector w˜t contains the ’backward-
looking’ variables of (3.6) while the (n + m) × 1 vector v˜t contains the ’forward-looking’
variables.
Equation (3.6) implies that the (2n+m)× (2n+m) matrix F is singular. To solve equation
(3.7) we apply the generalized Schur decomposition method (So¨derlind, 1999; Klein, 2000).
The decomposition of the square matrices F and G is given by
F = Q
′
SZ
′
, G = Q
′
TZ
′
(3.8)
or equivalently
QFZ = S, QGZ = T (3.9)
where Q,Z, S, and T are square matrices of complex numbers, S and T are upper triangular
and Q and Z are unitary, i.e.
Q ·Q
′
= Q
′
·Q = I(2n+m)×(2n+m) = Z · Z
′
= Z
′
· Z (3.10)
where the non-singular matrix Q
′
is the transpose of Q, which denotes the complex conjugate
of Q. Z
′
is the transpose of the complex conjugate of Z. The matrices S and T can be
arranged in such a way that the block with the stable generalized eigenvalues (the ith
diagonal element of T divided by the ith diagonal element of S) comes first. Premultiply
both sides of equation (3.7) with Q and define auxiliary variables z˜t and x˜t so that(
z˜t
x˜t
)
= Z
′
(
w˜t
v˜t
)
(3.11)
Partitioning the triangular matrices S and T in order to conform with z˜ and x˜ and set
Q
 D0n×r
0m×r
 = (Q1
Q2
)
(3.12)
where Q1 is n× r and Q2 is (n+m)× r. We then obtain the equivalent system(
S11 S12
0(n+m)×n S22
)(
z˜t+1
x˜t+1
)
=
(
T11 T12
0(n+m)×n T22
)(
z˜t
x˜t
)
+
(
Q1
Q2
)
νt+1 (3.13)
where the n× n matrix S11 and the (n+m)× (n+m) matrix T22 are invertible while S22
is singular. The square matrix T11 may also be singular. The lower block of equation (3.13)
contains the unstable generalized eigenvalues and must be solved forward. Since
x˜t+s =M2x˜t+s+1 − T
−1
22 Q2νt+s+1 (s = 0, 1, 2, . . .) (3.14)
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where M2 = T
−1
22 S22, the unique stable solution for x˜t is given by
x˜t = −
∞∑
s=0
Ms2T
−1
22 Q2 Et νt+s+1 =
{
−Mτ−1−t2 T
−1
22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ t < τ
0 for t ≥ τ
(3.15)
The upper block of (3.13) contains the stable generalized eigenvalues and can be solved
backward. Since
z˜t+1 =M1z˜t + S
−1
11 (T12x˜t − S12x˜t+1) + S
−1
11 Q1νt+1 (3.16)
where M1 = S
−1
11 T11 (which in general is not invertible), the general solution is given by
z˜t =M
t
1K +
t−1∑
s=0
M t−s−11 S
−1
11 (T12x˜s − S12x˜s+1 +Q1νs+1) (3.17)
=

M t1K +
∑t−1
s=0M
t−s−1
1 S
−1
11 (T12x˜s − S12x˜s+1) for 0 ≤ t < τ
M t1K +
∑τ−1
s=0 M
t−s−1
1 S
−1
11 (T12x˜s − S12x˜s+1) +M
t−τ
1 S
−1
11 Q1ν for t ≥ τ
where x˜s is defined in (3.15).
The solution for t ≥ τ can be rewritten as
z˜t =M
t−τ
1 K˜ for t ≥ τ (3.18)
where
K˜ =Mτ1K + S
−1
11 Q1ν +
τ−1∑
s=0
Mτ−s−11 S
−1
11 (T12x˜s − S12x˜s+1) (3.19)
Since
x˜s =
{
−Mτ−1−s2 T
−1
22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ s < τ
0 for s ≥ τ
(3.20)
we can write K˜ as
K˜ =Mτ1K + S
−1
11 Q1ν + [−W˜1 +M1W˜2]T
−1
22 Q2ν (3.21)
where
W˜1 =
τ−1∑
s=0
Mτ−s−11 S
−1
11 T12M
τ−s−1
2 =
τ−1∑
k=0
Mk1 S
−1
11 T12M
k
2 (3.22)
and
W˜2 =
τ−2∑
s=0
Mτ−s−21 S
−1
11 S12M
τ−s−2
2 =
τ−2∑
k=0
Mk1 S
−1
11 S12M
k
2 (3.23)
W˜1 as well as W˜2 is a finite geometric sum of matrices and can be written as
W˜1 = S
−1
11 T12 −M
τ
1 S
−1
11 T12M
τ
2 +M1W˜1M2 (3.24)
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and
W˜2 = S
−1
11 S12 −M
τ−1
1 S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1
2 +M1W˜2M2 (3.25)
To solve for W˜1 and W˜2 respectively, we use the matrix identities (Rudebusch and Svensson
1999; Klein, 2000) vec (A+B) = vec (A) + vec (B) and vec (ABC) = [C ′⊗A] vec (B) where
vec (A) denotes the vector of stacked column vectors of the matrix A and ⊗ denotes the
Kronecker product of matrices.
We then obtain from (3.24) and (3.25)
vec W˜1 − [M
′
2 ⊗M1] vec W˜1 = vec [S
−1
11 T12 −M
τ
1 S
−1
11 T12M
τ
2 ] (3.26)
and
vec W˜2 − [M
′
2 ⊗M1] vec W˜2 = vec [S
−1
11 S12 −M
τ
1 S
−1
11 S12M
τ
2 ] (3.27)
with the solution
vec W˜1 = [I −M
′
2 ⊗M1]
−1 · vec [S−111 T12 −M
τ
1 S
−1
11 T12M
τ
2 ] (3.28)
vec W˜2 = [I −M
′
2 ⊗M1]
−1 · vec [S−111 S12 −M
τ−1
1 S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1
2 ] (3.29)
According to (3.17) and (3.20), the solution of z˜t for the anticipation period 0 < t < τ can
be rewritten as
z˜t =M
t
1K + [−W
∗
1t +W
∗
2t]T
−1
22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ t < τ (3.30)
with
W ∗1t =
t−1∑
s=0
M t−s−11 S
−1
11 T12M
τ−s−1
2 =
t−1∑
k=0
Mk1 S
−1
11 T12M
τ−t+k
2 (3.31)
and
W ∗2t =
t∑
s=1
M t−s1 S
−1
11 S12M
τ−s−1
2 =
t−1∑
k=0
Mk1 S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1−t+k
2 (3.32)
W ∗1t satisfies the matrix equation
2
W ∗1t = S
−1
11 T12M
τ−t
2 −M
t
1S
−1
11 T12M
τ
2 +M1W
∗
1tM2 (0 ≤ t < τ) (3.33)
with the solution
vec W ∗1t = [I −M
′
2 ⊗M1]
−1 · vec (S−111 T12M
τ−t
2 −M
t
1S
−1
11 T12M
τ
2 ) (3.34)
The matrix W ∗2t satisfies the equation
3
W ∗2t = S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1−t
2 −M
t
1S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1
2 +M1W
∗
2tM2 (0 ≤ t < τ) (3.35)
2Note that equation (3.33) is also well-defined for t = τ . In this case it is equivalent to (3.24) implying
W ∗1τ = W˜1.
3For t = τ − 1 equation (3.35) is equivalent to (3.25) so that W ∗2τ−1 = W˜2. Then, according to (3.21),
K˜ = z˜τ =Mτ1 K + S
−1
11 Q1ν + [−W
∗
1τ +M1W
∗
2τ−1]T
−1
22 Q2ν.
The definition of W ∗1t implies that W
∗
1t also satisfies the dynamic equation
W ∗1t+1 = S
−1
11 T12M
τ−(t+1)
2 +M1W
∗
1t (0 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1)
with the initial value W ∗1 0 = 0. Analogical, W
∗
2t satisfies the matrix difference equation
W ∗2t+1 = S
−1
11 S12M
τ−t−2
2 +M1W
∗
2t (W
∗
2 0 = 0)
which only holds for 0 ≤ t < τ − 1 since M
τ−(τ−1)−2
2 =M
−1
2 generally does not exist.
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with the solution
vec W ∗2t = [I −M
′
2 ⊗M1]
−1 · vec (S−111 S12M
τ−1−t
2 −M
t
1S
−1
11 S12M
τ−1
2 ) (3.36)
The constant K can be determined using the initial value of the predetermined vector w˜.
By premultiplying equation (3.11) with Z and by partitioning the matrix Z to conform with
the dimension of z˜ and x˜, we obtain(
w˜t
v˜t
)
=
(
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
)(
z˜t
x˜t
)
(3.37)
and therefore
w˜0 = Z11z˜0 + Z12x˜0 (3.38)
with w˜0 = (w
′
0, 0
′
n2×1)
′, z˜0 = K, and
x˜0 = −M
τ−1
2 T
−1
22 Q2ν (3.39)
where it is assumed that τ > 0.4 Equation (3.38) implies
K = Z−111 w˜0 − Z
−1
11 Z12x˜0 (3.40)
provided the inverse Z−111 exists. A necessary condition is that the dynamic system (3.7) has
the saddle path property, i.e., that the number of backward-looking variables (n1 + n2 = n)
coincides with the number of stable generalized eigenvalues (So¨derlind, 1999; Klein, 2000].
In the case τ > 0 we can assume w0 = 0 so that according to (3.39) the constant K can be
written as
K = Z−111 Z12M
τ−1
2 T
−1
22 Q2ν (3.41)
The solution to the state vector (z˜t, x˜t)
′ for 0 ≤ t < τ now reads as follows(
z˜t
x˜t
)
= ΞtT
−1
22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ t < τ (3.42)
where
Ξt =
(
φ∗t
−Mτ−1−t2
)
(0 ≤ t < τ) (3.43)
and5
φ∗t =M
t
1Z
−1
11 Z12M
τ−1
2 −W
∗
1t +W
∗
2t (3.44)
4In the special case τ = 0 (unanticipated shocks) we have x˜0 = 0 and z˜t = (S
−1
11 T11)
tK +(S−111 T11)
tS−111 Q1ν
implying z˜0 = K + S
−1
11 Q1ν and K = Z
−1
11 w˜0 − S
−1
11 Q1ν with w0 6= 0. By contrast, the initial value w0 can
be normalized to zero if τ > 0.
5φ∗t satisfies the dynamic equation
φ∗t+1 =M1φ
∗
t + S
−1
11 [−T12M2 + S12]M
τ−t−2
2
where the time index t must be restricted to 0 ≤ t < τ − 1.
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If Z11 is invertible, equation (3.37) implies
v˜t = Z21z˜t + Z22x˜t = Z21(Z
−1
11 w˜t − Z
−1
11 Z12x˜t) + Z22x˜t = Nw˜t + Zˆx˜t (3.45)
where N = Z21Z
−1
11 and Zˆ = Z22 − Z21Z
−1
11 Z12. Write equation (3.45) as vtut
pw t
 =
N11 N12N21 N22
N31 N32
(wt
pv t
)
+
Zˆ1Zˆ2
Zˆ3
 x˜t (3.46)
and assume the n2×n2 matrix N12 is invertible. The optimal policy rule under commitment
can then be written as
ut = N21wt +N22pv t + Zˆ2x˜t
= N21wt +N22N
−1
12 (vt −N11wt − Zˆ1x˜t) + Zˆ2x˜t
= N22N
−1
12 vt + (N21 −N22N
−1
12 N11)wt + (Zˆ2 −N22N
−1
12 Zˆ1)x˜t (3.47)
where x˜t is given by (3.15). For t < τ , ut depends on the auxiliary variable x˜t, while for
t ≥ τ , ut is only a linear function of the predetermined state variables wt and pvt, where pvt
can be substituted with the original state variables vt and wt.
Minimum Value of the Loss Function. To determine the minimum value of the loss
function Jt at time t = 0, we express Jt as function of w˜ and v˜. The loss function (3.4) can
be written as
Jt =
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi(k′t+i, u
′
t+i)H
(
kt+i
ut+i
)
=
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi(w′t+i, v
′
t+i, u
′
t+i)H
wt+ivt+i
ut+i
 (3.48)
where the (n+m)× (n+m) matrix H is given by
H =
(
W˜ P
P ′ R
)
(3.49)
with H = H ′. Define the n1 × n matrix D˜1 and the (n2 + m) × (n + m) matrix D˜2 by
D˜1 = (In1×n1 , 0n1×n2) and D˜2 = (I(n2+m)×(n2+m), 0(n2+m)×n1), respectively. Then w =
D˜1(w
′, p′v)
′ = D˜1w˜
′, (v′, u′)′ = D˜2(v
′, u′, p′w)
′ = D˜2v˜
′, (w′, v′, u′)′ = D˜(w˜′, v˜′)′ with
D˜ =
(
D˜1 0n1×(n+m)
0(n2+m)×n D˜2
)
=
(
In1×n1 0n1×n2 0n1×(n2+m) 0n1×n1
0(n2+m)×n1 0(n+m)×n2 I(n2+m)×(n2+m) 0(n2+m)×n1
)
(3.50)
which is a (n+m)× (2n+m) matrix. The loss function Jt can now be rewritten as
Jt =
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi(w˜′t+i, v˜
′
t+i)D˜
′HD˜
(
w˜t+i
v˜t+i
)
= J
(1)
t + J
(2)
t (3.51)
where
J
(1)
t =
1
2
τ−1∑
i=0
λi(w˜′t+i, v˜
′
t+i)D˜
′HD˜
(
w˜t+i
v˜t+i
)
(3.52)
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and
J
(2)
t =
1
2
∞∑
i=τ
λi(w˜′t+i, v˜
′
t+i)D˜
′HD˜
(
w˜t+i
v˜t+i
)
(3.53)
First, we calculate J
(2)
t . For t ≥ τ , we have v˜t = Nw˜t and w˜t = Z11z˜t, where N = Z21Z
−1
11 .
We then obtain (w˜′t, v˜
′
t)
′ = N˜w˜t = N˜Z11z˜t, where N˜ = (In×n, N
′)′ is a (2n+m)×n matrix.
J
(2)
t can then be rewritten as
J
(2)
t =
1
2
∞∑
i=τ
λiZ ′11z˜
′
t+iN˜
′D˜′HD˜N˜Z11z˜t+i =
1
2
∞∑
i=τ
λiZ ′11z˜
′
t+iH
∗Z11z˜t+i (3.54)
with H∗ = N˜ ′D˜′HD˜N˜ is a symmetric n× n matrix. Inserting (3.18) in (3.54) we obtain
J
(2)
t =
1
2
(M t1K˜)
′λτ
(
∞∑
i=τ
λi−τ (Z11M
i−τ
1 )
′H∗(Z11M
i−τ
1 )
)
M t1K˜ (3.55)
=
1
2
λτϕ′tV
∗ϕt =
1
2
λτ trace(V ∗ϕtϕ
′
t)
where ϕt =M
t
1K˜ and V
∗ is the convergent geometric sum of matrices
V ∗ =
∞∑
i=τ
λi−τ (Z11M
i−τ
1 )
′H∗(Z11M
i−τ
1 ) (3.56)
which is of dimension n× n and satisfies the matrix equation
V ∗ = Z ′11H
∗Z11 + λM
′
1V
∗M1 (3.57)
with the solution
vec (V ∗) = [I − λM ′1 ⊗M1]
−1 vec (Z ′11H
∗Z11) (3.58)
For t = 0 we obtain from (3.55)
J
(2)
0 =
1
2
λτ trace(V ∗ϕ0ϕ
′
0) =
1
2
λτ trace(V ∗K˜K˜ ′) (3.59)
with K˜ given by (3.21).
The next step is the calculation of the finite sum J
(1)
t as defined in (3.52). Because (w˜
′
t, v˜
′
t)
′ =
Z(z˜′t, x˜
′
t)
′, we can write J
(1)
0 as
J
(1)
0 =
1
2
τ−1∑
i=0
λi(z˜′i, x˜
′
i)Z
′D˜′HD˜Z
(
z˜i
x˜i
)
=
1
2
τ−1∑
t=0
λt(z˜′t, x˜
′
t)H˜
(
z˜t
x˜t
)
(3.60)
where H˜ = Z ′D˜′HD˜Z.
Inserting the solution formulas for z˜t and x˜t in (3.60), we obtain the expression
J
(1)
0 =
1
2
(T−122 Q2ν)
′
[
τ−1∑
t=0
λtΞ′tH˜Ξt
]
(T−122 Q2ν) =
1
2
µ′W ∗µ =
1
2
trace (W ∗µµ′) (3.61)
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where µ = T−122 Q2ν and W
∗ =
∑τ−1
t=0 λ
tΞ′tH˜Ξt.
Ξt satisfies the matrix difference equation
Ξt+1 =
(
φ∗t+1
−M
τ−1−(t+1)
2
)
=
(
M1φ
∗
t
0
)
+
(
S−111 [−T12M2 + S12]
−I
)
M
τ−1−(t+1)
2 (3.62)
=
(
M1φ
∗
t
−Mτ−1−t2
)
+
(
S−111 [−T12M2 + S12]
M2 − I
)
M
τ−1−(t+1)
2
= M˜Ξt +ΩM
τ−t−2
2 (0 ≤ t < τ − 1)
with
M˜ =
(
M1 0
0 I
)
, Ω =
(
S−111 [−T12M2 + S12]
M2 − I
)
(3.63)
and the initial value
Ξ0 =
(
φ∗0
−Mτ−12
)
=
(
Z−111 Z12
−I
)
Mτ−12 (3.64)
Note that the dynamic equation (3.62) is not defined for t = τ − 1, since M2 = T
−1
22 S22 is
generally not invertible. The solution time path for Ξt (0 ≤ t < τ − 1) can be obtained by
either solving equation (3.62) backward or – if possible – by solving equation (3.62) forward.
Solving (3.62) backward in time yields
Ξt = M˜
tΞ0 +
t−1∑
s=0
M˜ t−s−1ΩMτ−s−22 (3.65)
To obtain the forward solution assume that M1 = S
−1
11 T11 is invertible. Then M˜
−1 exists
and equation (3.62) can be written as
Ξt = M˜
−1Ξt+1 − M˜
−1ΩMτ−t−22 (3.66)
Given
Ξτ−1 =
(
φ∗τ−1
−I
)
(3.67)
we obtain recursively for t = τ − n:
Ξτ−n =
(
M˜−1
)n−1
Ξτ−1 −
(
M˜−1
)n−1
Ω−
(
M˜−1
)n−2
ΩM2
−
(
M˜−1
)n−3
ΩM22 − · · · −
(
M˜−1
)
ΩMn−22
=
(
M˜−1
)n−1
Ξτ−1 −
n−1∑
k=1
(
M˜−1
)n−k
ΩMk−12
With t = τ − n we then get the forward solution
Ξt =
(
M˜−1
)τ−t−1
Ξτ−1 −
τ−t−1∑
k=1
(
M˜−1
)τ−t−k
ΩMk−12 (0 ≤ t < τ − 2) (3.68)
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The total loss under the optimal unrestricted policy under commitment is now given by
J0 = J
(1)
0 + J
(2)
0 =
1
2
trace(W ∗µµ′) +
1
2
λτ trace(V ∗K˜K˜ ′) (3.69)
Obviously, the value of J0 depends on the size of the lead time τ . In New Keynesian models
we often have a hump-shaped pattern for the function J0 = J0(τ) where J0 is increasing in
τ for small values of τ (see Section 3).
In the limiting case of unanticipated shocks (τ = 0), the total loss is given by
J0 = J
(2)
0 =
1
2
K˜ ′V ∗K˜ (3.70)
where
K˜ = K
∣∣∣
τ=0
+ S−111 Q1ν = Z
−1
11 w˜0 − S
−1
11 Q1ν + S
−1
11 Q1ν = Z
−1
11 w˜0 (3.71)
Then
J0 =
1
2
w˜′0Z
−1′
11 V
∗Z−111 w˜0 =
1
2
w˜′0V w˜
′
0 =
1
2
trace(V w˜0w˜
′
0) (3.72)
where
w˜0w˜
′
0 =
(
w0
pv 0
)
(w′0, p
′
v 0) =
(
w0w
′
0 0n1×n2
0n2×n2 0n2×n2
)
(3.73)
and V = Z−1
′
11 V
∗Z−111 satisfies the matrix equation
V = Z−1
′
11 V
∗Z−111 = H
∗ + λZ−1
′
11 M
′
1V
∗M1Z
−1
11
= H∗ + λZ−1
′
11 M
′
1Z
′
11Z
′
−1
11 V
∗Z−111 Z11M1Z
−1
11 = H
∗ + λΓ′V Γ (3.74)
with Γ = Z11M1Z
−1
11 .
3.2.2 (Optimal) Simple Rules
The policy maker could alternatively commit to a suboptimal simple rule of the form
ut = Λkt +ΨEt kt+1 (3.75)
where the constant matrices Λ and Ψ are m × n. Assuming rational expectations and ex-
ogenous shocks of the form (3.2) which are anticipated in t = 0, we obtain the dynamic
system (
A 0n×m
Ψ 0m×m
)(
kt+1
ut+1
)
=
(
B C
−Λ Im×m
)(
kt
ut
)
+
(
D
0m×r
)
νt+1 (3.76)
The generalized Schur decomposition yields the system of equations
F
(
w˜t+1
v˜t+1
)
= G
(
w˜t
v˜t
)
+
(
D
0m×r
)
νt+1 (3.77)
where w˜ = w is an n1×1 vector, v˜ = (v
′, u′)′ is an (n2+m)×1 vector and where the square
matrices F and G are (n+m)× (n+m) with the decomposition QFZ = S and QGZ = T ,
where Q, Z, S, and T are (n+m)× (n+m) matrices. Since(
w˜
v˜
)
=
(
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
)(
z˜
x˜
)
(3.78)
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the matrices Z11, Z12, Z21, and Z22 are now n1 × n1, n1 × (n2 +m), (n2 +m) × n1, and
(n2 + m) × (n2 + m) respectively. The auxiliary variables z˜ and x˜ satisfy the system of
equations (
S11 S12
0(n2+m)×n1 S22
)(
z˜t+1
x˜t+1
)
=
(
T11 T12
0(n+m)×n1 T22
)(
z˜t
x˜t
)
+
(
Q1
Q2
)
νt+1 (3.79)
where S11 and T11 are n1 × n1 matrices, S22 and T22 are (n2 +m)× (n2 +m) and S12 and
T12 are n1 × (n2 +m). The matrices Q1 and Q2 are n1 × r and (n2 +m) × r respectively
with (
Q1
Q2
)
= Q
(
D
0m×r
)
(3.80)
The solution of (3.79) is given by (3.15) and (3.17). For t ≥ τ , we obtain v˜t = Nw˜t = Nwt,
where N = Z21Z
−1
11 is now an (n2 +m)× n1 matrix.
The loss function (3.51) simplifies to
Jt =
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi(w′t+i, v˜
′
t+i)H
(
wt+i
v˜t+i
)
(3.81)
since D˜1 = In1×n1 , D˜2 = I(n2+m)×(n2+m) and therefore D˜ = I(n+m)×(n+m) (cf. (3.50)).
Jt can be partitioned using (3.51). J
(2)
t can be written as (3.54) with H
∗ = N˜ ′HN˜ and
N˜ = (In1×n1 , N
′)′. The value of the loss function J0 for given matrices Λ and Ψ is given by
J0 = J
(1)
0 + J
(2)
0 , where J
(1)
0 and J
(2)
0 are defined in (3.59) and (3.61) respectively.
The minimization of J0 with respect to the coefficients of the matrices Λ and Ψ yields an
optimal simple rule of the form (3.75).
3.3 Example: A Hybrid New Keynesian Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model for a closed and cashless economy with the
additional features of internal habit formation in consumption preferences and a variant
of the Calvo (1983) mechanism with partial indexation of non-optimized prices to past
inflation.6 The economy consists of final goods producers, labor bundlers, households, and
intermediate goods producers.
Final goods producers use a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) to produce the homoge-
nous final good Yt in a perfectly competitive market. A final goods producer maximizes his
profits PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di, subject to the following CES production function
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λp di
)1+λp
(3.82)
where Pt is the price of the final good, Pt(i) is the price of the intermediate good i, and
(1 + λp) is the mark-up in the intermediate goods market.
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields the demand function for intermediate
good i
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−
(1+λp)
λp
Yt (3.83)
6Similar models are applied by Smets and Wouters (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2004), or Casares (2006).
3.3 Example: A Hybrid New Keynesian Model 34
and the equation for marginal costs
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
−
1
λp di
)−λp
(3.84)
Analogously to final goods producers, labor bundlers buy differentiated labor types Nt(j),
aggregate them to Nt and sell it to the intermediate goods producers under perfectly com-
petitive conditions. A bundler maximizes his profits WtNt−
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Nt(j)dj, subject to the
following CES aggregation function
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
1
1+λw,t dj
)1+λw,t
(3.85)
Wt is the price of the labor bundle Nt,Wt(j) denotes the price of labor type j and (1+λw,t)
is the time-varying wage mark-up.
The first-order condition for profit maximization yields the demand function for labor type
j
Nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−
(1+λw,t)
λw,t
Nt (3.86)
and the wage index equation
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
−
1
λw,t dj
)−λw,t
(3.87)
The economy is made up by a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Each household
j is a monopolistic supplier of labor type Nt(j). The household determines the amount of the
final good Ct(j) for consumption, its one-period nominal bond holdings Bt(j), and chooses
the wage for its labor type Wt(j) in order to maximize its lifetime utility
Et
∞∑
k=0
βk
(
1
1− σ
(
Ct(j)− hCt−1(j)
)1−σ
−
1
1 + η
Nt(j)
1+η
)
(3.88)
where β is the discount factor, σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution in consumption, and η > 0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. Ct−1(j) is the
consumption of the jth household in period t− 1 and Nt(j) are the total hours worked. We
assume h ≥ 0 to allow for internal habit formation in consumption. Maximization of (3.88) is
subjected to the labor demand function (3.86) and the households’ period-by-period budget
constraint is given by
Ct(j) +
Bt(j)
Pt
=
Wt(j)
Pt
Nt(j) +
Rt−1Bt−1(j)
Pt
+Drt (j) (3.89)
where Rt is the one-period gross nominal interest rate on households jth nominal bond
holdings Bt(j), and D
r
t (j) are dividends, expressed in real terms.
The first-order conditions for this maximization problem are given by
βRt Et pi
−1
t+1 = Et
[
(Ct − hCt−1)
−σ − hβ(Ct+1 − hCt)
−σ
(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ − hβ(Ct+2 − hCt+1)−σ
]
(3.90)
3.3 Example: A Hybrid New Keynesian Model 35
Wt
Pt
= (1 + λw,t) Et
[
Nηt
(Ct − hCt−1)−σ − hβ(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ
]
(3.91)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of price inflation. We make use of the fact that
all households are faced with the same optimization problem and hence, choose the same
amount of consumption Ct(j) = Ct, the same nominal wage Wt(j) = Wt, and supply the
same amount of labor Nt(j) = Nt.
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of the intermediate good i ∈
[0, 1]. Firm i uses the amount Nt(i) of homogenous labor and the constant returns to scale
technology Yt(i) = Nt(i), to produce its intermediate good Yt(i). Real marginal costs are
the same for all firms and is given by MCt(i) =Wt/Pt.
The price-setting decision for profit-maximization is constrained by a standard Calvo mech-
anism. In each period, the intermediate goods producer faces the constant probability 1− θ
of being allowed to re-optimize his price Pt(i). We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) by
assuming that a firm which cannot re-optimize his price, resets the price according to
Pt(i) = Pt−1(i)pi
γ
t−1, where γ is the degree of price indexation. The firm chooses Pt(i)
in order to maximize
Et
∞∑
k=0
θk∆t,t+k
(
Pt(i)Πt,t+k−1
Pt+k
Yt+k(i)−MCt+kYt+k(i)
)
(3.92)
subject to the sequence of demand functions
Yt+k(i) =
(
Pt(i)Πt,t+k−1
Pt+k
)
−
(1+λp)
λp
Yt+k for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (3.93)
where ∆t,t+k denotes the stochastic discount factor for real payoffs and
Πt,t+k−1 = pi
γ
t pi
γ
t+1 . . . pi
γ
t+k−1 = (Pt+k−1/Pt−1)
γ (3.94)
The first-order condition for the price-setting problem yields
P ∗t (i) = (1 + λp)
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k∆t,t+kMCt+k(Pt+k/Πt,t+k−1)
(1+λp)/λpYt+k
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k∆t,t+k(Pt+k/Πt,t+k−1)−1/λpYt+k
(3.95)
Dividing equation (3.95) by Pt yields
P ∗t (i)
Pt
= µp
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k∆t,t+kMCt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
) 1+λp
λp
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)
−
γ(1+λp)
λp
Yt+k
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k∆t,t+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
) 1
λp
(
Pt+k−1
Pt−1
)
−
γ
λp
Yt+k
(3.96)
where µp = 1 + λp.
Since all firms which are allowed to re-optimize their price will choose the same price P ∗t (i) =
P ∗t , the price index (3.84) can be rewritten as
1 = θ
(
piγt−1
pit
)−λp
+ (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)
−λp
(3.97)
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Log-linearizing equation (3.97) yields
Pˆ ∗t − Pˆt =
θ
1− θ
(pˆit − γpˆit−1) (3.98)
Note that we use the convention that a hat above a variable denotes the percentage deviation
from its steady state value.
By combining the latter equation with the log-linearized price-setting condition (3.96), we
finally obtain
pˆit =
γ
1 + βγ
pˆit−1 +
β
1 + βγ
Et pˆit+1 +ΘMˆCt (3.99)
where Θ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ(1+βγ) . By log-linearizing the optimality condition (3.91), using the log-
linearized overall resource constraint Yˆt = Cˆt and using the fact that Ŵt/Pt = M̂Ct and
Yˆt = Nˆt, we obtain
M̂Ct = λˆw,t + (η + δ1)Yˆt − δ2Yˆt−1 − βδ2 Et Yˆt+1 (3.100)
where δ1 =
σ(1+βh2)
(1−h)(1−βh) , δ2 =
hσ
(1−h)(1−βh) . The log-linearized mark-up λˆw,t is described by
the AR(1) process
λˆw,t = ρλˆw,t−1 + et (3.101)
By inserting the latter equation into equation (3.99), we obtain a hybrid Phillips curve that
follows
pˆit = ω1 Et pˆit+1 + ω2pˆit−1 + ω3Yˆt − ω4Yˆt−1 − βω4 Et Yˆt+1 +Θλˆw,t (3.102)
where ω1 =
β
1+βγ , ω2 =
γ
1+βγ ω3 = Θ(η + δ1), and ω4 = Θδ2.
Note that in our model the level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities (the natural
level) Y nt is constant. Thus, the linearized output Yˆt coincides with the linearized output gap
Yˆ gt = Yˆt − Yˆ
n
t , where Yˆ
n
t = 0. Further note that for γ = h = 0, equation (3.102) collapses
into the purely forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips
pˆit = β Et pˆit+1 + κYˆt + kt (3.103)
where κ = (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ (σ + η) and kt =
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ λˆw,t is a cost-push shock.
By log-linearizing the optimality condition (3.90) and using Yˆt = Cˆt, we obtain
Yˆt = κ1Yˆt−1 + κ2 Et Yˆt+1 − κ3 Et Yˆt+2 − κ4(Rˆt − Et pˆit+1) (3.104)
where κ1 =
h
1+h+βh2 , κ2 =
1+βh+βh2
1+h+βh2 , κ3 =
βh
1+h+βh2 , and κ4 =
(1−h)(1−βh)
σ(1+h+βh2) . Note that for
h = 0, we obtain the purely forward-looking New Keynesian IS curve
Yˆt = Et Yˆt+1 −
1
σ
(Rˆt − Et pˆit+1) (3.105)
Following Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004), a second-order ap-
proximation to the households’ utility yields a loss function of the form
J0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(pˆit − γpˆit−1)
2 + αY (Yˆt − δYˆt−1)
2
)
(3.106)
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where αy =
Θhσλp
(1+λp)δ(1−βh)(1−h)
and δ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation
hσ
(1− βh)(1− h)
(1 + βδ2) =
(
η +
σ
(1− βh)(1− h)
(1 + βh2)
)
δ (3.107)
We follow Giannoni and Woodford (2004) and Casares (2006) by assuming that the mon-
etary authority is concerned about the volatility of the nominal interest rate. Therefore,
we augment the welfare-theoretic loss function by the additional term αRRˆ
2
t , where αR
measures the weight on interest rate stabilization.
The monetary authority then seeks to minimize the loss function
J0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(pˆit − γpˆit−1)
2 + αY (Yˆt − δYˆt−1)
2 + αRRˆ
2
t
)
(3.108)
subject to the model equations (3.101), (3.102), and (3.104). Note that in our model, the
discount factor for the policy-maker, λ, is equal to the household’s discount factor β.
In order to solve the model by using the methods outlined in Section 2, we define the policy
objective parameters Yˆ ot = Yˆt − δYˆt−1 and pˆi
o
t = pˆit − γpˆit−1. Furthermore, we define the
auxiliary variables pit = pˆit−1, Y˜t = Yˆt−1, and st = Et pˆit+1. If we add the definition of the
real interest rate rˆt = Rˆt − Et pˆit+1, we finally obtain a 3 × 1 vector wt of predetermined
variables given by wt = (λˆw,t, pit, Y˜t)
′, a 6×1 vector vt of non-predetermined variables given
by vt = (pˆit, Yˆt, st, rˆt, pˆi
o
t , yˆ
o
t )
′, the vector of policy instruments ut which is simply the scalar
ut = Rˆt, and the 1× 1 shock vector νt = et. The 9× 9 matrices A and B are given by
A =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 β1+βγ −βω4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 κ4 κ2 −κ3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

B =

ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−Θ − γ1+βγ ω4 1 −ω3 0 0 0 0
0 0 −κ1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 γ 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 δ 0 −1 0 0 0 1

while the 9× 1 matrices C and D are
C =
(
0 0 0 0 κ4 0 1 0 0
)′
D =
(
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)′
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Finally, the matrices W˜ , P , and R are given by P = 09×9, R = αR, and
W˜ =

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 αY

We complete the description of the model by presenting the calibration. The time unit is
one quarter. The discount rate is equal to β = 0.99, implying a quarterly steady state real
interest rate of approximately one percent. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ,
is assumed to σ = 2. We follow Casares (2006) and set the habit formation parameter to
h = 0.85 implying that the weight on lagged output in the IS equation is 1/3. The calibrated
η = 3 implies a labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage of 1/3. λp is set to 8/7
which implies a steady state mark-up in the goods market of approximately 14 percent.
We assume the linearized wage mark-up λˆw,t to be persistent and choose ρ equal to 0.8.
The Calvo parameter θ is set to 0.75 implying an average duration of price contracts of one
year. The price indexation parameter γ is set to 0.45 which is roughly equal to the value
reported by Smets and Wouters (2003). This implies that the weight on lagged inflation in
the Phillips curve equation is 0.31.
The parameter values chosen for our model imply a weight on output in the policy-makers’
objective function of approximately αY = 0.69. Following Casares (2006), we set αR = 0.0088
implying a small preference for interest rate smoothing.
For the analysis concerning anticipated and unanticipated shocks, we assume that the econ-
omy is in a deterministic steady state until period t = 0. In the case of an unanticipated
shock, the mark-up λˆw,t jumps by one percent in period t = 0 and begins to fall thereafter.
In the case of an anticipated shock, the agents anticipate in period t = 0 that a one per-
cent increase in the mark-up will take place at some future date τ > 0. They also know
that the mark-up will subsequently decline according to the autoregressive process (3.101),
where now et = 1 for t = τ and et = 0 for t 6= τ . Note that τ also defines the lengths of
the anticipation period or the time interval between t = 0 and t = τ . In order to obtain
impulse response functions and welfare results, we simulate dynamic adjustment paths and
the welfare loss function by using the methods outlined in Section 2.7
Figure 3.1 depicts the impulse response functions of inflation, output, nominal, and real
interest rates under the unrestricted optimal monetary policy. The solid lines with circles
represent the responses to an unforeseen cost-push shock that emerged in period t = 0. The
solid lines with squares, triangles, and stars represent responses to a cost-push shock whose
realization in period τ = 1, τ = 2, or τ = 3 is anticipated in period t = 0.
An unanticipated rise in the wage mark-up puts upward pressure on the prices of intermediate
goods and hence on inflation. Despite the instantaneous jump in inflation, the real interest
rate rises due to the sharp increase in the nominal interest rate. The increase in the real
7Matlab codes can be downloaded from the author’s webpage at http://www.wiso.uni-
kiel.de/vwlinstitute/Wohltmann/REAS solution.zip.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse response functions under unrestricted optimal monetary policy.
Notes: Solid lines with circles denote responses to an unanticipated cost-push shock, solid
lines with squares, triangles, and stars denote responses to an anticipated cost-push shock taking
place in period τ = 1, τ = 2, and τ = 3.
interest rate induces households to postpone consumption which implies an abrupt drop in
output. Subsequently, the nominal interest rate continues to rise. This leads – in conjunction
with the decline in inflation – to hump-shaped response functions of the real interest rate
and output.
In the case of anticipated shocks, the optimal policy calls for a decline in nominal and real
interest rates in response to the anticipation of a future rise in marginal costs. At the latest
with the occurrence of the anticipated shock in period τ , the nominal and real interest rates
start to rise and display a hump-shaped development. Inflation declines in response to the
anticipation of the future rise in marginal costs. After this initial decline, inflation starts
to rise and peaks in the period when the anticipated shock materializes. Output displays a
hump-shaped downturn, starting at the point of anticipation, t = 0. The drop in output is
thereby amplified by the lengths of the anticipation period, τ .
Notably, the anticipation of future shocks leads to an increase in the persistence (or volatility)
of inflation, output as well as nominal and real interest rates which increases in lead time
τ . Thereby, persistence is measured as the total variation of a variable over time, i.e. by
its intertemporal deviation from its initial steady state. The impact or anticipation effect,
however, is inversely related to the time span between anticipation and realization of the
cost-push shock. It measures the initial jump of a variable taking place at the time of
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anticipation.
The opposing effects of anticipations are shown in Figure 3.2 which displays the welfare loss
as a function of the time span between the anticipation and the occurrence of the cost-push
shock. The welfare function exhibits a hump-shaped pattern implying that for a realistic time
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Figure 3.2: Welfare loss for different lengths of the anticipation period under unrestricted optimal
monetary policy
span between the anticipation and the realization of cost-push shocks, anticipated shocks
entail higher welfare losses than unanticipated shocks of equal size. The rationale is that the
anticipation effect is dominated by the persistence effect. A welfare gain from anticipating
can only be achieved for very large values of τ . Besides the anticipation effect, this can also
be explained by discounting the realization impacts from period τ to period t = 0.
The results we obtained from our simulations show that the welfare loss of anticipated
cost-shocks exceeds the welfare loss of an unanticipated cost-shock of equal magnitude for
plausible lengths of the anticipation period. Hence, our results strongly support the findings
reported in Chapter 2, where a similar result within the purely forward-looking canonical
New Keynesian model was obtained.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented a method to solve linear dynamic rational expectations models
with anticipated shocks and optimal policy by using the generalized Schur decomposition
method. Our approach also allows for the evaluation of the widely discussed case of unpre-
dictable shocks and can therefore be seen as a generalization of the methods summarized by
So¨derlind (1999). We demonstrated our method by means of a calibrated New Keynesian
model with internal habit formation in consumption preferences, a variant of Calvo price
staggering with partial indexation to past inflation, a time-varying wage mark-up, and a
utility-based loss function. We simulated the model economy’s responses to unanticipated
and anticipated cost-push shocks under the unrestricted optimal monetary policy. It was then
shown that anticipated shocks amplify both, the stagflationary effects of cost-push shocks
and the overall welfare loss. Hence, our results strongly support the findings reported in
Chapter 2, where we have demonstrated the welfare-reducing effects of anticipations within
the purely forward-looking canonical New Keynesian model.
Part II: Nonlinear Dynamics – Ramsey
Policy, Simple Rules, and Welfare
4 On the Superiority of Simple Rules
to Ramsey Monetary Policy under
Timeless Perspective Commitment
4.1 Introduction
This chapter studies optimal monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian model for a
closed and cashless economy with price and wage rigidities resulting from quadratic ad-
justment costs. In particular, we derive the Ramsey-type optimal monetary policy in the
presence of cost-push shocks such as wage and price mark-up shocks for the case of an in-
efficient and efficient steady state and analyze welfare implications of Ramsey policy and
simple monetary policy rules. We show that in the case of an efficient steady state, the
Ramsey policy is the globally optimal policy under commitment, whereas in the case of an
inefficient steady state, there exist monetary policy rules which are superior to the Ramsey
policy under timeless perspective commitment.
The design of optimal monetary policy in the presence of cost-push shocks is one of the
most discussed topics in monetary macroeconomics. However, a bulk of papers apply the
linear-quadratic approach (see, among others, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999), Svensson
(1999), or the textbooks of Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2008)).
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003) show that, under certain circum-
stances, a second-order approximation of the households’ utility function leads to a quadratic
loss function similar to those widely applied in the linear-quadratic literature on optimal
monetary policy. However, the assumptions which must be made to derive this utility-based
welfare function are restrictive.
Thus, Khan, King, and Wolman (2003) propose to use the Ramsey approach for the analysis
of optimal monetary policy since it does not rely on any approximation of the utility function.
Instead, the optimal policy is derived by maximizing the utility of households subject to the
non-linearized model equations. In this chapter, we follow Khan, King, and Wolman (2003),
Yun (2005), Faia (2008a, 2008b), Faia and Monacelli (2004, 2007, 2008), or Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2004b, 2005, 2007b) and apply the Ramsey approach for the derivation of optimal
policy.
Since the seminal works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), it is
well-known that the solution of optimal policy problems in models with forward-looking ra-
tional agents is time-inconsistent. In dynamic optimal control problems with forward-looking
rational agents the assimilable problem of dynamic inconsistent or strategic incoherent solu-
tions arises (see, for example, Wohltmann and Kro¨mer (1989), Currie and Levine (1993), or
McCallum (2005)). In order to overcome the problem of dynamic inconsistency, Woodford
(1999a) proposes the concept of timeless perspective policy-making. Dennis (2001), McCal-
lum and Nelson (2004), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), and McCallum (2005) extensively
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discuss the concept of a timeless perspective within the linear-quadratic framework. Faia and
Monacelli (2004) provide a detailed discussion of the timeless perspective approach within
the framework of Ramsey-type optimal policy.
The widely recognized shortcomings of policy-making from a timeless perspective are that
the problem of time-inconsistency in the sense of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983) is in fact not solved and that the policy generally fails to globally maximize
the policy makers’ objective function (see, among others, Jensen and McCallum (2002)).
Nevertheless, the concept of timeless perspective commitment achieved a lot of attention
and is widely considered as a good approximation of the globally optimal policy under
commitment.1
However, Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) show within the linear-quadratic
framework that alternative simple instrument rules deliver superior welfare results. These
studies apply the canonical New Keynesian model with a quadratic welfare function which
does not rely explicitly on the utility of households.
In this chapter, we demonstrate the non-optimality of timeless perspective commitment by
using the Ramsey monetary policy approach with a utility-based welfare function. In par-
ticular, we show that even simple instrument rules such as the interest rate rule originally
proposed by Taylor (1993) or an interest rate peg may be superior to the Ramsey mone-
tary policy under timeless perspective commitment. Hence, our findings strongly support
the results of Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) and call into question the
appropriateness of the proposed Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment as
a guideline for the conduct of monetary policy.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 describes the conduct of monetary policy and derives the optimal Ramsey-type monetary
policy. Section 4 presents the calibration and discusses the solution method. In Section 5,
the results of our simulations are reported. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
4.2 The Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model for a closed and cashless economy which con-
sists of households, intermediate goods producers, final goods producers, and labor bundlers.
We model price rigidity by assuming that each intermediate goods producer faces a quadratic
cost of adjusting nominal prices as in Hairault and Portier (1993). Accordingly, we follow
Kim (2000) and introduce nominal wage rigidity by assuming that each household faces a
quadratic cost of adjusting nominal wages.2
In the following, we present the model in detail.
4.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers use the continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) to produce the homoge-
nous final good Yt in a perfectly competitive market. A final goods producer maximizes his
1Most studies that analyze optimal policy under commitment apply in fact the timeless perspective. However,
they simply denote this as commitment.
2Alternatively, we could introduce nominal rigidities by using the well-known Calvo (1983) mechanism.
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profits
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (4.1)
subject to the following CES production function
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
εp,t−1
εp,t di
) εp,t
εp,t−1
(4.2)
where Pt is the price of the final good, Pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i, and εp,t > 1
denotes the (possibly time-varying) elasticity of substitution between different intermediate
goods. εp,t follows an autoregressive process given by
(εp,t/εp) = (εp,t−1/εp)
ρp exp(ep,t) (4.3)
where εp denotes the steady state value.
3
The first-order condition for profit maximization is given by
Pt
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
εp,t−1
εp di
) 1
εp,t−1
Yt(i)
−
1
εp,t = Pt(i) (4.4)
By rearranging (4.4), we obtain the demand function for intermediate good i
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp,t
Yt (4.5)
To obtain the price of final goods, we substitute the demand function (4.5) into the CES
production function (4.2) which yields
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εp,tdi
) 1
1−εp,t
(4.6)
4.2.2 Labor Bundlers
Analogously to final goods producers, labor bundlers buy the differentiated labor types
Nt(j), aggregate them to Nt and sell it to the intermediate goods producers under perfectly
competitive conditions. A bundler maximizes his profits
WtNt −
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Nt(j)dj (4.7)
subject to the following CES aggregation function
Nt =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
εw,t−1
εw,t dj
) εw,t
εw,t−1
(4.8)
3Note that equation (4.3) is the nonlinear counterpart of the usual expression εˆp,t = ρpεˆp,t−1 + ep,t, where
εˆp,t = log(εp,t)− log(εp) ≈ (εp,t − εp)/εp denotes log-deviation from the steady state.
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where Wt is the price of the labor bundle Nt, Wt(j) is the price of labor type j, and εw,t > 1
denotes the (possibly time-varying) elasticity of substitution between different labor types.
εw,t follows an autoregressive process given by
(εw,t/εw) = (εw,t−1/εw)
ρw exp(ew,t) (4.9)
where εw denotes the steady state value.
The first-order condition for profit maximization is given by
Wt
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
εw,t−1
εw,t dj
) 1
εw,t−1
Nt(j)
−
1
εw,t =Wt(j) (4.10)
By rearranging (4.10) and using (4.8), we obtain the demand function for labor type j
Nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw,t
Nt (4.11)
The demand function (4.11) can be substituted into the CES aggregation function (4.8) to
obtain the wage index
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1−εw,tdj
) 1
1−εw,t
(4.12)
4.2.3 Households
The economy is made up by a continuum of differentiated households, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Each household seeks to maximize its discounted sum of per-period utility U(Ct(j), Nt(j))
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Ct(j), Nt(j)
)
(4.13)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and E0 is the expectation operator conditional on
information available in period t = 0. Ct(j) is household jth consumption of final goods and
Nt(j) are its hours worked. Maximization of (4.13) is subjected to the demand function (4.11)
for household jth differentiated labor type and the households’ period-by-period budget
constraint
Ct(j) +
Bt(j)
Pt
=
Wt(j)
Pt
Nt(j) +
Rt−1Bt−1(j)
Pt
−ACwt (j)− T
r
t (j) + Π
r
t (j) (4.14)
where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate on one-period nominal bond holdings
Bt(j). T
r
t (j) are time-varying lump-sum taxes and Π
r
t (j) are dividends, both expressed in
real terms. Following Kim (2000), we assume that the household is faced with a quadratic
cost of adjusting its nominal wage given by
ACwt (j) =
θw
2
(
Wt(j)
Wt−1(j)
− piw
)2
(4.15)
where θw ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal wage rigidity and pi
w is the steady state gross
rate of wage inflation.
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By inserting the constraint (4.14) into the intertemporal utility function (4.13), we obtain
the maximization problem
MaxBt(j) E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
−
Bt(j)
Pt
+
Rt−1Bt−1(j)
Pt
+ t.i.o., Nt(j)
)
(4.16)
where t.i.o. = Wt(j)Pt Nt(j) − T
r
t (j) + Π
r
t (j) − AC
w
t (j) comprises all terms independent of
this optimization problem. Differentiating (4.16) with respect to Bt(j) gives the familiar
consumption Euler equation
UC,t(j) = βUC,t+1(j)Rt
Pt
Pt+1
(4.17)
where UC,t(j) denotes the marginal utility of consumption.
The household is a monopolistic supplier of labor type Nt(j) and chooses its nominal wage
Wt(j) in order to maximize utility. By inserting the constraints (4.11) and (4.14) into the
intertemporal utility function (4.13), we obtain the wage setting problem
MaxWt(j) E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
[
Wt(j)
Pt
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw,t
Nt −
θw
2
(
Wt(j)
Wt−1(j)
− piw
)2
(4.18)
+ t.i.w. ,
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw,t
Nt
]
where t.i.w. = −(Bt(j)−Rt−1Bt−1(j))/Pt−T
r
t (j)+Π
r
t (j) comprises all terms independent of
the wage-setting problem. Differentiating (4.18) with respect to Wt(j) yields the first-order
condition
0 = UC,t(j)(1− εw,t)
Nt(j)
Pt
− UC,t(j)θw
(
Wt(j)
Wt−1(j)
− piw
)
1
Wt−1(j)
(4.19)
− εw,tUN,t(j)
Nt(j)
Wt(j)
+ β Et
{
UC,t+1(j)θw
(
Wt+1(j)
Wt(j)
− piw
)
Wt+1(j)
Wt(j)2
}
Note that in the case of perfectly flexible wages, i.e., θw = 0, the optimality condition (4.19)
collapses into the static wage setting rule
Wt(j)
Pt
= µw,tMRSt(j) (4.20)
where µw,t =
εw,t
εw,t−1
, and MRSt(j) = −
UN,t(j)
UC,t(j)
denotes the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and labor. The monopolistic structure of the labor market drives a
wedge (of the amount of the mark-up µw,t > 1) between the marginal rate of substitution
and the real wage.
4.2.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of the intermediate good i ∈
[0, 1]. Firm i uses the amount Nt(i) of homogenous labor and the decreasing returns to scale
technology
AtNt(i)
1−α (4.21)
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to produce the intermediate good Yt(i). At is a technology shifter which may be described
by the autoregressive process
At/A = (At−1/A)
ρa exp(ea,t) (4.22)
The firm takes the real price of labor Wt/Pt as given. Note that we allow for the existence
of wage subsidies τWt, financed by lump-sum taxes. The real marginal costs MCt(i) can be
obtained from the minimization of total real costs TCt(i) =
Wt
Pt
(1 − τ)Nt(i) subject to the
production function (4.21) which yields
MCt(i) =
1− τ
1− α
Wt
Pt
Yt(i)
α
1−αA
−
1
1−α
t (4.23)
Following Hairault and Portier (1993), the firm faces a quadratic cost of price adjustment
given by
ACpt (i) =
θp
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− pip
)2
(4.24)
where θp ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal price rigidity, and pi
p denotes the steady state
gross rate of price inflation.4
The firm chooses Pt(i) in order to maximize his real profits
E0
∞∑
t=0
∆0,t
(
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)−MCt(i)Yt(i)−AC
p
t (i)
)
(4.25)
subject to the demand function (4.5), where ∆0,t = β
tUC,t/UC,0 denotes the stochastic
discount factor for real payoffs. Plugging equations (4.5) and (4.24) into the intertemporal
profit function (4.25) yields the following maximization problem
E0
∞∑
t=0
∆0,t
[(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp,t
Yt −MCt(i)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp,t
Yt −
θp
2
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− pip
)2]
(4.26)
By differentiating (4.26) with respect to Pt(i), we obtain the first-order condition
0 = (1− εp,t)
Yt(i)
Pt
+ εp,tMCt(i)
Yt(i)
Pt(i)
− θp
(
Pt(i)
Pt−1(i)
− pip
)
1
Pt−1(i)
(4.27)
+ Et
{
∆0,t+1
∆0,t
θp
(
Pt+1(i)
Pt(i)
− pip
)
Pt+1(i)
Pt−1(i)2
}
Note that in the case of perfectly flexible prices, i.e., θp = 0, the optimality condition (4.27)
will read as
Pt(i) = µp,tPtMCt(i) (4.28)
where µp,t =
εp,t
εp,t−1
. The monopolistic supplier of good i will set its price Pt(i) as a mark-up
µp,t over nominal marginal costs given by PtMCt(i).
4Note that this approach is observably equivalent to the pricing assumption introduced by Rotemberg (1982)
when the steady state gross rate of price inflation is equal to one.
4.2 The Model 48
4.2.5 The Government
The government collects lump-sum taxes from households to finance wage subsidies. The
government budget constraint is given by
PtT
r
t = τWtNt (4.29)
where T rt denotes real time-varying lump-sum taxes and Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)di is the aggregated
labor demand.
4.2.6 Aggregation, Market Clearing, and Functional Forms
The market clearing condition for labor type j and the market clearing condition for inter-
mediate good i are given by
Nt(j) ≡ N
s
t (j) = N
d
t (j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw,t
Nt (4.30)
Yt(i) ≡ Y
s
t (i) = Y
d
t (i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp,t
Yt (4.31)
We assume a symmetric equilibrium in which all intermediate goods producers and house-
holds are identical and are faced with the same price and wage setting problems, respectively.
Thus, each intermediate goods producer and each household will choose the same price
and wage, i.e., Wt(j) = Wt and Pt(i) = Pt. Then, the market clearing conditions (4.30)
and (4.31) imply Nt(j) = Nt and Yt(i) = Yt. According to equations (4.15) and (4.24),
each household is faced with identical real costs of wage adjustment, i.e. ACwt (j) = AC
w
t ,
and each intermediate goods producer is faced with identical costs of price adjustment, i.e.
ACpt (i) = AC
p
t . Furthermore, each household chooses the same amount of consumption,
holds the same amount of bonds, pays the same amount of taxes, and receives the same
amount of dividends, i.e., Ct(j) = Ct, Bt(j) = Bt, T
r
t (j) = T
r
t , and Π
r
t (j) = Π
r
t .
In what follows, we assume the following functional form for the per-period utility function:
U(Ct, Nt) =
1
1− σ
C1−σt −
1
1 + η
N1+ηt (4.32)
where σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and
1/η with η > 0 measures the labor supply elasticity. The marginal utility of consumption UC,t
and the marginal disutility of labor UN,t are then given by UC,t = C
−σ
t and UN,t = −N
η
t ,
respectively.
Now, the consumption Euler equation (4.17) and the optimal wage setting condition (4.19)
can be rewritten as
C−σt = C
−σ
t+1Rt(pi
p
t+1)
−1 (4.33)
and
(piwt − pi
w)piwt = β Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(piwt+1 − pi
w)piwt+1
}
+
Nt(εw,t − 1)
θw
(
µw,tC
σ
t N
η
t −
Wt
Pt
)
(4.34)
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where pipt = Pt/Pt−1 and pi
w
t = Wt/Wt−1 denote the gross rate of price and wage inflation,
respectively. Equation (4.34) represents a nonlinear wage Phillips curve.5
Note that wage and price inflation are connected by the identity
Wt
Pt
=
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
(4.35)
Analogously to the wage setting equation, we can rewrite the optimal price setting condition
(4.27) to obtain
(pipt − pi
p)pipt = β Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(pipt+1 − pi
p)pipt+1
}
+
Ytεp,t
θp
(
MCt −
1
µp,t
)
(4.36)
where marginal costs are given by
MCt =
1− τ
1− α
Wt
Pt
Y
α
1−α
t A
−
1
α
t (4.37)
and
Yt = AtN
1−α
t (4.38)
Note that equation (4.36) represents a nonlinear New Keynesian Phillips curve.6
Inserting the bond market clearing condition, Bt = 0, and the definition of the real cost of
wage adjustment, ACwt =
θw
2 (pi
w
t −pi
w)2, into the aggregate budget constraint of households
yields
Ct =
Wt
Pt
Nt − T
r
t +Π
r
t −
θw
2
(piwt − pi
w)2 (4.39)
Combining (4.39) with the government budget constraint (4.29) and the aggregated profits
of intermediate goods producers
Πrt = Yt −
Wt
Pt
(1− τ)Nt −AC
p
t (4.40)
yields the overall resource constraint
Yt = Ct +
θp
2
(pipt − pi
p)2 +
θw
2
(piwt − pi
w)2 (4.41)
where we make use of the definition of the real cost of price adjustment, ACpt =
θp
2 (pi
p
t −
pip)2. Equation (4.41) shows that the quadratic price and wage adjustment costs limit the
consumption possibilities of the economy.7 Note that the functional form assumed for ACpt
and ACwt ensures that the real costs of price and wage adjustment are zero in the steady
state.8
5By log-linearizing equation (4.34) around the steady state, we obtain a standard linear wage Phillips curve
given by π̂wt = β Et π̂
w
t+1 + λw(M̂RSt − Ŵt/Pt), where λw = N
1+ηCσǫw/θw. Note that variables without
time subscript refer to steady state values and a hat above a variable denotes the percentage deviation from
its steady state value.
6By log-linearizing equation (4.36) around the steady state, we obtain a standard linear New Keynesian
Phillips curve given by π̂pt = β Et π̂
p
t+1 + λpM̂Ct, where λp = Y (εp − 1)/θp.
7By log-linearizing equation (4.41) around the steady state, we obtain Yˆt = Cˆt. Thus, the distortion due to
quadratic wage and price adjustment costs vanishes in the linearized system.
8Furthermore, it rules out any long-run effects of trend inflation, i.e πp = πw > 1, by leading to vertical
long-run Phillips curves. A discussion of the effects of trend inflation under the Rotemberg (1982) pricing
assumption is provided by Ascari and Rossi (2008).
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4.2.7 The Steady State
We calculate the steady state of the model by omitting the time indices t. For simplicity, we
normalize steady state technology to unity, i.e., A = 1. The equations describing wage and
price setting now read as
MC = 1/µp = (εp − 1)/εp (4.42)
and
W/P = µwC
σNη (4.43)
where µw = εw/(εw−1). Inserting the labor demand functionN = Y
1/(1−α) and the resource
constraint Y = C into equation (4.43) yields
W/P = µwY
σ(1−α)+η
1−α (4.44)
Marginal costs given by equation (4.37) can be rewritten as
MC =
1− τ
1− α
µwY
η+σ+α(1−σ)
1−α (4.45)
By inserting (4.42) into the latter equation, we obtain
Y =
(
(1− α)
µpµw(1− τ)
) 1−α
η+σ+α(1−σ)
(4.46)
The steady state level of output Y differs from the efficient level of output due to the
existence of constant wage and price mark-ups µp > 1 and µw > 1. Efficiency of the steady
state can be achieved by choosing the subsidy rate τ such that µpµw(1 − τ) = 1. It then
follows that the optimal subsidy rate is given by
τ = 1− 1/(µpµw) (4.47)
The gross real interest rate can be obtained by using the steady state Euler equation C−σ =
βC−σR(pip)−1. Hence, we have R/pip = 1/β. The gross nominal interest rate is then given
by R = pip/β.
The steady state amount of hours worked can easily be computed by inserting equation
(4.46) into the labor demand function N = Y 1/(1−α).
4.2.8 The Welfare Measure
We follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) or Faia and Monacelli (2007) and measure abso-
lute welfare by the expectation of the discounted sum of aggregate lifetime utility conditional
on the set of information at time equal to zero
V a0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
(4.48)
We also compute a relative welfare measure V r0 which is defined as the percentage deviation
of absolute welfare under a monetary policy rule from absolute welfare under the Ramsey
policy, discussed below.9
9Let V a,k0 denote absolute welfare under the monetary policy regime k =∈ {rule, Ramsey}, we formally
obtain V r0 =
(V
a,rule
0 −V
a,Ramsey
0 )
V
a,Ramsey
0
· 100. For σ > 1 and η > 0, V a,k0 ∈ R
−
0 holds. Then, the Ramsey policy is
superior if V r0 > 0, whereas the opposite is true for V
r
0 < 0.
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4.3 Monetary Policy
We consider two different monetary policy regimes. First, we derive the optimal monetary
policy under commitment. In doing so, we distinguish between the policy under time-zero
commitment and the policy under timeless-perspective commitment. Second, we assume
that the monetary authority commits itself to a simple time-invariant instrument rule. In
doing so, we apply an interest rate peg and two types of the interest rate rule originally
proposed by Taylor (1993).
For the determination of optimal monetary policy under commitment, we use the Ramsey
approach described in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003). In this approach, the monetary
authority seeks to maximize the utility of households subject to the constraints that describe
the competitive economy, given by
0 = AtN
1−α
t − Ct −
θp
2
(pipt − pi
p)2 −
θw
2
(piwt − pi
w)2 (4.49)
0 = (pipt − pi
p)pipt − β Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(pipt+1 − pi
p)pipt+1
}
(4.50)
−AtN
1−α
t
εp,t
θp
(
1− τ
1− α
Wt
Pt
Nαt
1
At
−
1
µp,t
)
0 = (piwt − pi
w)piwt − β Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(piwt+1 − pi
w)piwt+1
}
(4.51)
−
Nt(εw,t − 1)
θw
(
µw,tC
σ
t N
η
t −
Wt
Pt
)
0 =
Wt
Pt
−
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
(4.52)
where we have used the production function (4.38) to substitute for Yt and equation (4.37)
to substitute for the real marginal costs MCt. Note that the consumption Euler equation
(4.33) is not a binding restriction for the Ramsey problem. We assume that the monetary
authority is able to commit to the policy plan determined at time t = 0.
The optimal Ramsey monetary policy can be obtained by solving the following optimization
problem. Let λ1,t, λ2,t, λ3,t, λ4,t represent the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints (4.49),
(4.50), (4.51) and (4.52), respectively. For given exogenous processes (4.3), (4.9), and (4.22),
the monetary authority optimizes the Lagrangian
L0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
+ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλ1,t+1
(
AtN
1−α
t − Ct −
θp
2
(pipt − pi
p)2 −
θw
2
(piwt − pi
w)2
)
+ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλ2,t+1
(
(pipt − pi
p)pipt − β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(pipt+1 − pi
p)pipt+1
−AtN
1−α
t
εp,t
θp
(
1− τ
1− α
Wt
Pt
Nαt
1
At
−
1
µp,t
))
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+ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλ3,t+1
(
(piwt − pi
w)piwt − β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
(piwt+1 − pi
w)piwt+1
−
Nt(εw,t − 1)
θw
(
µw,tC
σ
t N
η
t −
Wt
Pt
))
+ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtλ4,t+1
(
Wt
Pt
−
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
)
with respect to the set of control variables Ωt = {Nt, Ct, pi
p
t , pi
w
t ,Wt/Pt} and the set of
costate variables Λt+1 = {λ1,t+1, λ2,t+1, λ3,t+1, λ4,t+1}.
The first-order conditions with respect to Nt, Ct, pi
p
t , pi
w
t , and Wt/Pt are then given by
0 = −Nηt + λ˜1,tAt(1− α)N
−α
t − λ˜2,t
εp,t
θp
α(1− τ)
1− α
Wt
Pt
(4.53)
− λ˜2,t
εp,t
θp
AtN
−α
t (1− α)
(
1− τ
1− α
Wt
Pt
Nαt
At
−
1
µp,t
)
− λ˜3,t
(εw,t − 1)
θw
(
µt,wC
σ
t N
η
t (1 + η)−
Wt
Pt
)
0 = C−σt − λ˜1,t − λ˜2,tσβ Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
1
Ct
(pipt+1 − pi
p)pipt+1
}
(4.54)
− λ˜3,t
[
σβ Et
{(
Ct+1
Ct
)
−σ
1
Ct
(piwt+1 − pi
w)piwt+1
}
+ µw,t
(εw,t − 1)σ
θw
N1+ηt C
σ−1
t
]
+ λ˜2,t−1σ
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
−σ
1
Ct
(pipt − pi
p)pipt + λ˜3,t−1σ
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
−σ
1
Ct
(piwt − pi
w)piwt
0 = −λ˜1,tθp(pi
p
t − pi
p) + λ˜2,t(2pi
p
t − pi
p) (4.55)
− λ˜2,t−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
−σ
(2pipt − pi
p) + λ˜4,t
(
Wt−1
Pt−1
)
piwt
(pipt )
2
0 = −λ˜1,tθw(pi
w
t − pi
w) + λ˜3,t(2pi
w
t − pi
w) (4.56)
− λ˜3,t−1
(
Ct
Ct−1
)
−σ
(2piwt − pi
w)− λ˜4,t
(
Wt−1
Pt−1
)
1
pipt
0 = −λ˜2,tNt
εp,t(1− τ)
θp(1− α)
+ λ˜3,t
Nt(εw,t − 1)
θw
+ λ˜4,t − β Et
{
λ˜4,t+1
piwt+1
pipt+1
}
(4.57)
where we have redefined the costate variables as λi,t+1 = λ˜i,t (i = 1, . . . , 4). Note that the
costate variables λ2,t = λ˜2,t−1 and λ3,t = λ˜3,t−1 are predetermined, whereas λ˜1,t and λ˜4,t
are non-predetermined (jump) variables.
To obtain a global optimum under time zero commitment, the initial values of the predeter-
mined costate variables must be
λ2,0 = λ˜2,−1 = 0 = λ3,0 = λ˜3,−1 (4.58)
However, in the spirit of the timeless perspective commitment policy proposed by Woodford
(1999a), the literature usually neglects the optimality condition (4.58).10 Instead, the initial
10See, among others, Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), Faia (2008a, 2008b), Faia and Monacelli (2008).
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values of the predetermined costate variables are set equal to their respective steady state
values
λ2,0 = λ˜2,−1 = λ2
λ3,0 = λ˜3,−1 = λ3
(4.59)
The Ramsey policy under time zero commitment and the Ramsey policy under timeless per-
spective commitment obviously coincide when the steady state values of the predetermined
costate variables λ2 and λ3 are equal to zero. Besides this exception, the Ramsey policy
under timeless perspective commitment fails to maximize the policy makers’ objective func-
tion V a0 . McCallum and Nelson (2004) point out that the timeless perspective policy can
be considered as ”policy-making according to a rule”.11 As a consequence, other monetary
policy rules (in addition to time zero commitment) may exist which are superior to the
Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment.
After having discussed the policy regime Ramsey monetary policy, we now turn to the
alternative regime commitment to a time-invariant simple rule. For this purpose, we consider
a interest rate rule of the form
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φ((
pipt
pip
)δpi (Yt
Y
)δy)1−φ
(4.60)
where δpi is the constant weight on price inflation, and δy denotes the constant weight on
output. A positive value of the constant parameter φ indicates a preference for interest rate
smoothing.12
4.4 Calibration and Computation
We employ a standard calibration. The time unit is one quarter. The discount rate is equal
to β = 0.99, implying an annual steady state real interest rate of approximately 4%. The
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, σ, is set to σ = 2. The
calibrated η = 3 implies a labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage of 1/3. The
steady state values of the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods, εp,
and the elasticity of substitution between different labor types, εw, are both set to 8. This
implies steady state mark-ups of approximately 14 percent as well as an optimal subsidy
rate given by τ = 0.2344. The degree of decreasing returns to scale (1 − α) is set to 0.7.
The parameters which measure the degree of nominal price and wage rigidity are set to
θp = 342.48 and θw = 1546.68, respectively. These values imply slopes of the price and wage
Phillips curves which are equal to the slopes under Calvo (1983) price and wage setting with
standard Calvo parameters equal to 0.75. We set ρp, ρw, and ρa either equal to zero implying
one-off shocks or to 0.95 implying that the exogenous processes are highly persistent.
Equation (4.60) comprises several well-known monetary policy rules. The rule originally
proposed by Taylor (1993) can be obtained by setting φ = 0, δpi = 1.5, and δy = 0.125. To
consider a Taylor rule with smoothing, we set φ = 0.8, δpi = 1.5, and δy = 0.125. Finally, we
11See McCallum and Nelson (2004), p. 45.
12Note that equation (4.60) is the nonlinear counterpart of the linear rule usually considered in the literature.
By log-linearizing, we obtain Rˆt = φRˆt−1 + (1− φ)(δpiπˆ
p
t + δyYˆt) where a hat above a variable denotes the
percentage deviation from its steady state value.
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follow Collard and Dellas (2005) and set φ = 0.999, δpi = 1.001 and δy = 0 to consider an
interest rate peg.
In what follows, we assume deterministic shock terms ep,t, ew,t, and ea,t in the exogenous
processes. Thus, we depart from the usual assumption of white noise shocks. In order to
simulate a 10 percent decrease in the elasticities εp,t and εw,t occurring at time t = 0, we
set ep,t = ew,t = log(7.2/εl) for t = 0, where εl = 8 with l ∈ {p,w} and ep,t = ew,t = 0 for
t 6= 0. Note that this implies jumps in the price and wage mark-ups µp,t = εp,t/(εp,t − 1)
and µw,t = εw,t/(εw,t − 1) of approximately 1.6 percent. To analyze a 10 percent increase
in technology At, we assume ea,0 = log(1.1/A), where the steady state value of technology
is normalized to A = 1.
The overall deterministic model under timeless perspective commitment is described by
the equations (4.37), (4.38), (4.49), (4.50), (4.51), (4.52), and the optimality conditions
(4.53) to (4.57). For given exogenous processes (4.3), (4.9), and (4.22) this set of equations
determines the optimal paths of the non-predetermined (or jump) variables Ct, Yt, Nt,MCt,
pipt , pi
w
t , the predetermined variableWt/Pt, the predetermined costate variables λ2,t = λ˜2,t−1,
λ3,t = λ˜3,t−1 and the non-predetermined costate variables λ˜1,t, λ˜4,t. By dropping the time
indices we can solve for the steady state of this system, which we denote as the Ramsey
steady state. To analyze our model under a simple instrument rule, we replace the set of
optimality conditions (4.53) to (4.57) by equation (4.60).
Our deterministic approach allows us to solve the model without any approximation. For
the deterministic but nonlinear simulations, we use the software DYNARE developed by
Juillard (1996).
4.5 Simulation Results
At first, we briefly discuss the properties of the Ramsey steady state and then turn to the
welfare implications of wage and price mark-up shocks.
The numerical solution for the steady state values of the costate variables suggests the fol-
lowing: If we assume the existence of an optimal subsidy as defined in (4.47) that guarantees
steady state efficiency, the steady state values of the predetermined costate variables λ2 and
λ3 will be zero. In this case, the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment
corresponds to the policy under time zero commitment and is therefore the globally optimal
policy under commitment. Otherwise, if the government does not subsidize the costs of em-
ployment, the initial steady state is distorted and the numerical solution for the steady state
values yields λ2 6= 0 and λ3 6= 0. Thus, the optimality condition (4.58) is violated and the
policy under timeless commitment is not the globally optimal policy under commitment.
Table 4.1 reports the absolute and relative welfare results for persistent and one-off wage and
price mark-up shocks where both the case of an efficient (with optimal subsidies) and the
case of an inefficient steady state (without optimal subsidies) are considered. Note that our
definition of relative welfare implies that the Ramsey policy is superior if V r0 > 0, whereas
the opposite is true for V r0 < 0. Or, to put it differently, V
r
0 measures the welfare costs
or gains of committing to a simple rule instead of committing to the timeless perspective
Ramsey policy.
The key results to note are as follows. First, and as already mentioned, the existence of
optimal subsidies ensures that Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment is the
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Table 4.1: Welfare effects
Persistent shock One-off shock
V a0 V
r
0 V
a
0 V
r
0
Wage mark-up shock
With optimal subsidies
Ramsey -123.9107 – -123.9106 –
Interest rate peg -123.9111 2.7176·10−4 -123.9106 3.0191·10−7
Taylor rule -123.9122 0.0012 -123.9106 3.5262·10−7
Taylor rule with smoothing -123.9118 8.8664·10−4 -123.9106 3.2783·10−7
Without optimal subsidies
Ramsey -124.4438 – -124.4371 –
Interest rate peg -124.4435 -2.7136·10−4 -124.4377 4.3549·10−4
Taylor rule -124.4431 -5.8738·10−4 -124.4377 4.2061·10−4
Taylor rule with smoothing -124.4430 -6.5441·10−4 -124.4377 4.2527·10−4
Price mark-up shock
With optimal subsidies
Ramsey -123.9117 – -123.9106 –
Interest rate peg -123.9121 3.0186·10−4 -123.9106 4.9620·10−8
Taylor rule -123.9147 0.0024 -123.9106 5.9649·10−7
Taylor rule with smoothing -123.9134 0.0014 -123.9106 3.3600·10−7
Without optimal subsidies
Ramsey -124.4469 – -124.4377 –
Interest rate peg -124.4497 0.0022 -124.4378 8.2695·10−5
Taylor rule -124.4456 -0.0011 -124.4376 -6.8903·10−5
Taylor rule with smoothing -124.4466 -2.9624·10−4 -124.4377 -1.7009·10−5
Notes: Relative welfare V r0 is the percentage of the welfare under a policy regime relative to the welfare
under the Ramsey policy. The definition of relative welfare implies that the Ramsey policy is superior when
V r0 > 0, whereas the opposite is true for V
r
0 < 0
globally optimal policy under commitment. An obvious implication of the previous result
is that no superior rule exists within the class of time-invariant rules which the monetary
authority commits itself to.
Second, if the initial steady state is distorted, the Ramsey monetary policy under timeless
perspective commitment is generally not superior to simple monetary policy rules. In the
case of a persistent wage mark-up shock, the monetary authority could achieve a welfare
gain by switching to all the rules under consideration. In the case of a persistent price mark-
up shock, a Taylor rule performs 0.0011 percent better than the Ramsey policy. A small
welfare gain could also be achieved by following a simple Taylor rule with smoothing. By
considering one-off shocks, we obtain mixed results. In the case of wage mark-up shocks, the
Ramsey policy performs better than the simple rules under consideration, whereas in the
case of price mark-up shocks, the Ramsey policy is again inferior to a Taylor rule with and
without smoothing.13
13However, also in the case of a one-off wage mark-up shock a time-invariant instrument rule exists that
performs better than the Ramsey monetary policy under timeless perspective commitment. This superior
rule is an augmented Taylor rule with a positive weight on the elasticity of substitution between labor types
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Note that we have also found the non-optimality of Ramsey policy under timeless perspective
commitment in the case of technology shocks. For a persistent as well as for a one-off 10
percent increase in At, a more complicated rule with a high weight on price and wage
inflation, a significant degree of interest rate smoothing and a negative weight on output
would perform better than the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment.
The rationale for these results has already been mentioned: Ramsey policy from a timeless
perspective implies that the monetary authority ignores the optimality condition (4.58) and
instead sets the initial values of the predetermined costate variables equal to their respective
values in the by now distorted steady state. As a consequence, the policy under timeless
perspective commitment fails to maximize the policy makers’ objective function.
Nevertheless, this policy is widely considered as a good approximation of the globally optimal
policy under commitment. Or, according to McCallum and Nelson (2004), the policy under
timeless perspective commitment should be optimal within the class of time-invariant rules
which the monetary authority commits itself to. Our results reveal that this is, however, not
generally true.
This is particularly notable, since we do not even search for optimal simple rules by max-
imizing the policy makers’ objective function with respect to the parameters of a given
simple rule.14 If we did, we would improve the welfare results of simple rules which in turn
would amplify the relative welfare loss of the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective
commitment.
In this chapter, however, our purpose is not to find the optimal monetary policy rule or
to investigate the structure of optimal simple rules but solely to demonstrate a possible
inferiority of the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment to widely-discussed
simple monetary policy rules within a standard New Keynesian model under a reasonable
calibration.
The existence of such superior rules challenges the appropriateness of the proposed Ramsey
approach under timeless perspective commitment as a guideline for the conduct of monetary
policy.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, the Ramsey monetary policy in the presence of technology and cost-push
shocks was derived. In particular, we compared the optimal policy to simple monetary policy
rules. We have demonstrated that Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment
may be inferior to simple ad-hoc monetary policy rules when the initial steady state is
distorted. Thus, our work sounds a cautionary note about proposed Ramsey policies under
timeless perspective commitment as a guideline for monetary policy.
To find a time-invariant rule which is utility-maximizing for different shocks that hit the
economy and under different calibrations as well as to discover the structure of such an
”optimal rule” within a non-linearized framework would be a fruitful area for future research.
leading to a sharp decline in the nominal interest rate in response to a rise in the wage mark-up.
14Among the numerous studies which solve such a constrained optimization problem see, for example, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007a).
5 Ramsey Monetary Policy, Oil Price
Shocks, and Welfare
5.1 Introduction
Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007) seek to answer the question, why the actual hike in oil prices has
smaller impacts on inflation and economic activity than the oil price shocks of the seventies.
They identify three main reasons, a smaller oil share in production, a higher flexibility of
labor markets, and a better monetary policy. However, they do not ask what will be the
best or optimal monetary policy in response to an increase in oil prices.
In this chapter, we seek to shed light on this question by deriving the optimal Ramsey-type
monetary policy in an oil-dependent economy with staggered price and wage setting. We
derive the optimal Ramsey-type monetary policy for the case of an efficient and inefficient
steady state and compare the optimal policy to simple monetary policy rules. Furthermore,
we investigate the usual case of an unanticipated shock, but also allow for the case that the
occurrence of the energy price hike is known in advance. In order to check the robustness of
our results, we also compare the welfare effects of anticipated and unanticipated cost-push
shocks.
This chapter is related to different strands of literature. The first strand deals with the
macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks. Contributions which utilize models without rigor-
ous micro-foundations include, among others, Buiter (1978), Bhandari (1981), Bhandari and
Turnovsky (1984), Bruno and Sachs (1985), Wohltmann (1994b), Wohltmann and Clausen
(2003), and Wohltmann and Winkler (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 2008a).1
In contrast, Kim and Loungani (1992), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996), and Finn (2000)
analyze the effects of oil price shocks in micro-founded dynamic general equilibrium models
of closed economies. Backus and Crucini (2000) consider an open-economy real business
cycle model to study the effects of oil on the economy. The latter studies are based on the
assumption of completely flexible prices. Hence, there is no role for monetary policy.
A second strand of the literature studies the interaction between oil price shocks and mon-
etary policy. Among the numerous empirical studies see, for example, Hamilton (1983),
Hamilton and Herrera (2004), Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, 2004), or Barsky and
Kilian (2002). Theoretical contributions are, among others, Leduc and Sill (2004), Medina
and Soto (2005), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006), and Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007).
Leduc and Sill (2004), Medina and Soto (2005) and Calstrom and Fuerst (2006) seek to
answer the question whether the recessionary consequences of oil price shocks are caused
by the oil price hike or by the monetary response to the rise in oil prices. However, these
studies concentrate on the recessionary consequences and do not, as we do, investigate the
welfare effects of oil price shocks under different monetary policy regimes, in particular the
optimal Ramsey monetary policy.
1German readers are also referred to Jarchow (1992) or Wohltmann (1987, 1993).
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Before reviewing the small stream of literature on optimal monetary policy and oil shocks, we
highlight our methodological relation and contribution to the vast literature on the optimal
design of monetary policy.
In this chapter, we again use the Ramsey approach under timeless perspective commitment
for the derivation of optimal policy. Recall that the optimal policy under timeless perspective
commitment is the globally optimal policy under commitment if the steady state of the
system is efficient. Efficiency can be achieved by a fiscal policy that optimally subsidizes the
cost of production. If we abandon the assumption that optimal subsidies are in place, the
Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment is not the globally optimal policy
under commitment. In Chapter 4, we have demonstrated that in this case, the Ramsey
monetary policy under timeless perspective commitment may be inferior to simple (non-
optimized) monetary policy rules.
In this chapter, we are able to show the possible inferiority of Ramsey policy under timeless
perspective commitment in the presence of energy price shocks. In particular, we show that
even simple instrument rules such as the interest rate rule originally proposed by Taylor
(1993) or an interest rate peg may be superior to the Ramsey monetary policy under time-
less perspective commitment. Hence, our findings strongly support the results reported in
Chapter 4.
After having discussed our methodological contribution, we now relate this chapter to the
combination of two strands of literature, namely the interaction of oil shocks and the optimal
design of monetary policy.
The only studies, we are aware of, that analyze optimal monetary policy in the presence of oil
shocks are De Fiori, Lombardo, and Stebunovs (2006), Montoro (2007), and Wohltmann and
Winkler (2008a). De Fiori, Lombardo, and Stebunovs (2006) consider a three-country frame-
work and search for optimal parameters of a simple monetary policy rule. Montoro (2007)
considers a closed and oil-dependent economy with staggered price setting and investigates
optimal monetary policy under commitment by conducting a second-order approximation of
the utility function according to Benigno and Woodford (2005). Hence, this chapter is based
on the linear-quadratic approach. This approach is also used by Wohltmann and Winkler
(2008a) who consider a stylized small-open economy framework with a loss function that
reflects, according to Svensson (2000), the policy objective of flexible domestic inflation tar-
geting. They derive the optimal policy under commitment and search for optimal simple
policy rules.
This chapter contributes to the literature by deriving the globally optimal Ramsey mone-
tary policy under commitment for an oil-dependent economy with staggered price and wage
setting. Thereby, we do neither approximate the utility-based policy makers’ objective func-
tion nor the competitive equilibrium conditions of the model economy. In this perspective,
we follow the suggestion of Ascari and Merkl (2007) and take into account the effects of
non-linearities. Our results suggest that the question whether monetary policy amplifies or
dampens the recessionary effects of energy price shocks is negligible from a welfare point of
view since the welfare-maximizing policy in fact calls for a significant recession.
In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, we have shown that anticipated cost-push shocks may lead to
higher welfare losses than unanticipated cost-push shocks. Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a)
report the same result for energy price shocks.
In this chapter, we compare the welfare effects of anticipated and unanticipated energy price
and cost-push shocks under different monetary policy regimes. Our simulations suggest that
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the anticipation of a future energy price shock is welfare-enhancing, whereas the anticipation
of cost-push shocks induces higher welfare losses than unanticipated cost-push shocks.
Our mixed results stand in contrast to the findings of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a)
but confirm our previous findings reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. In this respect, we
suggest that the welfare effects of anticipation depend on the nature of the shock that is
known in advance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a micro-founded
model for an oil-dependent economy. First, we lay out the baseline model with staggered
price and wage setting as well as monopolistic competition on product and labor markets.
Second, we derive the real business cycle core of the model which is the limiting case of the
baseline model with perfectly flexible prices and wages. Then, we solve for the steady state
of the model which is independent of the degree of price and wage flexibility. Thereby, it is
shown how wage and energy price subsidies can eliminate the monopolistic distortions and,
thus, lead to the efficiency of both the steady state level of output and the output level
without nominal rigidities (henceforth denoted as natural level). At the end of Section 2, an
absolute and a relative measure of overall welfare is presented.
Section 3 describes two different monetary policy regimes. First, we derive the optimal
Ramsey-type monetary policy under commitment. In doing so, we distinguish between the
policy under time-zero commitment and the policy under timeless perspective commitment.
We show under which conditions these commitment policies are identical. Second, we assume
that the monetary authority commits itself to a simple (and time-invariant) instrument rule.
We apply an interest rate peg and several types of the interest rate rule originally proposed
by Taylor (1993).
Section 4 presents the calibration and discusses the solution method.
In Section 5, the results of our simulations are reported. First, we analyze the steady state
effects of permanent changes in the real price of energy. Second, we briefly discuss the prop-
erties of the Ramsey steady state which is defined as the long-run equilibrium of the model
under the optimal Ramsey-type monetary policy. Then, we turn to dynamics and analyze
the effects of energy price shocks. Initially, we consider the real business cycle core of the
model in order to obtain the natural responses to the energy price shock as a benchmark
for our subsequent analysis. Thereafter, we consider the baseline model with staggered price
and wage setting. We present impulse response functions for the model under the globally
optimal policy under commitment and under the simple interest rate rule that was intro-
duced by Taylor (1993). Thereby, we investigate whether the optimal policy amplifies or
dampens the recessionary and inflationary effects of a persistent increase in the real price of
energy. Furthermore, we discuss the welfare effects of different monetary policy regimes. In
particular, we compare simple ad-hoc interest rate rules to the optimal Ramsey monetary
policy under commitment. In doing so, we emphasize the role of the efficiency of the initial
steady state for the welfare-ranking of monetary polices. Finally, we compare the welfare
effects of anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Thereby, we do not restrict our analysis to
the case of energy price shocks but extend it to wage and price mark-up shocks.
Section 6 provides a summary of our main findings and some suggestions for future research.
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5.2 A New Keynesian Model for an Oil-Dependent
Economy
The model is a standard New Keynesian model for a closed and cashless economy which uses
energy, e.g. oil, as an input in production. We follow Calstrom and Fuerst (2006) and assume
that energy is bought from exogenous sources at an exogenously given real energy price. The
economy consists of households, intermediate goods producers, final goods producers, and
labor bundlers.
Households consume homogenous final goods, hold bonds and monopolistically supply differ-
entiated labor. Intermediate goods firms monopolistically supply differentiated intermediate
goods produced with homogenous labor and energy. Final goods producers buy intermedi-
ate goods, aggregate them to a homogenous final good and provide the final good under
perfectly competitive conditions. Similarly, labor bundlers buy differentiated labor types,
aggregate them to a homogenous labor bundle and sell it to intermediate goods producers
in a perfectly competitive market.
In addition, we follow Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and assume that both the price
setting decision of intermediate goods producers and the wage setting decision of households
are constrained by a usual Calvo (1983) mechanism.2 In the following, we present the model
in detail.
5.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers use the continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) to produce the homoge-
nous final good Y˜t in a perfectly competitive market. A final goods producer maximizes his
profits
PtY˜t −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di (5.1)
subject to the following CES production function
Y˜t =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
εp−1
εp di
) εp
εp−1
(5.2)
where Pt is the price of the final good, Pt(i) is the price of intermediate good i, and εp > 1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods.
The first-order condition for profit maximization is given by
Pt
(∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
εp−1
εp di
) 1
εp−1
Yt(i)
−
1
εp = Pt(i) (5.3)
By rearranging (5.3), we obtain the demand function for intermediate good i
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
Y˜t (5.4)
2Merkl and Snower (2009) show that wage and price staggering a` la Calvo are in general complementary in
generating monetary persistence.
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The demand function (5.4) can be substituted into the CES production function (5.2) which
yields
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−εpdi
) 1
1−εp
(5.5)
The RHS of equation (5.5) represents the marginal costs of a final goods producer. Thus,
equation (5.5) states that the price equals marginal costs which, obviously, must hold under
perfect competition.
5.2.2 Labor Bundlers
Analogously to final goods producers, labor bundlers buy the differentiated labor types
Nt(j), aggregate them to N˜t and sell it to the intermediate goods producers under perfectly
competitive conditions. A bundler maximizes his profits
WtN˜t −
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Nt(j)dj (5.6)
subject to the following CES aggregation function
N˜t =
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
εw,−1
εw dj
) εw
εw−1
(5.7)
where Wt is the price of the labor bundle N˜t, Wt(j) is the price of labor type j, and εw > 1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between different labor types.
The first-order condition for profit maximization is given by
Wt
(∫ 1
0
Nt(j)
εw−1
εw dj
) 1
εw−1
Nt(j)
−
1
εw =Wt(j) (5.8)
By rearranging (5.8) and using (5.7), we obtain the demand function for labor type j
Nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
N˜t (5.9)
The demand function (5.9) can be substituted into the CES aggregation function (5.7) to
obtain
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
1−εwdj
) 1
1−εw
(5.10)
The RHS of (5.10) represents the marginal costs of a labor bundler, such that equation
(5.10) is the ’price equals marginal costs’ condition in a perfectly competitive market.
5.2.3 Households
The economy is made up by a continuum of differentiated households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
Each household seeks to maximize its discounted sum of per-period utility U(Ct(j), Nt(j))
Et
∞∑
k=0
βkU
(
Ct+k(j), Nt+k(j)
)
(5.11)
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator conditional on
information available in period t. Ct(j) denotes household jth consumption of final goods
and Nt(j) are its total hours worked. Maximization of (5.11) is subjected to the demand
function (5.9) for household jth differentiated labor type and the households’ period-by-
period budget constraint
Ct(j) +
Bt(j)
Pt
=
Wt(j)
Pt
Nt(j) +
Rt−1Bt−1(j)
Pt
− T rt (j) + Π
r
t (j) (5.12)
where Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on its one-period nominal bond holdings Bt(j).
T rt (j) are lump-sum taxes and Π
r
t (j) are dividends, both expressed in real terms and assumed
to be equal for all households j (T rt (j) = T
r
t , Π
r
t (j) = Π
r
t ).
Furthermore, we assume the existence of complete financial markets, which ensures the
household against variations in its wage income Wt(j)Nt(j). As a consequence, each house-
hold chooses the same level of consumption (Ct(j) = Ct).
By inserting the constraint (5.12) into the intertemporal utility function (5.11), we obtain
the maximization problem
MaxBt(j) Et
∞∑
k=0
βkU
(
−
Bt+k(j)
Pt+k
+
Rt+k−1Bt+k−1(j)
Pt+k
+ t.i.o., Nt+k(j)
)
(5.13)
where t.i.o. = Wt+k(j)Pt+k Nt+k(j) − T
r
t+k(j) + Π
r
t+k(j) comprises all terms independent of this
optimization problem. Differentiating (5.13) with respect to Bt(j) gives the familiar con-
sumption Euler equation
UC,t = βUC,t+1Rt
Pt
Pt+1
(5.14)
where UC,t denotes the marginal utility of consumption where we can drop the index j due
to the assumption of complete financial markets.
In what follows, we take the following functional form for the per-period utility function:
U(Ct, Nt(j)) =
1
1− σ
C1−σt −
1
1 + η
Nt(j)
1+η (5.15)
where σ > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and
1/η with η > 0 measures the labor supply elasticity.3 The marginal utility of consumption
UC,t and the marginal disutility of labor UN,t(j) are then given by
UC,t = C
−σ
t (5.16)
and
UN,t(j) = −Nt(j)
η = −
[(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
N˜t
]η
(5.17)
where in the latter equation we make use of (5.9). The consumption Euler equation (5.14)
now reads as follows:
C−σt = C
−σ
t+1Rt(pi
p
t+1)
−1 (5.18)
3Note that in the limiting case σ = 1, we obtain U(Ct, Nt(j)) = logCt −Nt(j)1+η/(1 + η).
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where pipt = Pt/Pt−1 denotes the gross rate of price inflation.
Following Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), the household is a monopolistic supplier of
labor type Nt(j). In each period the household faces the constant probability (1−θw) ∈ (0, 1]
of being allowed to choose its nominal wage. A household j which is able to reset its nominal
wage in period t will choose Wt(j) in order to maximize its utility
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kU
(
Ct+k, Nt+k(j)
)
(5.19)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints
Ct+k =
Wt(j)
Pt+k
Nt+k(j)−
Bt+k(j)
Pt+k
+
Rt+k−1Bt+k−1(j)
Pt+k
− T rt+k +Π
r
t+k (5.20)
and labor demand functions
Nt+k(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt+k
)
−εw
N˜t+k for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.21)
Combining the constraints (5.20) and (5.21) and plugging them into the intertemporal utility
function (5.19) yields the following maximization problem of a household which is able to
set its wage Wt(j) in period t
Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kU
(
Wt(j)
Pt+k
(
Wt(j)
Wt+k
)
−εw
N˜t+k + t.i.w.,
(
Wt(j)
Wt+k
)
−εw
N˜t+k
)
(5.22)
where t.i.w. = −(Bt+k(j) − Rt+k−1Bt+k−1(j))/Pt+k − T
r
t+k + Π
r
t+k comprises all terms
independent of the wage-setting problem. Differentiating (5.22) with respect to Wt(j) yields
the first-order condition
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k Et
[
(1− εw)
UC,t+k
Pt+k
Nt+k(j)− εw
UN,t+k(j)
Wt(j)
Nt+k(j)
]
= 0 (5.23)
By inserting (5.16) and (5.17) into the optimality condition (5.23) and rearranging terms,
the following optimal wage setting rule can be obtained
Wt(j)
1+εwη = µw
Et
∑
∞
k=0(βθw)
kW
εw(1+η)
t+k N˜
1+η
t+k
Et
∑
∞
k=0(βθw)
kC−σt+kP
−1
t+kW
εw
t+kN˜t+k
(5.24)
where µw =
εw
εw−1
.
Note that in the case of perfectly flexible wages, i.e., θw = 0, all households choose the same
nominal wage Wt(j) = Wt and supply the same amount of labor Nt(j) = Nt. Then, the
optimality condition (5.23) collapses into the static wage setting rule
Wt
Pt
= µw
(
−
UN,t
UC,t
)
(5.25)
The monopolistic structure of the labor market drives a wedge (of the amount of the mark-
up µw > 1) between the marginal rate of substitution −UN,t/UC,t and the real wage Wt/Pt.
Note that in the limiting case of perfect substitutability between the different types of labor
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(εw →∞), the mark-up µw vanishes and the market outcome under perfect competition is
restored.
Dividing equation (5.24) by W 1+εwηt gives(
Wt(j)
Wt
)1+εwη
=
Ψwt
Φwt
(5.26)
where
Ψwt = µw Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
(
Wt+k
Wt
)εw(1+η)
N˜1+ηt+k (5.27)
Φwt = Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
kC−σt+k
Wt+k
Pt+k
(
Wt+k
Wt
)εw−1
N˜t+k (5.28)
Note that Wt+kWt =
Wt+1
Wt
Wt+2
Wt+1
. . . Wt+kWt+k−1 = Π
k
i=1pi
w
t+i is the gross wage inflation rate between
period t and t+ k, and piwt =Wt/Wt−1.
According to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a), equation (5.27) can be expressed in recursive
form as
Ψwt = µwN˜
1+η
t + µw Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k+1
(
Wt+k+1
Wt
)εw(1+η)
N˜1+ηt+k+1 (5.29)
Note that
Ψwt+1 = µw Et+1
∞∑
k=0
(βθw)
k
(
Wt+k+1
Wt
)εw(1+η)( Wt
Wt+1
)εw(1+η)
N˜1+ηt+k+1 (5.30)
By combining (5.30) and (5.29), we obtain
Ψwt = µwN˜
1+η
t + βθw Et
(
(piwt+1)
εw(1+η)Ψwt+1
)
(5.31)
Rewriting (5.28) in the same way yields
Φwt = C
−σ
t
Wt
Pt
N˜t + βθw Et
(
(piwt+1)
εw−1Φwt+1
)
(5.32)
5.2.4 Intermediate Goods Producers
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of the intermediate good i ∈
[0, 1]. Firm i uses the amount N˜t(i) of homogenous labor, the amount Ent(i) of energy from
exogenous sources and the constant returns to scale technology(
(1− a)N˜t(i)
1−ρ + aEnt(i)
1−ρ
) 1
1−ρ
(5.33)
to produce his intermediate good Yt(i).
4 ρ > 0 denotes the inverse of the constant elasticity
of substitution between energy and labor, a ∈ (0, 1) represents a share parameter.
4This way of modeling energy usage is widely applied in the literature. See, among others, Kamps and
Pierdzioch (2002), Medina and Soto (2005), Calstrom and Fuerst (2006), Castillo, Montoro, and Tuesta
(2007), or Montoro (2007). For an early reference, see Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984).
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The firm takes the real price of labor Wt/Pt and the real price of energy P
e
t as given.
5 The
supply of energy from exogenous sources is assumed to be perfectly elastic. The real price
of energy P et is described by the following autoregressive process
P et
P e
=
(
P et−1
P e
)φe
exp(et) (5.34)
where P e denotes the steady state value of the real energy price.6
We allow for the existence of wage and energy price subsidies τwWt/Pt and τeP
e
t , both
financed by lump-sum taxes. The subsidy rates τw ∈ [0, 1) and τe ∈ [0, 1) are assumed to be
constant.
Factor demands can be obtained from the minimization of total real costs TCt(i) =
Wt
Pt
(1−
τw)N˜t(i) + P
e
t (1− τe)Ent(i) subject to the production function (5.33). The solution of the
cost minimization problem reads as follows
N˜t(i) = Yt(i)
(
(1− a)MCt(i)
(Wt/Pt)(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(5.35)
Ent(i) = Yt(i)
(
aMCt(i)
P et (1− τe)
) 1
ρ
(5.36)
where MCt(i) denotes real marginal costs, which can be expressed as
MCt(i) =
(
(1− a)
1
ρ ((Wt/Pt)(1− τw))
ρ−1
ρ + a
1
ρ (P et (1− τe))
ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(5.37)
Due to our assumption of constant returns to scale and competitive factor markets, real
marginal costs do not depend on the quantity produced by firm i, and are thus the same for
all firms, i.e., MCt(i) =MCt.
The profit-maximizing price-setting decision is constrained by a Calvo mechanism. In each
period the intermediate goods producer faces the constant probability (1 − θp) ∈ (0, 1] of
being allowed to choose his price Pt(i) in order to maximize his real profits
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkp∆t,t+k
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
Yt+k(i)−MCt+kYt+k(i)
)
(5.38)
subject to the sequence of demand functions
Yt+k(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
)
−εp
Y˜t+k for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . (5.39)
where ∆t,t+k denotes the stochastic discount factor for real payoffs. Plugging the constraint
(5.39) into the intertemporal profit function (5.38) yields the following maximization problem
of a firm which is able to re-optimize his price Pt(i) in period t
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkp∆t,t+k
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
)
−εp
Y˜t+k −MCt+k
(
Pt(i)
Pt+k
)
−εp
Y˜t+k
)
(5.40)
5By considering an exogenously given real price of energy, we implicitly assume that the exogenous supplier
of energy fully indexes the nominal energy price, P e,nt , to the price index of the energy consumer, Pt.
6Note that equation (5.34) is the nonlinear counterpart of the usual expression Pˆ et = φePˆ
e
t−1 + et, where
Pˆ et = log(P
e
t )− log(P
e) ≈ (P et −P
e)/P e denotes the log-deviation of the real price of energy from its steady
state value.
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By differentiating (5.40) with respect to Pt(i), we obtain the first-order condition
Et
∞∑
k=0
θkp∆t,t+k
[
(1− εp)
1
Pt+k
Yt+k(i) + εp
1
Pt(i)
MCt+kYt+k(i)
]
= 0 (5.41)
Inserting (5.39) into the optimality condition (5.41) and rearranging terms yields the fol-
lowing optimal price setting rule
Pt(i) = µp
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k
p∆t,t+kMCt+kP
εp
t+kY˜t+k
Et
∑
∞
k=0 θ
k
p∆t,t+kP
εp−1
t+k Y˜t+k
(5.42)
where µp =
εp
εp−1
.
Note that in the case of perfectly flexible prices, i.e., θp = 0, all intermediate goods producers
choose the same optimal price Pt(i) = Pt and produce the same amount Yt(i) = Yt. The
optimality condition (5.41) will then read as
MCt =
1
µp
(5.43)
The monopolistic supplier of good i will set his price Pt as a constant mark-up µp over nom-
inal marginal costs given by MCnt = PtMCt. In the limiting case of perfect substitutability
between different types of intermediate goods (εp → ∞) the mark-up µp vanishes and the
market outcome under perfect competition (MCt = 1 respectively Pt =MC
n
t ) is restored.
Dividing equation (5.42) by Pt and using the definition of the stochastic discount factor for
real payoffs7
∆t,t+k = β
kUC,t+k
UC,t
= βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)
−σ
, (5.44)
the price setting equation (5.42) can be rewritten as follows
Pt(i)
Pt
=
Ψpt
Φpt
(5.45)
where
Ψpt = µp Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθp)
kC−σt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)εp
MCt+kY˜t+k (5.46)
Φpt = Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθp)
kC−σt+k
(
Pt+k
Pt
)εp−1
Y˜t+k (5.47)
Note that Pt+kPt =
Pt+1
Pt
Pt+2
Pt+1
. . . Pt+kPt+k−1 = Π
k
i=1pi
p
t+i is the gross price inflation rate between
period t and t+ k, and pipt = Pt/Pt−1.
7According to (5.14), the stochastic discount factor can also be written as a product of the short term real
interest rates
∆t,t+k = β
k UC,t+k
UC,t
= β
UC,t+1
UC,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
rr−1t
·β
UC,t+2
UC,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
rr−1
t+1
. . . β
UC,t+k
UC,t+k−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
rr−1
t+k−1
= Πk−1i=0 rr
−1
t+i
where rrt = RtPt/Pt+1 is the gross one-period real interest rate.
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We again follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) and rewrite (5.46) recursively to obtain
Ψpt = µpC
−σ
t MCtY˜t + µp Et
∞∑
k=0
(βθp)
k+1C−σt+k+1
(
Pt+k+1
Pt
)εp
MCt+k+1Y˜t+k+1 (5.48)
Note that
Ψpt+1 = µp Et+1
∞∑
k=0
(βθp)
kC−σt+k+1
(
Pt+k+1
Pt
)εp ( Pt
Pt+1
)εp
MCt+k+1Y˜t+k+1 (5.49)
and therefore
Ψpt = µpC
−σ
t MCtY˜t + βθp Et
((
pipt+1
)εp
Ψpt+1
)
(5.50)
Rewriting (5.47) in the same way yields
Φpt = C
−σ
t Y˜t + βθp Et
(
(pipt+1)
εp−1Φpt+1
)
(5.51)
5.2.5 The Government
The government collects lump-sum taxes from households to finance wage and oil price
subsidies. The government budget constraint is given by
T rt = τw
Wt
Pt
N˜t + τeP
e
t Ent (5.52)
where T rt are real lump-sum taxes, N˜t =
∫ 1
0
N˜t(i)di and Ent =
∫ 1
0
Ent(i)di are the aggre-
gated factor demands for labor and energy, respectively. The subsidy rates τw and τe are
optimally set to eliminate the distortion resulting from monopolistic competition in labor
and product markets and to restore the efficiency of the flexible price equilibrium.
5.2.6 Aggregation and Market Clearing
We assume a symmetric equilibrium in which all intermediate goods firms and households
are faced with the same price and wage setting problem, respectively. Thus, each firm which
is allowed to change his price in period t will optimally set the same price Pt(i). The mass
of those firms is given by 1− θp. The rest of the firms (θp) will leave their prices unchanged.
As a consequence, the price index (5.5) evolves according to the following law of motion
P
1−εp
t = θpP
1−εp
t−1 + (1− θp)Pt(i)
1−εp (5.53)
Dividing equation (5.53) by P
1−εp
t yields
1 = θp(pi
p
t )
εp−1 + (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−εp
(5.54)
The wage index (5.10) can be rewritten in the same way to obtain
1 = θw(pi
w
t )
εw−1 + (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)1−εw
(5.55)
Note that wage and price inflation are connected by the identity
Wt
Pt
=
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
(5.56)
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The Labor Market. The market clearing condition for labor type j is given by
Nt(j) ≡ N
s
t (j) = N
d
t (j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
N˜t (5.57)
where N˜t =
∫ 1
0
N˜t(i)di is the aggregated labor demand of all intermediate goods producers
which is equal to the supply of the labor bundler. By integrating (5.57) over all labor types
j, we obtain
Nt ≡
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
(∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
dj
)
N˜t = s
w
t N˜t (5.58)
swt =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
dj ≥ 1 is a measure of wage dispersion.8 Note that the inability of
the typical household j to change its price Wt(j) in every period drives a wedge between
the aggregated amount of labor supplied Nt and the aggregated amount of labor used in
production N˜t. Note further that in the case of perfectly flexible wages (θw = 0), each house-
hold sets the same wage Wt(i) = Wt and thus, the inefficiency induced by wage dispersion
vanishes (swt = 1).
According to Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a), swt can be rewritten as
swt = (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ (1− θw)θw
(
Wt−1(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ (1− θw)θ
2
w
(
Wt−2(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ . . . = (1− θw)
∞∑
i=0
θiw
(
Wt−i(j)
Wt
)
−εw
(5.59)
The infinite sum can be written recursively as
swt = (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ (1− θw)θw
∞∑
i=0
θiw
(
Wt−i−1(j)
Wt
)
−εw
= (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ θw
(
Wt−1
Wt
)
−εw
swt−1 (5.60)
where
swt−1 = (1− θw)
∞∑
i=0
θiw
(
Wt−i−1(j)
Wt−1
)
−εw
By using the definition of the gross rate of wage inflation, piwt =Wt/Wt−1, we finally obtain
9
swt = (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ θw (pi
w
t )
εw swt−1 (5.61)
8Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) show that the measure of wage dispersion is bounded below by 1. Their
reasoning goes as follows: Define xt(j) = (Wt(j)/Wt)1−εw . By using the definition of the wage index given in
equation (5.10), we can obtain 1 =
(∫ 1
0 xt(j)dj
)εw/(εw−1)
with εw/(εw−1) > 1. Furthermore, we can rewrite
swt to obtain s
w
t =
∫ 1
0 xt(j)
εw/(εw−1)dj. Jensen’s inequality then implies that swt =
∫ 1
0 xt(j)
εw/(εw−1)dj ≥(∫ 1
0 xt(j)dj
)εw/(εw−1)
= 1.
9Note that a log-linearization of swt around a zero inflation steady state, i.e. π
w = 1, yields sˆwt = θw sˆ
w
t−1.
Hence, the measure of wage dispersion follows an autoregressive process which is independent of the dynamics
of the remaining linearized system.
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The Goods Market. The market clearing condition for intermediate good i is given by
Yt(i) ≡ Y
s
t (i) = Y
d
t (i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
Y˜t (5.62)
where Y˜t is the supply of the final goods producers which is equal to the aggregate demand
for final goods. By integrating (5.62) over all intermediate goods i, we obtain
Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di =
(∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
di
)
Y˜t = s
p
t Y˜t (5.63)
where Yt =
∫ 1
0
Yt(i)di denotes the aggregate production of intermediate goods, and s
p
t =∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)
−εp
di ≥ 1 is a measure of price dispersion.10 The inability of the typical inter-
mediate goods producer to change his price Pt(i) in every period drives a wedge between
aggregate production Yt and aggregate demand Y˜t. Note that in the case of perfectly flex-
ible prices (θp = 0), each firm charges the same price Pt(i) = Pt and thus, the inefficiency
induced by price dispersion vanishes (spt = 1).
We can rewrite spt in the same way as s
w
t to obtain
spt = (1− θp)
∞∑
j=0
θjp
(
Pt−j(i)
Pt
)
−εp
(5.64)
or, equivalently,
spt = (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
+ (1− θp)θp
(
Pt−1
Pt
)
−εp ∞∑
j=0
θjp
(
Pt−j−1(i)
Pt−1
)
−εp
(5.65)
Note that
spt−1 = (1− θp)
∞∑
j=0
θjp
(
Pt−j−1(i)
Pt−1
)
−εp
(5.66)
Thus, we finally end up with
spt = (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
+ θp (pi
p
t )
εp spt−1 (5.67)
where pipt = Pt/Pt−1.
11
The Aggregate Production Function and the Overall Resource Constraint. The
aggregate production function reads as follows
Yt =
(
(1− a)N˜1−ρt + aEn
1−ρ
t
) 1
1−ρ
(5.68)
10The proof that spt is bounded below by 1 is similar to the proof of s
w
t ≥ 1, given in footnote 8.
11Note that a log-linearization of spt around a zero inflation steady state, i.e. π
p = 1, yields sˆpt = θpsˆ
p
t−1. As
the measure of wage dispersion, the measure of price dispersion follows an autoregressive process which is
independent of the dynamics of the remaining linearized system.
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where the aggregate factor inputs, N˜t =
∫ 1
0
N˜t(i)di and Ent =
∫ 1
0
Ent(i)di, are given by
N˜t = Yt
(
(1− a)MCt
(Wt/Pt)(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(5.69)
Ent = Yt
(
aMCt
P et (1− τe)
) 1
ρ
(5.70)
Integrating the budget constraint (5.12) over all households j ∈ [0, 1] yields∫ 1
0
Ct(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Pt
Nt(j)−
Bt(j)−Rt−1Bt−1(j)
Pt
− T rt (j) + Π
r
t (j)
)
dj (5.71)
By using Ct(j) = Ct, T
r
t (j) = T
r
t , Π
r
t (j) = Π
r
t , the bond market clearing condition Bt =∫ 1
0
Bt(j)dj = 0, the labor demand function (5.9), and the definition of the wage index (5.10),
we obtain12
Ct =
Wt
Pt
N˜t − T
r
t +Π
r
t (5.72)
The aggregated real profits of all intermediate goods producers are given by
Πrt =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i)− P
e
t (1− τe)Ent(i)− wt(1− τw)N˜t(i)
)
di (5.73)
By inserting the demand function (5.4) and using the definition of the price index (5.5), we
obtain
Πrt = Y˜t − P
e
t (1− τe)Ent −
Wt
Pt
(1− τw)N˜t (5.74)
Combining the aggregated budget constraint of households (5.72) with the government bud-
get constraint (5.52) and the aggregated profits of intermediate goods producers (5.74) yields
aggregate absorption
Y˜t = Ct + P
e
t Ent (5.75)
Equation (5.75) shows that the usage of oil from exogenous sources limits the consumption
possibilities of the economy.13
The overall resource constraint of the oil-dependent economy can be obtained by combining
(5.75) and (5.63):
Yt = s
p
t (Ct + P
e
t Ent) (5.76)
The overall baseline model for an oil-dependent economy with staggered price and wage
setting is summarized in Table 5.1.
12Since we assume a mass of households normalized on the unit interval, per capita consumption Ct(j) = Ct
is equal to aggregated consumption Ct. The same is true for all per capita terms which are assumed to be
equal for all households j.
13Alternatively, one can assume that energy is owned by the government which transfers the resulting profits
to the households. In this case, we have Y˜t = Ct. This assumption is used by, for example, Castillo, Montoro,
and Tuesta (2007) or Montoro (2007).
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Table 5.1: The baseline model at a glance
Euler equation C−σt = βC
−σ
t+1Rt(pi
p
t+1)
−1
Production function Yt =
(
(1− a)
(
Nt
swt
)1−ρ
+ aEn1−ρt
)1/(1−ρ)
Factor inputs Ent = Yt
(
aMCt
P et (1−τe)
)1/ρ
Nt = s
w
t Yt
(
(1−a)MCt
(Wt/Pt)(1−τw)
)1/ρ
Price Phillips curve 1 = θp(pi
p
t )
εp−1 + (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−εp
Pt(i)
Pt
=
Ψpt
Φpt
Ψpt = µpC
−σ
t MCt
Yt
spt
+ βθp Et
((
pipt+1
)εp
Ψpt+1
)
Φpt = C
−σ
t
Yt
spt
+ βθp Et
(
(pipt+1)
εp−1Φpt+1
)
Wage Phillips curve 1 = θw(pi
w
t )
εw−1 + (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)1−εw(
Wt(j)
Wt
)1+εwη
=
Ψwt
Φwt
Ψwt = µw
(
Nt
swt
)1+η
+ βθw Et
(
(piwt+1)
εw(1+η)Ψwt+1
)
Φwt = C
−σ
t
Wt
Pt
Nt
swt
+ βθw Et
(
(piwt+1)
εw−1Φwt+1
)
Price dispersion spt = (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
+ θp (pi
p
t )
εp spt−1
Wage dispersion swt = (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ θw (pi
w
t )
εw swt−1
Resource constraint Yt = s
p
t (Ct + P
e
t Ent)
Real wage WtPt =
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
Real energy price
P et
P e =
(
P et−1
P e
)φe
exp(et)
5.2.7 The Real Business Cycle Core
The real business cycle core of the oil-dependent economy with monopolistic competition on
labor and product markets can be obtained by assuming that prices and wages are perfectly
flexible. In this case, the heterogeneity of individual prices, wages, and quantities vanishes
and we obtain
Pt(i)
Pt
=
Wt(j)
Wt
= spt = s
w
t = 1 (5.77)
and Nt(i) = Nt, Ent(i) = Ent, Yt(i) = Yt, Nt(j) = Nt, where we make use of market
clearing conditions as well as of equations N˜t = Nt and Y˜t = Yt which obviously follow from
(5.77). By inserting equations (5.16) and (5.17) into the wage setting rule (5.25), we obtain
Wt
Pt
= µwC
σ
t N
η
t (5.78)
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Inserting equation (5.78) and the price setting equation (5.43) into the cost minimization
condition (5.35) yields
Nt = Yt
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(Nηt C
σ
t )
−
1
ρ (5.79)
By inserting the overall resource constraint (5.76), we obtain
Nt = Y
1
ρ
t
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(Nη(Yt − P
e
t Ent)
σ)−
1
ρ (5.80)
The natural counterpart of the cost minimization condition (5.36) reads as follows
Ent = Yt
(
a
µp(1− τe)P et
) 1
ρ
(5.81)
Substituting the latter equation into (5.80) finally yields
Nt = Y
ρ−σ
ρ+η
t
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ+η
(
1− (P et )
ρ−1
ρ
(
a
µp(1− τe)
) 1
ρ
)− σ
ρ+η
(5.82)
The natural level of output Y nt can be obtained by inserting equation (5.81) and (5.82) into
the production function (5.33). After some manipulations, we end up with
Y nt =

1− a
1
ρ
(
1
µp(1−τe)
) 1−ρ
ρ
(P et )
ρ−1
ρ
(1− a)
1+η
ρ+η
(
1
µpµw(1−τw)
) 1−ρ
ρ+η
(
1−
(
a
µp(1−τe)
) 1
ρ
(P et )
ρ−1
ρ
) (ρ−1)σ
ρ+η

ρ+η
(ρ−1)(σ+η)
(5.83)
Two points are worth mentioning here: First, the natural level of output depends on the
exogenously given real price of energy. Thus, a persistent change in this price leads to a
persistent change in the natural level of output. This feature distinguishes energy price
shocks from usual cost-push shocks like wage or price mark-up shocks where the natural
level of output is defined as the level of output under perfectly flexible prices and wages and
constant price and wage mark-ups.
Second, the natural level of output Y nt differs from the efficient level of output due to the
existence of constant wage and price mark-ups µp > 1 and µw > 1.
14 Efficiency of the
natural level of output can be achieved by choosing the subsidy rates τe and τw such that
µpµw(1− τw) = 1 , µp(1− τe) = 1 (5.84)
It then follows that the optimal subsidy rates are given by
τw = 1−
1
µpµw
, τe = 1−
1
µp
(5.85)
The natural level of energy and labor can be computed by inserting equation (5.83) into
(5.81) and (5.82), respectively. Similarly, natural consumption can be obtained by combining
(5.81) with the overall resource constraint (5.76). Finally, we can solve the consumption Euler
equation (5.18) for the natural real interest rate.
14Note that an efficient market outcome without subsidies requires that εp → ∞, εw → ∞, and thus µw =
µp = 1.
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5.2.8 The Steady State
We calculate the steady state of the model by omitting the time indices t. We follow the
widely used assumption of a zero inflation steady state which implies a steady state gross
rate of price inflation pip = 1. According to the identity (5.56), the steady state gross rate
of wage inflation is then given by piw = 1.
In the steady state, the equations describing wage and price setting read as follows
1− θp(pip)
εp−1 = (1− θp)
(
P (i)
P
)1−εp
(5.86)
1− θw(piw)
εw−1 = (1− θw)
(
W (j)
W
)1−εw
(5.87)
P (i)
P
=
Ψp
Φp
(5.88)(
W (i)
W
)1+εwη
=
Ψw
Φw
(5.89)
Ψw =
µwN˜
1+η
1− βθw(piw)εw(1+η)
(5.90)
Φw =
C−σt wtN˜
1− βθw(piw)εw−1
(5.91)
Ψp =
µpC
−σMCY˜
1− βθp (pi
p
t )
εp (5.92)
Φp =
C−σt Y˜
1− βθw(pip)εp−1
(5.93)
Inserting pip = 1 and piw = 1 into (5.86) and (5.87), respectively, yields P (i) = P and
W (j) =W .
The steady state equations for price and wage dispersion are given by
sp =
(1− θp)
(
P (i)
P
)
−εp
1− θp (pip)
εp (5.94)
sw =
(1− θw)
(
W (j)
W
)
−εw
1− θw (piw)
εw (5.95)
Using pip = pip = W (j)/W = P (i)/P = 1, it is obvious that sp = sw = 1. Then, (5.58) and
(5.63) become N = N˜ and Y = Y˜ , respectively.
Under zero inflation, the gross real interest rate and the gross nominal interest rate coincide
and can be obtained by using the steady state Euler equation
C−σ = βC−σR(pip)−1 (5.96)
Hence, we have R = rr = 1/β.
Inserting (5.92) and (5.93) into (5.88) yields
MC =
1
µp
(5.97)
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Similarly, we can combine (5.90), (5.91), and (5.89) to obtain
W
P
= µwC
σNη (5.98)
By inserting the wage setting condition (5.98) and the price setting condition (5.97) into
(5.69) and (5.70), we obtain
En = Y
(
a
µp(1− τe)P e
) 1
ρ
(5.99)
N = Y
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(NηCσ)−
1
ρ (5.100)
We can combine the overall resource constraint (5.76) and equation (5.100), to obtain
N = Y
1
ρ
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(Nη(Y − P eEn)σ)−
1
ρ (5.101)
Now, we plug equation (5.99) into (5.101) and after some manipulations we end up with
N = Y
ρ−σ
ρ+η
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ+η
(
1− (P e)
ρ−1
ρ
(
a
µp(1− τe)
) 1
ρ
)− σ
ρ+η
(5.102)
The steady state output Y can be obtained by inserting equations (5.102) and (5.99) into
the aggregate production function (5.68) which yields
Y =

1− a
1
ρ
(
1
µp(1−τe)
) 1−ρ
ρ
(P e)
ρ−1
ρ
(1− a)
1+η
ρ+η
(
1
µpµw(1−τw)
) 1−ρ
ρ+η
(
1−
(
a
µp(1−τe)
) 1
ρ
(P e)
ρ−1
ρ
) (ρ−1)σ
ρ+η

ρ+η
(ρ−1)(σ+η)
(5.103)
Three points are worth mentioning here: First, the solution of the steady state is exactly
equal to the solution of the real business cycle core besides the fact that in the model with
perfectly flexible prices and wages, the real price of energy is described by the autoregres-
sive process (5.34). Second, the steady state level of output depends ambiguously on the
steady real price of energy. Third, optimal subsidies as introduced in (5.85) eliminate the
inefficiencies caused by monopolistic product and labor markets and, thus, make the steady
state level of output efficient.
The steady state level of energy and labor can easily be computed by inserting equation
(5.103) into (5.99) and (5.102), respectively. Similarly, steady state consumption can be
obtained by combining (5.99) with the overall resource constraint (5.76).
Note that the dependency of steady state output on the real price of energy is unambiguous
when we take the simplifying assumption that energy is owned by the government which
transfers the resulting profits to the households. The resource constraint can then be reduced
to Y = C. By inserting the modified resource constraint into (5.101), we obtain
N = Y
ρ−σ
ρ+η
(
(1− a)
µpµw(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
(5.104)
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As shown above, the steady state output Y can be obtained by inserting the steady state
equations for labor (5.104) and energy (5.99) into the steady state version of the aggregate
production function (5.68) which yields
Y =
1− a
1
ρ
(
1
µp(1−τe)
) 1−ρ
ρ
(P e)
ρ−1
ρ
(1− a)
1+η
ρ+η
(
1
µpµw(1−τw)
) 1−ρ
ρ+η

ρ+η
(ρ−1)(σ+η)
(5.105)
In the case of the modified resource constraint Y = C, an increase in the steady state value
of the real price of energy leads unambiguously to a steady state output decline. However,
the employment effect of a rising real energy price is ambiguous.15 On the one hand, firms
will employ more labor in production due to the substitution effect while on the other hand,
overall production will decline which leads to a decreasing demand for both energy and
labor. Equation (5.104) indicates that for ρ > σ, the overall production effect dominates
and the amount of hours worked decreases with increasing real energy prices. For σ > ρ, the
substitution effect dominates the overall production effect and employment rises.
In our model, a further mechanism is at work. The steady state resource constraint Y =
C + P eEn implies, in isolation, a positive correlation between the real energy price P e
and output Y . The rationale is that a rise in the real energy bill due to the hike in the
real energy price must be financed by an increase in production. As a consequence, output
depends ambiguously on the real price of energy. This can also be seen by inspecting equation
(5.103), where, in contrast to equation (5.105), the real price of energy shows up in the
denominator and numerator.16
5.2.9 The Welfare Measure
We follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004a) or Faia and Monacelli (2007) and measure abso-
lute welfare by the expectation of the discounted sum of aggregate lifetime utility conditional
on the set of information at time equal to zero, that is
E0
∫ 1
0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct(j), Nt(j)) dj = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, Nt) (5.106)
where we make use of the fact that Ct = Ct(j) and Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj. By inserting (5.15), the
equation for the per-period utility function, we finally obtain the following absolute welfare
measure
V a0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt
1− σ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
(5.107)
The steady state level of welfare is then given by
V a =
1
1− β
(
C1−σ
1− σ
−
N1+η
1 + η
)
(5.108)
15This is a well-known result. See, for example, Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984).
16Note again that exactly the same considerations hold for the natural model.
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We can define a relative measure of welfare as the percentage deviation of absolute welfare
from its steady state value, formally
V r0 =
(V a0 − V
a)
|V a|
· 100 (5.109)
It is worth noting that in our approach V a0 is identified as both the policy makers’ objec-
tive function and the overall measure of welfare. Hence, we depart from the widely applied
practice of measuring overall welfare by the unconditional expectations of the policy mak-
ers’ objective function.17 Recently, Damjanovic, Damjanovic, and Nolan (2008) propose a
method for deriving optimal monetary policy based on the optimization of unconditional
expectations of the criterion function and thus, as we do, merge the objective function of
the monetary authority with the overall measure of welfare.18
5.3 Monetary Policy
We consider two different monetary policy regimes. First, we derive the optimal monetary
policy under commitment. In doing so, we distinguish between the policy under time-zero
commitment and the policy under timeless-perspective commitment. Second, we assume that
the monetary authority commits itself to a simple instrument rule. We apply an interest rate
peg and several types of the interest rate rule originally proposed by Taylor (1993).
For the determination of optimal monetary policy, we use the Ramsey approach described
in Khan, King, and Wolman (2003). In this approach, the monetary authority seeks to
maximize welfare, as defined in equation (5.107), given the set of competitive equilibrium
conditions and exogenous processes summarized in Table 5.1. We assume that the monetary
authority is able to commit to the policy plan determined at time t = 0. The maximization
problem of a monetary authority is then of the form
L0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
C1−σt
1− σ
−
N1+ηt
1 + η
+ λ1,t+1
(
C−σt − βC
−σ
t+1Rt(pi
p
t+1)
−1
)
(5.110)
+ λ2,t+1
(
spt Y˜t −
(
(1− a)N˜1−ρt + aEn
1−ρ
t
) 1
1−ρ
)
+ λ3,t+1
(
Y˜t − P
e
t Ent − Ct
)
+ λ4,t+1
(
Nt − s
w
t N˜t
)
+ λ5,t+1
(
N˜t − s
p
t Y˜t
(
(1− a)MCt
(Wt/Pt)(1− τw)
) 1
ρ
)
+ λ6,t+1
(
Ent − s
p
t Y˜t
(
aMCt
P et (1− τe)
) 1
ρ
)
+ λ7,t+1
(
spt − (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
− θp(pi
p
t )
εpspt−1
)
17See, among others, Amato and Laubach (2004), Jensen and McCallum (2002), McCallum and Nelson (2004),
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007a), Steinsson (2003), Walsh (2003a), Woodford (1999a). In our model, the
unconditional expectations of the policy makers’ objective function formally reads as E(V a0 ) where E denotes
the unconditional expectations operator.
18Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) also suggest to optimize unconditional expectations of the
criterion function but are not able to derive an analytical solution method.
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+ λ8,t+1
(
swt − (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
− θw(pi
w
t )
εwswt−1
)
+ λ9,t+1
(
1− θp(pi
p
t )
εp−1 − (1− θp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)1−εp)
+ λ10,t+1
(
1− θw(pi
w
t )
εw−1 − (1− θw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)1−εw)
+ λ11,t+1
((
Wt(j)
Wt
)1+εwη
−
Ψwt
Φwt
)
+ λ12,t+1
(
Pt(i)
Pt
−
Ψpt
Φpt
)
+ λ13,t+1
(
Ψwt − N˜
1+η
t − βθw Et(pi
w
t+1)
εw(1+η)Ψwt+1
)
+ λ14,t+1
(
Φwt − C
−σ
t (Wt/Pt)N˜t − βθw Et(pi
w
t+1)
εw−1Φwt+1
)
+ λ15,t+1
(
Ψpt − C
−σ
t MCtY˜t − βθp Et(pi
p
t+1)
εpΨpt+1
)
+ λ16,t+1
(
Φpt − C
−σ
t Y˜t − βθp Et(pi
p
t+1)
εp−1Φpt+1
)
+ λ17,t+1
(
Wt
Pt
−
Wt−1
Pt−1
piwt
pipt
)}
where L0 denotes the Lagrangian and where make use of the fact that Yt = s
p
t Y˜t and
Nt = s
w
t N˜t. The partial derivative of L0 with respect to the monetary instrument Rt is
given by
∂L0
∂Rt
= βt+1λ1,t+1C
−σ
t+1(pi
p
t+1)
−1 = 0 (5.111)
It follows that λ1,t = 0 for all t, so that the consumption Euler equation is not a binding
restriction for the Ramsey problem. The remaining set of first-order conditions is given by
∂L0
∂Ct
= βt
[
C−σt − λ3,t+1 + λ14,t+1σC
−σ−1
t
Wt
Pt
N˜t (5.112)
+ λ15,t+1σC
−σ−1
t MCtY˜t + λ16,t+1σC
−σ−1
t Y˜t
]
= 0
∂L0
∂Nt
= βt
[
−Nηt + λ4,t+1
]
= 0 (5.113)
∂L0
∂Y˜t
= βt
[
λ2,t+1s
p
t + λ3,t+1 − λ5,t+1
N˜t
Y˜t
− λ6,t+1
Ent
Y˜t
(5.114)
− λ15,t+1C
−σ
t MCt − λ16,t+1C
−σ
t
]
= 0
∂L0
∂
(
Wt
Pt
) = βt[λ5,t+1 N˜t
ρ (Wt/Pt)
− λ14,t+1C
−σ
t N˜t (5.115)
+ λ17,t+1 − βλ17,t+2
piwt+1
pipt+1
]
= 0
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∂L0
∂N˜t
= βt
[
− λ2,t+1(1− a)
(
spt Y˜t
N˜t
)ρ
− λ4,t+1s
w
t + λ5,t+1 (5.116)
− λ13,t+1(1 + η)N˜
η
t − λ14,t+1C
−σ
t
Wt
Pt
]
= 0
∂L0
∂Ent
= βt
[
− λ2,t+1a
(
spt Y˜t
Ent
)ρ
− λ3,t+1P
e
t + λ6,t+1
]
= 0 (5.117)
∂L0
∂MCt
= βt
[
− λ5,t+1
N˜t
ρMCt
− λ6,t+1
Ent
ρMCt
− λ15,t+1C
−σ
t Y˜t
]
= 0 (5.118)
∂L0
∂
(Pt(i)
Pt
) = βt[λ7,t+1(1− θp)εp(Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp−1
(5.119)
− λ9,t+1(1− θp)(1− εp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
+ λ12,t+1
]
= 0
∂L0
∂
(Wt(j)
Wt
) = βt[λ8,t+1(1− θw)εw (Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw−1
(5.120)
− λ10,t+1(1− θw)(1− εw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
+ λ11,t+1(1 + εwη)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)εwη ]
= 0
∂L0
∂spt
= βt
[
λ2,t+1Y˜t − λ5,t+1
N˜t
spt
− λ6,t+1
Ent
spt
(5.121)
+ λ7,t+1 − λ7,t+2βθp(pi
p
t+1)
εp
]
= 0
∂L0
∂swt
= βt
[
− λ4,t+1N˜t + λ8,t+1 − λ8,t+2βθw(pi
w
t+1)
εw
]
= 0 (5.122)
∂L0
∂pipt
= βt
[
− λ7,t+1θpεp(pi
p
t )
εp−1spt−1 − λ9,t+1θp(εp − 1)(pi
p
t )
εp−2 (5.123)
− λ15,tθpεp(pi
p
t )
εp−1Ψpt − λ16,tθp(εp − 1)(pi
p
t )
εp−2Φpt
+ λ17,t+1
Wt
Pt
1
pipt
]
= 0
∂L0
∂piwt
= βt
[
− λ8,t+1θwεw(pi
w
t )
εw−1swt−1 − λ10,t+1θw(εw − 1)(pi
w
t )
εw−2 (5.124)
− λ13,tθwεw(1 + η)(pi
w
t )
εw(1+η)−1Ψwt
− λ14,tθw(εw − 1)(pi
w
t )
εw−2Φwt − λ17,t+1
Wt
Pt
1
piwt
]
= 0
∂L0
∂Φwt
= βt
[
λ11,t+1
Ψwt
(Φwt )
2
+ λ14,t+1 − λ14,tθw(pi
w
t )
εw−1
]
= 0 (5.125)
∂L0
∂Φpt
= βt
[
λ12,t+1
Ψpt
(Φpt )
2
+ λ16,t+1 − λ16,tθp(pi
p
t )
εp−1
]
= 0 (5.126)
∂L0
∂Ψwt
= βt
[
− λ11,t+1
1
Φwt
+ λ13,t+1 − λ13,tθw(pi
w
t )
εw(1+η)
]
= 0 (5.127)
∂L0
∂Ψpt
= βt
[
− λ12,t+1
1
Φpt
+ λ15,t+1 − λ15,tθp(pi
p
t )
εp
]
= 0 (5.128)
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For the sake of comparability with the literature, we redefine the costate variables as λi,t+1 =
λ˜i,t (i = 2, . . . , 17). Then, the set of first-order conditions (5.112) to (5.128) reads as follows
0 = C−σt − λ˜3,t + σC
−σ−1
t
(
λ˜14,t
Wt
Pt
N˜t + λ˜15,tMCtY˜t + λ˜16,tY˜t
)
(5.129)
0 = −Nηt + λ˜4,t (5.130)
0 = λ˜2,ts
p
t + λ˜3,t − λ˜5,t
N˜t
Y˜t
− λ˜6,t
Ent
Y˜t
− C−σt
(
λ˜15,tMCt + λ˜16,t
)
(5.131)
0 = λ˜5,t
N˜t
ρ(Wt/Pt)
− λ˜14,tC
−σ
t N˜t + λ˜17,t − β Et
{
λ˜17,t+1
piwt+1
pipt+1
}
(5.132)
0 = −λ˜2,t(1− a)
(
spt Y˜t
N˜t
)ρ
− λ˜4,ts
w
t + λ˜5,t − λ˜13,t(1 + η)N˜
η
t − λ˜14,tC
−σ
t
Wt
Pt
(5.133)
0 = −λ˜2,ta
(
spt Y˜t
Ent
)ρ
− λ˜3,tP
e
t + λ˜6,t (5.134)
0 = −λ˜5,t
N˜t
ρMCt
− λ˜6,t
Ent
ρMCt
− λ˜15,tC
−σ
t Y˜t (5.135)
0 = λ˜7,t(1− θp)εp
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−(1+εp)
+ λ˜12,t − λ˜9,t(1− θp)(1− εp)
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−εp
(5.136)
0 = λ˜8,t(1− θw)εw
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−(1+εw)
+ λ˜11,t(1 + εwη)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)εwη
(5.137)
− λ˜10,t(1− θw)(1− εw)
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)
−εw
0 = λ˜2,tY˜t − λ˜5,t
N˜t
spt
− λ˜6,t
Ent
spt
+ λ˜7,t − βθp Et
{
λ˜7,t+1(pi
p
t+1)
εp
}
(5.138)
0 = −λ˜4,tN˜t + λ˜8,t − βθw Et
{
λ˜8,t+1(pi
w
t+1)
εw
}
(5.139)
0 = −λ˜7,tθpεp(pi
p
t )
εp−1spt−1 − λ˜9,tθp(εp − 1)(pi
p
t )
εp−2 + λ˜17,t
Wt
Pt
1
pipt
(5.140)
− λ˜15,t−1θpεp(pi
p
t )
εp−1Ψpt − λ˜16,t−1θp(εp − 1)(pi
p
t )
εp−2Φpt
0 = −λ˜8,tθwεw(pi
w
t )
εw−1swt−1 − λ˜10,tθw(εw − 1)(pi
w
t )
εw−2 (5.141)
− λ˜13,t−1θwεw(1 + η)(pi
w
t )
εw(1+η)−1Ψwt
− λ˜14,t−1θw(εw − 1)(pi
w
t )
εw−2Φwt − λ˜17,t
Wt
Pt
1
piwt
0 = λ˜11,t
Ψwt
(Φwt )
2
+ λ˜14,t − λ˜14,t−1θw(pi
w
t )
εw−1 (5.142)
0 = λ˜12,t
Ψpt
(Φpt )
2
+ λ˜16,t − λ˜16,t−1θp(pi
p
t )
εp−1 (5.143)
0 = −λ˜11,t
1
Φwt
+ λ˜13,t − λ˜13,t−1θw(pi
w
t )
εw(1+η) (5.144)
0 = −λ˜12,t
1
Φpt
+ λ˜15,t − λ˜15,t−1θp(pi
p
t )
εp (5.145)
Note that the costate variables λ13,t = λ˜13,t−1, λ14,t = λ˜14,t−1, λ15,t = λ˜15,t−1, and λ16,t =
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λ˜16,t−1 are predetermined.
To obtain a global optimum under time zero commitment, the initial values of the predeter-
mined costate variables must be
λ13,0 = λ˜13,−1 = 0
λ14,0 = λ˜14,−1 = 0
λ15,0 = λ˜15,−1 = 0
λ16,0 = λ˜16,−1 = 0
(5.146)
However, in the spirit of the timeless perspective commitment policy proposed by Woodford
(1999a) and discussed at length by Dennis (2001), Giannoni and Woodford (2003), McCal-
lum and Nelson (2004) and McCallum (2005) within the linear-quadratic framework, the
literature usually neglects the optimality condition (5.146).19 Instead, the initial values of
the predetermined costate variables are set equal to their respective steady state values
λ13,0 = λ˜13,−1 = λ13
λ14,0 = λ˜14,−1 = λ14
λ15,0 = λ˜15,−1 = λ15
λ16,0 = λ˜16,−1 = λ16
(5.147)
The policy under time zero commitment and the policy under timeless perspective commit-
ment obviously coincide when the steady state values of the predetermined costate variables
λ13 to λ16 are equal to zero. Besides this exception, the Ramsey policy under timeless
perspective commitment fails to maximize our welfare measure V a0 . McCallum and Nelson
(2004) point out that the timeless perspective policy can be considered as ”policy-making ac-
cording to a rule”.20 As a consequence, other monetary policy rules (in addition to time zero
commitment) may exist which are superior to the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective
commitment.21
After having discussed the policy regime timeless perspective commitment, we now turn to
the alternative regime commitment to a time-invariant simple rule. For this purpose, we
consider a general interest rate rule of the form
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φR ((pipt
pip
)δpi (Yt
x
)δy)1−φR
(5.148)
where x can either represent the steady state level of output Y or the natural output level
Y nt . δpi is the weight on price inflation, and δy denotes the weight on output stabilization.
A positive value of the parameter φR indicates a preference for interest rate smoothing.
22
19See, among others, Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), Faia (2008a, 2008b), Faia and Monacelli (2008). Faia
and Monacelli (2004) provide a detailed discussion of the timeless perspective approach within the framework
of Ramsey optimal policy.
20See, McCallum and Nelson (2004), p. 45.
21This exactly has been shown by Jensen and McCallum (2002) within the linear-quadratic framework. A
similar result is reported by Blake (2001). However, he uses a welfare measure based on unconditional
expectations. Jensen and McCallum (2002) provide results for both an unconditional and a conditional
measure of welfare.
22Note that equation (5.148) is the nonlinear counterpart of the linear rules usually considered in the literature.
By log-linearizing and setting x = Y , we obtain for instance Rˆt = φRRˆt−1 + (1− φR)(δpiπˆ
p
t + δyYˆt), where
Rˆt = log(Rt)− log(R), Yˆt = log(Yt)− log(Y ) and πˆ
p
t = log(π
p
t )− log(π
p) denote log-deviations of the gross
nominal interest rate, output, and inflation from their respective steady state values.
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The general equation (5.148) nests several well-known monetary policy rules. The rule orig-
inally proposed by Taylor (1993) can be obtained by setting φR = 0, x = Y , δpi = 1.5, and
δy = 0.125. Setting φR = 0, x = Y
n
t , δpi > 1, and δy > 0 yields a Taylor-type rule with a
positive weight on output-gap stabilization, the deviation of actual output from its natural
level. Note that by log-linearizing the term Yt/Y
n
t and taking into account that the steady
state values of Y nt and Yt coincide, we obtain the following well-known expression for the
output gap
Yˆ gt ≡ log(Yt)− log(Y
n
t ) = log(Yt/Y )− log(Y
n
t /Y ) = Yˆt − Yˆ
n
t (5.149)
Furthermore, we can analyze both rules with a positive weight on the lagged interest rate to
allow for interest rate smoothing.23 Finally, we can study an interest rate peg under which
the nominal interest rate is kept constant. To achieve Rt = R without an indeterminacy
problem, we follow Collard and Dellas (2005) and set φR = 0.999, δpi = 1.01, and δy = 0.
5.4 Calibration and Computation
We use a standard calibration which closely follows Calstrom and Fuerst (2006). The time
unit is one quarter. The discount rate is equal to β = 0.99, implying a quarterly steady state
real interest rate of approximately one percent.24 The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
in consumption, σ, is set to σ = 2.25 We set η = 3 implying a labor supply elasticity with
respect to the real wage of 1/3.26 The elasticity of substitution between different intermediate
goods, εp, and the elasticity of substitution between different labor types, εw, are both set
to 8. This implies steady state mark-ups of approximately 14 percent as well as optimal
subsidy rates given by τw = 0.2344 and τe = 0.125.
27 We set θw = θp = 0.75 implying an
average duration of price and wage contracts of one year. We normalize the steady state
real price of energy to one. The inverse of the elasticity of substitution between labor and
energy, ρ, is given by ρ = 1.7. We set a = 0.02 implying a share of energy in output and
marginal costs of 10%.28 Finally, we assume the real price of energy to be highly persistent
and choose φe equal to 0.95. Table 5.2 summarizes the calibration.
In what follows, we depart from the usual assumption that the shock term et in the exogenous
process P et /P
e = (P et−1/P
e)φe exp(et) is an i.i.d. random variable. Instead, we assume et to
be a deterministic term and calibrate it in a way to analyze a 10 percent increase in the
real price of energy. This assumption enables us to deal with anticipated shocks as well as
to solve our model without any approximation.
For the analysis of anticipated and unanticipated shocks, we assume that the economy is
in a deterministic steady state until period t = 0. In the case of an unanticipated shock,
23See Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1998, 2000) for a discussion and estimation of interest rate smoothing.
24Note that rr = 1/β = 1/0.99 = 1.0101. The annual gross real interest rate is then given by rr4 = 1.0410.
25Note that σ is equal to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk-aversion which is defined as RRA =
−CtUCC,t/UC,t. UCC,t denotes the second derivative of the per-period utility function U(Ct, Nt) with
respect to Ct. By using the utility function (5.15), we obtain UC,t = C
−σ
t , UCC,t = −σC
−σ−1
t , and thus
RRA = σ.
26Note that, according to (5.98), we have Ns = µ
1/η
w w
1/ηC−σ/η. Therefore, the steady state labor supply
elasticity is given by (∂Ns/∂w)w/Ns = 1/η.
27Remember that the mark-up is defined as µi = εi/(εi − 1) for i = w, p, and the subsidy rates are given by
τe = 1− 1/µp and τw = 1− 1/(µwµp).
28Note that the steady state share of energy in total output is given by a(En/Y )1−ρ, whereas the steady state
share of energy in the marginal costs is given by a1/ρ((1− τe)P e/MC)(ρ−1)/ρ.
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Table 5.2: Baseline calibration
Parameter β σ η εp εw θw θp P
e a ρ φe
Value 0.99 2 3 8 8 0.75 0.75 1 0.02 1.7 0.95
the real price of energy jumps by 10 percent in period t = 0 and begins to fall afterwards.
In the case of an anticipated shock, the agents anticipate at time t = 0 that a 10 percent
increase in the real price of energy will take place at some future date T > 0. They also
know that the price of energy will subsequently fall according to the autoregressive process
(5.34), where now
et =
{
log(1.1/P e) for t = T
0 for t 6= T
(5.150)
In our simulations, we set T = 2 implying a length of the anticipation period of two quarters.
The overall deterministic model under timeless perspective commitment is described by
equations (5.18), (5.26), (5.31), (5.32), (5.45), (5.50), (5.51), (5.55), (5.54), (5.61), (5.67),
(5.68), (5.69), (5.70), (5.76) (which are basically the derivatives of L0 with respect to the
costate variables or multipliers, i.e. λi,t+1 for i = 1, . . . , 17) and the optimality conditions
(5.129) to (5.145). For given exogenous processes (5.34) and (5.150), this set of equations
determines the optimal paths of the non-predetermined (or jump) variables (Ct, Yt, Y˜t, Nt,
N˜t, Ent, pi
p
t , pi
w
t , Pt(i)/Pt,Wt(j)/Wt, Ψ
p
t , Φ
p
t , Ψ
w
t , Ψ
p
t ), the predetermined variables (s
p
t , s
w
t ,
Wt/Pt), and the costate variables (λ˜2,t to λ˜17,t). By dropping the time indices we can solve
for the steady state of this system, which we denote as the Ramsey steady state. To analyze
our model under a simple instrument rule, we replace the set of optimality conditions (5.129)
to (5.145) by equation (5.148).29
As already mentioned, the deterministic approach allows us to solve the model without
any approximation. For the deterministic but nonlinear simulations, we use the software
DYNARE developed by Juillard (1996). More precisely, we proceed as follows: We solve for
the steady state in which the system stays until the energy price shock emerges or is antici-
pated. This occurs in a period denoted by t = 0. DYNARE now simulates the deterministic
adjustment paths from the initial steady state to the final steady state. Since we consider
temporary energy price shocks which do not change the steady state, the initial steady state
coincides with the final steady state. We then compute the percentage or percentage point
deviation of all variables from their respective steady state values.
5.5 Simulation Results
In this section, we present the results of our simulations which are based on the calibration
described above. Except where otherwise stated, we assume that optimal subsidies are in
place.
First, we analyze the steady state effects of permanent changes in the real price of energy.
Second, we briefly discuss the properties of the Ramsey steady state. Then we turn to
29To obtain absolute welfare, we rewrite equation (5.107) recursively as V at = 1/(1−σ)C
1−σ
t −1/(1+η)N
1−η
t +
βV at+1. We add this equation to our model and solve for the dynamics of V
a
t . V
a
0 is then simply the value of
V at at time t = 0.
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dynamics and analyze the effects of an unanticipated 10 percent increase in the real price of
energy.
Initially, we consider the case of perfectly flexible prices and wages in order to obtain the
efficient responses to the energy price shock as a benchmark for our subsequent analysis.
Furthermore, this allows us to compute gap variables defined as the percentage deviation
of a variable from its natural level.30 In addition, both the steady state analysis and the
investigation of the real business cycle core will help to gather intuition about the basic
mechanisms that are at work in our model.
Subsequently, we consider our baseline model with staggered price and wage setting. We
present impulse response functions and discuss the welfare effects of different monetary
policy regimes. In particular, we compare simple ad-hoc interest rate rules to the optimal
Ramsey monetary policy under commitment. In doing so, we emphasize the role of the initial
steady state for the welfare-ranking of monetary policies. Finally, we compare the welfare
effects of anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Thereby, we do not restrict our analysis to
the case of energy price shocks but extend it to wage and price mark-up shocks.
5.5.1 Steady State Effects of Energy Price Shocks
The steady state of our model was analytically derived in Section 5.2.8. For the sake of
illustration, we simulate the steady state of our model for different steady state values of
the real price of energy. Figure 5.1 displays the steady state values of output, employment,
energy usage, consumption, the real wage, and overall welfare or utility for different steady
state real energy prices.31
As already mentioned in Section 5.2.8, steady state output depends ambiguously on the real
price of energy. Under our baseline calibration, steady state output declines when the real
price of energy rises.32 The same holds true for consumption and energy usage. The reasons
for the decrease in energy usage are first the substitution from energy to employment caused
by both the rise in real energy prices and the decrease in real wages. Second, the overall
decline in output reduces the overall amount of factor inputs used in production. However,
employment rises with an increasing real price of energy.
As mentioned above, the effect of rising steady state energy prices on hours worked is
basically ambiguous. A positive correlation comes from the substitution effect, whereas the
decline in output reduces the amount of labor needed in production. Under our baseline
calibration, the substitution effect dominates and employment increases. Both, the increase
in employment and the decrease in consumption cause welfare to decline. Equation (5.97)
shows that in the steady state, real marginal costs are constant. Basically, real marginal
costs depend positively on the real price of energy and the real wage (cf. equation (5.37)).
Thus, to obtain the constancy of real marginal costs, the real wage must fall when the real
price of energy rises.
Figure 5.2 shows that the steady state amount of lump sum taxes needed to finance the
optimal subsidies declines with an increasing real energy price. Furthermore, Figure 5.2
displays the average tax rate (AVT), which is defined as the ratio of aggregate lump-sum
30For instance, the output gap is Yˆ gt ≡ Yˆt − Yˆ
n
t , where Yˆt and Yˆ
n
t denote the percentage deviation of actual
output Yt and natural output Y nt from their respective steady state values. Recall that with optimal subsidies
as defined in (5.85), the natural levels are also efficient.
31In our baseline calibration, we set P e = 1.
32Numerous simulations show that this result seems to be robust for a wide range of parameter sets.
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Figure 5.1: Steady state effects of varying the real price of energy
taxes T r and aggregate income of all households, formally
AV T =
T r
Πr + wN
(5.151)
where the steady state value of distributed real profits is denoted by Πr. Our simulations
illustrate that the average tax rate is a positive function of P e implying that the tax burden
of households increases with a rising energy price.33
33Note that our baseline calibration with P e = 1 implies a rather plausible average tax rate of approximately
22 percent.
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Figure 5.2: Lump-sum tax and tax burden in the steady state
5.5.2 The Ramsey Steady State
In this section, we briefly discuss the properties of the Ramsey steady state. Note that the
steady state values of the state variables do not change compared to the above discussed
case.
The numerical solution for the costate variables suggests the following: If we assume the
existence of optimal subsidies that guarantee steady state efficiency, the steady state values
of the predetermined costate variables λ13 to λ16 will be zero. In this case, the Ramsey
policy under timeless perspective commitment corresponds to the policy under time zero
commitment and is therefore the globally optimal policy under commitment. Otherwise, if we
abandon the assumption that the government optimally subsidizes the costs of employment
and energy, the initial steady state will be inefficient which in turn will exclude the global
optimality of the timeless perspective approach.34
5.5.3 Energy Price Shocks in the Model with Flexible Prices
and Wages
The real business cycle core of the model was derived in Section 5.2.7, where we have already
mentioned that the model with flexible prices and wages is rather similar to the steady
state of our model. The difference simply consists in the time dependence of the exogenous
variable, namely the real price of energy. As a consequence, the steady state effects of an
increase in the real price of energy described above carry over to the dynamic responses to
a positive energy price shock. Figure 5.3 illustrates the responses to an unanticipated 10
percent increase in the real price of energy.
On impact, natural output drops by approximately 0.4 percent, consumption by approxi-
mately 0.8 percent, energy usage by approximately 6 percent, and the real wage by approxi-
mately 1 percent. By contrast, the natural real interest rate increases by approximately 0.35
percentage points or 35 basis points and hours worked by approximately 0.2 percent. The
increase in the real energy price induces firms to substitute labor for energy. The decline
in production reinforces the negative effect on energy usage, whereas the positive effect on
34In this case, the numerical solution of the steady state yields λ13 6= 0, λ14 6= 0, λ15 6= 0, and λ16 6= 0. Thus,
the optimality condition (5.146) is violated.
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Figure 5.3: Impulse responses of the economy under flexible prices and wages to an unanticipated
10 percent energy price shock.
Note: All variables except for the real interest rate are expressed in percentage deviations
from their respective steady state values. The real interest rate is expressed in annualized percentage
point deviation from steady state.
employment is dampened.35 The difference between the consumption and output decline is
caused by the increase in the real energy bill P et Ent which in turn follows from the increase
in the real energy price.36 The instantaneous and sharp reduction in consumption possibili-
ties puts upward pressure on the real interest rate because of households’ efforts to smooth
35As extensively discussed in Section 5.2.8, even a decrease in hours worked may be possible.
36Note that the resource constraint Yt = Ct+P et Ent implies a positive effect of an increase in the real energy
price on output, holding other things constant.
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consumption.37
Following the initial changes, all variables converge monotonically to their unchanged steady
state values. The persistence of the endogenous processes is exclusively generated by the
persistence of the real energy price. If the energy price exhibits no serial correlation, i.e.,
φe = 0, all variables achieve their steady state values in the period immediately after the
occurrence of the shock.
The negative effect on consumption and the positive effect on hours worked cause households’
utility and thus welfare to decline. In our baseline scenario, we assume that optimal subsidies
are in place. The relative welfare loss due to an unanticipated energy price shock in a model
without nominal rigidities and monopolistic distortions is then given by 0.1447 percent. If
we do not assume the existence of optimal subsidies, welfare decreases by 0.1456 percent.
5.5.4 Energy Price Shocks and Monetary Policy
After having analyzed the effects of an unanticipated 10 percent increase in the variant of our
model without nominal rigidities and hence no role for monetary policy, we now turn to our
baseline model with staggered price and wage setting. Figure 5.4 depicts impulse response
functions for the model under Ramsey monetary policy and under the original Taylor rule.38
Lines marked with a circle pertain to responses under the Taylor rule. The lines with stars
correspond to responses under the Ramsey monetary policy.
The results are qualitatively consistent with the model under perfectly flexible prices and
wages. Output, consumption, energy usage, the real energy bill, and the real wage fall while
employment and the real interest rate rise. A main qualitative difference is the increase in
marginal costs which, by contrast, remains unchanged in the natural model. The rise in
real marginal costs puts upward pressure on the prices of intermediate goods and hence on
inflation.
Under the Taylor rule, nominal wage inflation rises, whereas it falls under the optimal
policy. The opposite responses can be explained by the larger increase in employment and
the more moderate decrease in consumption under a Taylor rule. Nevertheless, the shape and
magnitude of the response of the real wage is rather similar under both monetary regimes
and can be described as hump-shaped.39 The weaker increase in hours worked under the
optimal policy causes lump-sum taxes to decline, whereas the tax yield rises under the Taylor
rule.
The inability of firms and households to change prices and wages in every period gives
rise to a dispersion of prices and wages. Our simulations suggest that both price and wage
dispersion respond in a hump-shaped fashion.
Under the Taylor rule, the monetary authority raises the nominal interest rate by around
1.8 percentage points implying an 0.8 percentage point increase in the real interest rate. The
optimal monetary policy calls for a more moderate 0.75 percentage point rise in the nominal
interest rate. Accordingly, the real interest rate immediately rises by only 0.2 percentage
points. Despite this less contractionary effect on consumption and hence output, the optimal
37According to the consumption Euler equation (5.14), the real interest rate depends positively on the change
in consumption.
38Note that the original Taylor rule in log-linear form is given by Rˆt = 1.5πˆ
p
t + 0.125Yˆt, where a hat above a
variable denotes the percentage deviation from its steady state value.
39Note that in the case of a simple interest rate rule without smoothing, the real wage and the measures of
wage and price dispersion are the only predetermined state variables in our system.
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Figure 5.4: Impulse responses to an unanticipated 10 percent energy price shock.
Notes: Solid lines with circles denote responses under the original Taylor rule, solid lines
with stars denote responses under Ramsey monetary policy. All real variables except for the real
interest rate are expressed in percentage deviations from their respective steady state values. The
real interest rate, the nominal interest rate, wage inflation, and price inflation are expressed in
annualized percentage point deviation from steady state.
monetary policy implies a larger and more prolonged output and consumption slump. This
can be explained by the persistent and hump-shaped development of the real interest rate
and the more moderate increase in hours worked.
By looking at the gap variables, two points are of interest. First, the optimal policy obvi-
ously seeks to close the gap between the actual and the natural (efficient) levels of output,
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Figure 5.4: — Continued
consumption, employment, and the real interest rate.40 Second, if we measure economic ac-
tivity in terms of the output gap, a Taylor rule in fact leads to a boom, whereas the Ramsey
policy entails a moderate decline in the output, consumption, and employment gaps.
With regard to inflation, the optimal policy is able to reduce the change in wages and
prices which in turn diminishes the welfare-reducing dispersion of prices and wages. As
emphasized by Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), a complete stabilization of the welfare-
relevant output gap as well as price and wage inflation is impossible due to the trade-off
that arises in a model with staggered price and wage setting.41
40Recall that the natural levels coincides with the efficient levels due to the existence of optimal subsidies.
41Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) derive the optimal policy with sticky prices and wages by taking the
linear-quadratic approach.
5.5 Simulation Results 90
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
Quarters
%
LUMP SUM TAX
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0
1
2
3
4
5
Quarters
%
REAL ENERGY BILL
 
 
Taylor rule
Ramsey policy
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Quarters
%
OUTPUT GAP
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Quarters
%
CONSUMPTION GAP
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Quarters
%
EMPLOYMENT GAP
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Quarters
%
REAL INTEREST RATE GAP
Figure 5.4: — Continued
We conclude by offering a new insight into the question whether monetary policy amplifies or
dampens the recessionary effects of energy price shocks. As shown above, the optimal policy
calls for a stronger and more prolonged output slump and thus amplifies the recessionary
effects compared to a standard Taylor rule.
This result is particulary remarkable since our welfare measure is based on the utility of
households. If we instead assume a standard quadratic loss function with a high weight on
inflation variability (which Svensson (1999) calls a strict inflation targeting regime), such a
result will obviously hold. In our approach, the welfare relevant measure of output is the gap
between the actual and the efficient level of output. As already mentioned, a minimization
of the welfare-relevant output gap is actually achieved by the optimal policy. However, to
emphasize the point again, this policy calls for a significant drop in output.
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Table 5.3: Welfare effects of energy price shocks
Unanticipated shock Anticipated shock
V a0 V
r
0 V
a
0 V
r
0
With optimal subsidies
Ramsey -150.1563 -0.1451 -150.1518 -0.1421
Interest rate peg -150.1572 -0.1457 -150.1526 -0.1427
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt -150.1589 -0.1468 -150.1551 -0.1443
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆ
g
t -150.1575 -0.1459 -150.1536 -0.1433
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt) -150.1579 -0.1462 -150.1538 -0.1435
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆ
g
t ) -150.1570 -0.1456 -150.1529 -0.1428
Without optimal subsidies
Ramsey -151.1391 -0.1465 -151.1349 -0.1437
Interest rate peg -151.1273 -0.1387 -151.1262 -0.1380
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt -151.1199 -0.1338 -151.1198 -0.1337
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆ
gap
t -151.1265 -0.1382 -151.1268 -0.1384
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt) -151.1233 -0.1361 -151.1226 -0.1356
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆ
g
t ) -151.1301 -0.1406 -151.1295 -0.1402
Notes: Relative welfare is defined as the percentage deviation of absolute welfare from its steady state level.
Under our benchmark calibration with and without optimal subsidies the steady state level of welfare is
given by −149.9387 and −150.9180, respectively. Yˆ gt denotes the output gap.
Table 5.3 shows that the recessionary Ramsey policy is indeed welfare-enhancing compared
to the Taylor rule. The Ramsey policy leads to a welfare loss of 0.1451 percent, whereas
the standard Taylor rule causes welfare to decline by 0.1468 percent. Additionally, Table
5.3 reports results for three other monetary policy rules, namely an interest rate peg, a
Taylor rule with a weight on output-gap stabilization as well as both Taylor rules with a
preference for interest rate smoothing. Naturally, all these rules perform worse than the
globally optimal Ramsey policy under commitment.
A number of further results are worth noting. First, as emphasized by Woodford (1999b)
and shown by Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a) for the case of energy price shocks, history-
dependent interest rate rules seem to be welfare-enhancing. This result can be demonstrated
by comparing the Taylor rules with and without interest rate smoothing. The original Taylor
rule with smoothing causes welfare to decline by 0.1462 percent compared to a 0.1468 percent
welfare drop under a rule without smoothing. The same qualitative result holds for the Taylor
rule which puts weight on output-gap stabilization. The rule without smoothing leads to a
0.1459 percent decrease in welfare, while the rule with smoothing entails a welfare decline
of 0.1456 percent.
Second, a welfare improvement can be achieved by following rules which put weight on
output-gap stabilization instead of actual output stabilization. Furthermore, if we follow
Leduc and Sill (2004) or Calstrom and Fuerst (2006) and define an interest peg as a form
of neutral policy we can conclude that neutral monetary policy dampens the welfare loss
compared to active Taylor-type interest rules.42
Finally, all these results hold for anticipated shocks, too. A more detailed welfare analysis
of anticipated shocks is provided in the next section.
42This finding is in line with the results of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a). However, they question the
appropriateness of characterizing an interest rate peg as a neutral monetary policy.
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Up to now, we have analyzed the welfare effects of energy price shocks and monetary policy
under the assumption of optimal employment and energy subsidies. As already mentioned,
this additional policy instrument leads to the efficiency of both the natural level and the
steady state level of output and ensures the global optimality of the timeless perspective
Ramsey approach within the class of commitment policies. In the following, we apply the
usual practice of abandoning the assumption that the government pays employment and
energy subsidies by setting τe = τw = 0.
43
Table 5.3 reports the results of simulating the welfare effects, subjected to τe = τw = 0.
Now, the Ramsey monetary policy performs worse than all other rules under consideration.
The optimal policy under timeless perspective commitment entails a 0.1465 percent welfare
drop in the case of unanticipated shocks and a 0.1437 percent welfare drop in the case of
anticipated shocks, whereas the best policy is now the original Taylor rule which causes
welfare to decline by only 0.1338 percent and 0.1337 percent in the case of unanticipated
and anticipated shocks, respectively.
The mathematical rationale has already been mentioned: The monetary authority ignores
the optimality condition (5.146) and instead sets the initial values of the predetermined
costate variables equal to their respective values in the by now inefficient steady state.
As a consequence, the policy under timeless perspective commitment fails to maximize
our conditional welfare measure. Nevertheless, this policy is widely considered as a good
approximation of the globally optimal policy under commitment, or to use the terminology
of McCallum and Nelson (2004), the policy under timeless perspective commitment should
be optimal within the class of time-invariant rules which the monetary authority commits
itself to.44 Our results reveal that this is, however, not generally true. This is consistent with
the findings of Blake (2001) and Jensen and McCallum (2002) who show the non-optimality
of timeless perspective commitment within the linear-quadratic framework.
A rational policy-maker will prefer to use any of the rules discussed above instead of the
policy under timeless perspective commitment. This is particularly remarkable, since we do
not even search for optimal simple rules by maximizing the policy makers’ objective function
with respect to the parameters of a given simple rule.45 If we did, we would improve the
welfare results of simple rules which in turn would amplify the relative welfare loss of the
Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment. Hence, our results challenge the
appropriateness of the proposed Ramsey approach under timeless perspective commitment
as a guideline for the conduct of monetary policy.
5.5.5 A Comparison of the Welfare Effects of Anticipated and
Unanticipated Shocks
In this section, we compare the welfare effects of anticipated and unanticipated energy price
shocks. Recall that we set T = 2 implying a length of the anticipation period of two quarters.
The results reported in Figure 5.3 suggest that the anticipation of a future energy price hike
generally dampens the overall welfare loss. This results seems to be robust to a wide range of
variations. Welfare gains through anticipation are achieved i) under perfectly flexible prices
and wages as well as under our baseline calibration with a relative high degree of price and
43See, among others, Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), Faia (2008a, 2008b), Faia and Monacelli (2004, 2008).
44The simulation of the globally optimal policy under commitment in a model with an inefficient (distorted)
steady state remains an open computational problem.
45Among the numerous studies which solve such a constrained optimization problem see, for example, Schmitt-
Grohe´ and Uribe (2007a) or Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a).
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wage inflexibility, ii) irrespective of the existence of optimal subsidies, and iii) irrespective
of the conduct of monetary policy. The only exception is found when we start from an
inefficient steady state and use the Taylor rule with a weight on output-gap stabilization. In
this exceptional case, an unanticipated energy price shock implies a 0.1382 percent welfare
drop, while an anticipated shock causes welfare to decline by 0.1384 percent.
This result stands in contrast to the findings of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008a). However,
from a methodological point of view, this study is only loosely related to our work, since
they consider a stylized New Keynesian model of a small open economy and apply the linear-
quadratic framework with a more traditional loss function which reflects flexible inflation
targeting preferences.
The question arises whether the anticipation of future shocks generally leads to welfare gains
in the present model. In order to answer this question, we now turn back to cost shocks. Cost-
push shocks are widely considered in the literature on optimal monetary policy, because they
generate a tradeoff between stabilizing the output gap and inflation.46 We can identify two
different sources of cost-push shocks in our model, namely the wage mark-up and the price
mark-up.47 Recall that wage and price mark-ups are defined as µw =
εw
εw−1
and µp =
εp
εp−1
,
respectively.
In order to analyze the welfare effects of price and wage mark-up shocks we now assume
that both the elasticity of substitution between different intermediate goods, εp, and the
elasticity of substitution between different labor types, εw, follow an autoregressive process
given by
εi,t
εi
=
(
εi,t−1
εi
)φi
exp(ei,t) for i = p,w (5.152)
where the steady state values of εp and εw are set equal to 8. φp and φw are set to 0.95
implying a high degree of persistence. The shock terms ep,t and ew,t are again assumed to
be deterministic. In order to simulate a 10 percent jump in the mark-ups µp and µw which
ought to occur at time t = T , we set ep,t = ew,t = log(4.888/8) for t = T and ep,t = ew,t = 0
for t 6= T . We simulate our modified system under the assumption that optimal price and
wage subsidies are in place. Hence, we focus on the case of an efficient steady state where,
as mentioned above, the Ramsey policy under timeless perspective commitment coincides
with the globally optimal policy under commitment.
Table 5.4 reports results for the Ramsey policy, an interest rate peg, and the original Taylor
rule with and without smoothing.48 Our results indicate that anticipated cost-push shocks
lead to higher welfare losses than unanticipated cost-push shocks. This result holds for the
optimal policy under commitment, for simple Taylor rules as well as for an interest rate peg.
For instance, turn to optimal Ramsey policy. An unanticipated 10 percent increase in the
wage mark-up causes welfare to decline by 0.0026 percent, while an anticipated increase in
the wage mark-up implies a welfare drop of 0.0029 percent. Accordingly, an unanticipated
10 percent rise in the price mark-up implies a welfare drop of 0.0286 percent. If we instead
assume that the price mark-up shock occurs at time T = 2 and is anticipated at time t = 0,
the welfare drops by 0.033 percent.
46See, among others, Clarida, Gal´ı, and Gertler (1999) or Woodford (2003).
47See, for example, Gal´ı (2008).
48Note that, as usually in the literature, the level of output is defined as natural if both prices and wages
are perfectly flexible and the mark-ups are constant. It then follows, by definition, that the natural level of
output coincides with the steady state level of output if the energy price remains constant at its steady state
level.
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Table 5.4: Welfare effects of wage and price mark-up shocks
Unanticipated shock Anticipated shock
V a0 V
r
0 V
a
0 V
r
0
Wage mark-up shock
Ramsey -149.9426 -0.0026 -149.9431 -0.0029
Interest rate peg -149.9428 -0.0027 -149.9433 -0.0030
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt -149.9532 -0.0097 -149.9560 -0.0115
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt) -149.9487 -0.0067 -149.9505 -0.0078
Price mark-up shock
Ramsey -149.9815 -0.0286 -149.9882 -0.0330
Interest rate peg -149.9869 -0.0321 -149.9923 -0.0357
Rˆt = 1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt -150.0473 -0.0724 -150.0933 -0.1031
Rˆt = 0.8Rˆt−1 + 0.2(1.5pˆi
p
t + 0.125Yˆt) -150.0209 -0.0548 -150.0480 -0.0729
Notes: Relative welfare is defined as the percentage deviation of absolute welfare from its steady state level.
The table is based on the benchmark calibration with optimal subsidies. The steady state welfare is equal
to −149.9387.
These results confirm the findings reported and discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, where
we apply the linear framework with a quadratic loss function. Here, instead, we explicitly
use the utility function of households.
To summarize, our simulations suggest that the welfare effects of the anticipation of fu-
ture shocks depend on the nature of the shock. Here, our objective is not to provide any
explanation, but only to demonstrate this finding and its relation to existing literature.
A further interesting result is that an interest rate peg performs remarkably well, in par-
ticular in the case of wage mark-up shocks. For unanticipated as well as anticipated wage
mark-up shocks, the welfare loss is only 0.001 percentage points higher than the loss un-
der Ramsey monetary policy. In the case of a 10 percent increase in the price mark-up, an
interest rate peg also performs significantly better than the other ad-hoc instrument rules
under consideration. Furthermore, our simulations show that a Taylor rule with smoothing
performs better than a Taylor rule without smoothing. The rationale for these results is
that both rules are associated with a high degree of policy inertia or history-dependence
which also characterizes the optimal monetary policy under commitment, as pointed out by
Woodford (1999b).
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we laid out a nonlinear model of an oil-dependent economy with staggered
price and wage setting. We derived the Ramsey monetary policy in the presence of unantic-
ipated and anticipated energy price shocks. In particular, we compared the optimal policy
to simple monetary policy rules.
Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion whether the monetary policy amplifies
or dampens the recessionary effects of oil price shocks by pointing out that the utility-
maximizing monetary policy in fact calls for a sharp and prolonged output slump. By con-
trast, simple rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993) lead to a dampening of the actual output drop
that is welfare-reducing. Hence, instead of just looking at the recessionary consequences, we
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advocate the consideration of overall welfare in the analysis of the interaction between oil
price shocks and monetary policy.
As a methodological contribution, we have shown that Ramsey policy under timeless per-
spective commitment is inferior to simple ad-hoc monetary policy rules when the initial
steady state is distorted. Thus, our work sounds a cautionary note about proposed Ramsey
policies as a guideline for monetary policy.
By comparing the welfare effects of unanticipated and anticipated shocks, we obtained mixed
results. If the energy price shock is known in advance, its welfare-reducing effects are damp-
ened. However, the opposite is true for typical cost-push shocks such as wage mark-up and
price mark-up shocks. We conclude that (i) the welfare effects of the anticipation of future
shocks depend on the nature of the shock, and (ii) that the findings reported in Chapter 2
and Chapter 3 with respect to the welfare effects of anticipated cost-push shocks seem to be
robust when considering the Ramsey monetary policy approach and taking non-linearities
into account.
An important feature of our model is the consideration of imperfect labor markets by assum-
ing monopolistic competition and incomplete nominal wage adjustment. However, an impor-
tant direction for future research is to incorporate more elaborate labor market rigidities like
search and matching frictions (see, for example, Krause and Lubik (2007), Faia (2008a)), ef-
ficiency wages (Danthine and Kurmann (2004)), or labor turnover costs (Lechthaler, Merkl,
and Snower (2008)). This would enable us to analyze the interaction of oil price shocks,
monetary policy, and involuntary unemployment.
A further shortcoming is that we consider a model of an economy that depends on energy
bought from exogenous sources, but is otherwise assumed to be closed. Hence, we rule out
the potentially important impacts of changes in the nominal exchange rate and in the terms
of trade. Taking these effects into account, will also be a fruitful area for future research.
6 Summary and Outlook
This thesis contributes to the literature in four, we think, important dimensions:
The non-optimality of Ramsey monetary policy under timeless perspective com-
mitment
We demonstrate that the Ramsey monetary policy under timeless perspective commitment
may be inferior to simple (non-optimized) monetary policy rules. We derive the Ramsey
policy in the presence of technology and cost-push shocks for an economy with monopolis-
tic competition on product and labor markets as well as staggered price and wage setting
resulting from quadratic adjustment costs. We are able to show that policy-making from a
timeless perspective is the globally optimal policy under commitment only if the monopolis-
tic distortions are eliminated by optimal wage subsidies. If the government, however, does
not subsidize the cost of production, the optimal policy under timeless perspective commit-
ment may be inferior even to simple monetary policy rules such as an interest rate peg or
instrument rules of Taylor-type. This result is confirmed in our analysis of optimal mone-
tary policy-making in the presence of energy price shocks. We base this investigation on a
non-linearized model for an oil-dependent economy with, in turn, monopolistic competition
on product and labor markets as well as inflexible price and wage adjustment here modeled
by the well-known Calvo (1983) mechanism.
Our finding calls into question the appropriateness of the proposed Ramsey policy under
timeless perspective commitment as a guideline for the conduct of monetary policy. Then,
the question naturally arises what will be the best or optimal monetary policy. To find a
time-invariant rule which is utility-maximizing for different shocks that hit the economy and
under different calibrations as well as to discover the structure of such an ”optimal rule”
within a non-linearized framework would be a fruitful area for future research.
The non-optimality of information
We point out that the information about date and magnitude of a future cost-push shock is
in general welfare-reducing. We analytically show this result within the canonical linear New
Keynesian model with a monetary authority that seeks to minimize a quadratic loss function
in inflation and the output gap. We show that for empirically plausible degrees of nominal
rigidity, anticipated cost shocks entail higher welfare losses than unexpected cost shocks.
The anticipation of a future cost-push shock dampens the volatility of the output gap and
inflation only if prices are highly flexible. These results hold independently of the monetary
policy regime (timeless perspective commitment, discretion, (optimal) simple rules).
We confirm our finding that the knowledge about future cost-shocks reduces welfare at least
for plausible degrees of nominal rigidity (and plausible lengths of the time span between the
anticipation and the realization of the shock) within two extensions of the baseline model.
First, the baseline model is extended by considering habit formation in consumption pref-
erences and by assuming a variant of the Calvo mechanism with partial indexation of non-
optimized prices to lagged inflation. This leads to hybrid IS and Phillips curves which make
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the model empirically more appealing. In addition, the second-order approximation of the
households’ utility function then leads to a quadratic loss function in quasi-differences in
inflation and the output gap.
Second, we take non-linearities into account. We consider an oil-dependent economy with
monopolistic competition on product and labor markets as well as staggered price and wage
setting a` la Calvo (1983), where overall welfare is measured by the aggregate utility of house-
holds. As mentioned above, we again find the welfare-reducing effects of the anticipation of
typical cost-push shocks such as wage and price mark-up shocks. However, if an increase
in the real price of energy is known in advance, its welfare-reducing effects are dampened
compared to an unanticipated shock of equal size.
This result suggests that the welfare effects of the anticipation of future shocks depend on
the nature of the shock. Thus, an important direction for future research could be to system-
atically investigating the welfare effects of the anticipation of different shocks under optimal
monetary policy. Moreover, a deeper empirical and theoretical analysis of the impacts of an-
ticipated shocks on business cycle fluctuations should be conducted. This should include the
quest for welfare-maximizing monetary and fiscal policy in the face of anticipated macroe-
conomic disturbances.
Optimal monetary policy in the presence of oil price shocks
We derive the optimal Ramsey-type monetary policy in the presence of energy price shocks.
We discuss the effects of a persistent increase in the real price of energy both in the limit-
ing case without nominal rigidities and hence no role for monetary policy as well as in our
baseline model where sticky prices and wages give a role for monetary policy. Thereby, we
compare the response functions under the optimal monetary policy to the responses under
the celebrated Taylor rule. Furthermore, we discuss the welfare effects of several monetary
policy rules including an interest rate peg and several variants of the rule originally proposed
by Taylor (1993).
Our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion whether the monetary policy amplifies
or dampens the recessionary effects of oil price shocks by pointing out that the utility-
maximizing monetary policy in fact calls for a sharp and prolonged output slump. By con-
trast, simple rules in the spirit of Taylor (1993) lead to a dampening of the actual output drop
that is welfare-reducing. Hence, instead of just looking at the recessionary consequences, we
advocate the consideration of overall welfare in the analysis of the interaction between oil
price shocks and monetary policy.
An important feature of our model is the consideration of imperfect labor markets by assum-
ing monopolistic competition and incomplete nominal wage adjustment. However, an impor-
tant direction for future research is to incorporate more elaborate labor market rigidities like
search and matching frictions (see, for example, Krause and Lubik (2007), Faia (2008a)), ef-
ficiency wages (Danthine and Kurmann (2004)), or labor turnover costs (Lechthaler, Merkl,
and Snower (2008)). This would enable us to analyze the interaction of oil price shocks,
monetary policy, and involuntary unemployment.
A further shortcoming is that we consider a model of an economy that depends on energy
bought from exogenous sources, but is otherwise assumed to be closed. Hence, we rule out
the potentially important impacts of changes in the nominal exchange rate and in the terms
of trade. Taking these effects into account, will also be a fruitful area for future research.
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A general solution method for linear rational expectations models with opti-
mal policy and anticipated shocks
The thesis offers a methodological contribution by extending the methods summarized by
So¨derlind (1999) who uses the generalized Schur decomposition method to solve linear ratio-
nal expectations models with optimal policy. In contrast to So¨derlind (1999), our approach
provides the opportunity to solve linear dynamic rational expectations models with optimal
policy and anticipated shocks. In particular, we show how to compute response functions
and minimal values of the quadratic loss function in the presence of anticipated shocks for
the policy regimes commitment, discretion and (optimal) simple rules. In the method pro-
posed, the time span between the anticipation and the realization of shocks is an exogenous
variable. The evaluation of unpredictable shocks is then contained as a limiting case.
A limitation of our approach is that the date of occurrence and the magnitude of all future
shocks are known exactly at the time when the solution of the model is computed. An
important direction for future research would be to allow for uncertainty about timing and
A Appendix to Chapter 2
Optimal Timeless Perspective Precommitment Policy
The solution time path of the price level pt under the optimal timeless perspective precom-
mitment policy can be derived from the solution of pit due to
pt =
t∑
k=0
pik (A.1)
We then obtain for t ≤ T :
pt =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
r−T1
t∑
k=0
[
(r1 − 1)r
k
1 − (r2 − 1)r
k
2
]
(A.2)
=
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
r−T1
[
rt+11 − r
t+1
2
]
and for t ≥ T
pt =
T−1∑
k=0
pik +
t∑
k=T
pik (A.3)
=
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
r−T1
[
rT1 − r
T
2
]
+
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r2 − ϕ
·
·
t∑
k=T
{
(1− ϕ)ϕk−T −
(r1 − ϕ)r
−T
2 − (r2 − ϕ)r
−T
1
r1 − r2
(1− r2)r
k
2
}
=
1
β
1
r2 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
rt+1−T2 −
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r1 − r2
r−T1 r
t+1
2 −
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
1
r2 − ϕ
ϕt+1−T
Obviously,
lim
t→∞
pt = 0 for all T ≥ 0 (A.4)
and
p0 =
1
β
1
r1 − ϕ
r−T1 = pi0 > 0 (A.5)
so that the size of the initial jump in p is inversely proportional to the lead time T .
Similar results hold for the state variables xt and pit. Since
t∑
k=0
(xk − xk−1) = xt (A.6)
Appendix to Chapter 2 100
equation (2.6) implies
pt =
t∑
k=0
pik = −
α2
α1κ
t∑
k=0
(xk − xk−1) = −
α2
α1κ
xt (A.7)
so that pt > 0 if and only if xt < 0. The optimal policy under timeless perspective implies
pt > 0 for all 0 ≤ t <∞ so that xt < 0 for all t <∞.
In the following, we show that the persistence or total variation of pt is positive correlated
with T , i.e.
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T=0
<
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T>0
for all T > 0 (A.8)
where the infinite sum
∑
∞
t=0 pt
∣∣∣
T>0
is an increasing function in T .
The persistence measure used here is based on the deviation of pt from its initial steady state
level p0, where the deviation |pt− p0| is calculated both for t < T and t ≥ T . Thereafter the
differences |pt− p0| are summed up. Since p0 = 0 and pt > 0 for all t we must determine the
infinite sum
∑
∞
t=0 pt.
Inequality (A.8) holds although the initial jump of pt is a negative function in T . To prove
the inequality note that
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T=0
=
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(1− r2)(1− ϕ)
(A.9)
T∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T>0
=
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
r−T1
[
r1
1− rT+11
1− r1
− r2
1− rT+12
1− r2
]
(A.10)
and
∞∑
t=T+1
pt
∣∣∣
T>0
=
1
β(r2 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
r1−T2
rT+12
1− r2
−
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
r−T1 r2
rT+12
1− r2
(A.11)
−
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
ϕ1−T
ϕT+1
1− ϕ
so that
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T>0
=
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r1 − r2)
[
r1
1− r1
(
r−T1 − r1
)
−
r2r
−T
1
1− r2
]
(A.12)
+
1
β(r2 − ϕ)
[
1
r1 − r2
r22
1− r2
−
1
r1 − ϕ
ϕ2
1− ϕ
]
After some tedious manipulations, we obtain
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T>0
>
∞∑
t=0
pt
∣∣∣
T=0
⇔ 1− r−T1 > 0 (A.13)
Since r1 > 1, the last inequality is fulfilled. Note that the total variation of pt, i.e.
∑
∞
t=0 pt
∣∣∣
T>0
is an increasing function in T . This follows from equation (A.12), since the derivative of
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r1
1−r1
r−T1 −
r2
1−r2
r−T1 with respect to T is positive. An implication of inequality (A.13) is
∞∑
t=0
|xt|
∣∣∣
T=0
<
∞∑
t=0
|xt|
∣∣∣
T>0
(A.14)
since
|xt| =
α1κ
α2
pt (A.15)
The persistence of output in the case of anticipated cost-push shocks is therefore stronger
than in the case of unanticipated shocks.
A similar result can be shown for the inflation rate pit if the limiting case ϕ = 0 is considered.
We then obtain for T = 0
pit =
{
1− (1− r2) = r2 if t = 0
−(1− r2)r
t
2 < 0 if t > 0
(A.16)
implying
∞∑
t=0
pit = pi0 +
∞∑
t=1
pit = r2 − (1− r2)
∞∑
t=1
rt2 (A.17)
= r2 − (1− r2)
[
1
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− 1
]
= r2 − r2 = 0
and
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t=0
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T=ϕ=0
= r2 + (1− r2)
∞∑
t=1
rt2 = 2r2 (A.18)
In the case T > 0 and ϕ = 0, we obtain
- for t ≤ T :
pit =
r2
r1 − r2
r−T1
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t
1 − (r2 − 1)r
t
2
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> 0 (A.19)
- for t > T :
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r1r
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2 − r2r
−T
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r1 − r2
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Then
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and
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(A.22)
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so that
∞∑
t=0
pit = 0 (A.23)
and
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Now
r2
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> r2 ⇔ r2
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rT1 − r
T
2
]
> 0 (A.25)
Due to r1 > 1 > r2 > 0 the last inequality is met so that
∞∑
t=0
|pit|
∣∣∣
T=ϕ=0
<
∞∑
t=0
|pit|
∣∣∣
T>0
ϕ=0
(A.26)
The case ϕ > 0 is more difficult to analyze since pit can take both positive and negative
values for t > T > 0. If T = 0, pit changes sign immediately after the initial jump. Since
pit =
1
β(r1 − ϕ)(r2 − ϕ)
[
(1− ϕ)ϕt − (1− r2)r
t
2
]
(if T = 0) (A.27)
we obtain
pi0 =
1
β(r1 − ϕ)
> 0 (A.28)
and
∞∑
t=1
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In the case T > 0, pit is positive for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and due to (2.13) we obtain
T∑
t=0
pit =
1
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[
1−
(
r2
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> 0
(since r1 > 1 > r2 > 0). If t > T , pit is negative for sufficiently large values of t. For small
values of t > T , pit may be positive. Due to
lim
t→∞
pt = 0 and pt =
t∑
k=0
pik (A.32)
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we must have
∞∑
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pit = 0 (A.33)
so that
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The last equation also follows from (2.15). With
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we obtain
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T
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The last inequality is met due to r1 > 1 > r2 > 0. Since
−
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the stronger persistence in the case of anticipated shocks follows:
∞∑
t=0
|pit|
∣∣∣
T>0
=
T∑
t=0
pit +
∞∑
t=T+1
|pit| ≥
T∑
t=0
pit −
∞∑
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|pit|
∣∣∣
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(A.39)
Note that for arbitrary T > 0
pi0
∣∣∣
T=0
<
T∑
t=0
pit
∣∣∣
T>0
(A.40)
but
pit
∣∣∣
T>0
< pi0
∣∣∣
T=0
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T (A.41)
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In particular,
piT
∣∣∣
T>0
< pi0
∣∣∣
T=0
(A.42)
since
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(
r2
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< 1
Since the last equation holds, the value of the inflation rate at the time of implementation of
the cost-push shock is smaller in the case of anticipated compared to unanticipated shocks.1
Optimal Policy under Discretion
For all 0 ≤ ϕ < 1, the adjustment processes of xt and pit in the case of anticipated cost-push
shocks show a stronger persistence than in the case T = 0. With the abbreviation
φ˜ =
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
> 0 (A.44)
we have
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and
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1
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1
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=
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∣∣∣
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since rD > 1 and 0 < r
−T
D < 1 if T > 0. An analogous result holds for xt.
The policy regime discretion implies
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and
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xt
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(A.48)
1This result holds under the optimal timeless perspective precommitment policy. Under the policy regime
discretion we have (cf. (2.29))
π0
∣∣∣
T=0
= πT
∣∣∣
T>0
=
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
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so that the stronger persistence of pit and xt in the case T > 0 is due to the anticipation
effects
∑T−1
t=0 pit > 0 and
∑T−1
t=0 xt < 0.
The solution time path for the price level pt results from
pt =
t∑
k=0
pik (A.49)
For 0 ≤ t ≤ T we obtain
pt =
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t∑
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(A.50)
and for t ≥ T
pt =
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[
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− ϕ−T
ϕt+1 − ϕT
1− ϕ
]
(A.51)
with
lim
t→∞
pt =
α2
α2 + α1κ2 − α2βϕ
[
1− r−TD
rD − 1
+
1
1− ϕ
]
> 0 (A.52)
Note that the limit value of pt is a positive function in T . It is well-known that a temporary
cost-push shock yields a permanent rise in the price level under the policy regime discretion.
By contrast, under the optimal timeless perspective precommitment policy there is only a
temporary rise in the price level.
Total Loss under a Simple Rule
We can also determine the total loss under an ad hoc Taylor rule
it = δpipit + δxxt (A.53)
with exogenously given coefficients δpi and δx. It is well-known that under the condition
δpi > 1 and δx ≥ 0 the baseline New Keynesian model satisfies the Blanchard/Kahn (1980)
saddlepath condition. The state equations
A
(
Etxt+1
Etpit+1
)
= B
(
xt
pit
)
+
(
0
−1
)
kt (A.54)
with
A =
(
1 1σ
0 β
)
, B =
(
1 + δxσ
δpi
σ
−κ 1
)
(A.55)
have two unstable eigenvalues belonging to the state matrix A−1B. Solving the state equa-
tions forward we obtain with
vt =
(
xt
pit
)
, P = B−1A, q =
(
0
−1
)
(A.56)
the solution time paths in the case of anticipated cost-push shocks:
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- For t ≥ T
vt = −
(
∞∑
s=0
ϕsP s
)
B−1qϕt−T = −[B − ϕA]−1qϕt−T (A.57)
- For t < T
vt = −
(
∞∑
s=T−t
ϕsP s
)
B−1qϕt−T = −[I2×2 − ϕP ]
−1PT−t B−1q (A.58)
The solution formula for t < T also holds in t = T since
vT = −[B − ϕA]
−1q = −[I2×2 − ϕP ]
−1B−1 (A.59)
The total loss under the simple Taylor rule (VSTR) can be written as
VSTR =
∞∑
t=0
βtv′t
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
vt = V
STR
1 + V
STR
2 (A.60)
where
V STR1 =
T−1∑
t=0
βtv′t
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
vt (A.61)
and
V STR2 =
∞∑
t=T
βtv′t
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
vt (A.62)
Define
M = (B − ϕA)−1 =
(
m11 m12
m21 m22
)
(A.63)
Then
V STR2 =
∞∑
t=T
βtq′M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Mqϕ2(t−T ) = q′M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Mqϕ−2T
(
∞∑
t=T
βtϕ2t
)
(A.64)
=
(βϕ2)T
1− βϕ2
ϕ−2T q′M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Mq =
βT
1− βϕ2
tr
(
M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Mqq′
)
where
M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
M =
(
α2m
2
11 + α1m
2
21 α2m11m12 + α1m21m22
α2m11m12 + α1m21m22 α2m
2
12 + α1m
2
22
)
(A.65)
Since
qq′ =
(
0 0
0 1
)
(A.66)
we obtain
tr
(
M ′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Mqq′
)
= α2m
2
12 + α1m
2
22 (A.67)
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The definition of the matrices A and B implies
B − ϕA =
(
1 + δxσ − ϕ
δpi
σ −
ϕ
σ
−κ 1− ϕβ
)
(A.68)
∆ = |B − ϕA| =
(
1 +
δ
σ
− ϕ
)
(1− ϕβ) + κ
(
δpi
σ
−
ϕ
σ
)
=
1
σ
b (A.69)
where
b = (1− ϕ)(1− ϕβ)σ + δx(1− ϕβ) + κ(δpi − ϕ) > 0 if δpi > 1 and δx > 0 (A.70)
Then
M = (B − ϕA)−1 =
1
b
(
σ(1− ϕβ) −(δpi − ϕ)
σκ σ(1− ϕ) + δx
)
(A.71)
so that
m12 = −
1
b
(δpi − ϕ), m22 =
1
b
[σ(1− ϕ) + δx] (A.72)
and
V STR2 =
βT
1− βϕ2
1
b2
[
α2(δpi − ϕ)
2 + α1(σ(1− ϕ) + δx)
2
]
(A.73)
The loss function V STR2 = V
STR
2 (T ) hat the same properties as the corresponding function
under discretion (V D2 (T )).
To calculate the loss V STR1 , set
Q = [I2×2 − ϕP ]
−1 (where P = B−1A) (A.74)
and
q˜ = B−1q (A.75)
Then
vt = −QP
T−tq˜ for t ≤ T (A.76)
and
V STR1 = q˜
′
(
T−1∑
t=0
βt(PT−t)′Q′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
QPT−t
)
q˜ (A.77)
= q˜′
(
T∑
k=1
βT−k(P k)′Q′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
QP k
)
q˜
= βT q˜′W˜ q˜ = βT tr(W˜ q˜q˜′)
where
q˜q˜′ = B−1qq′(B−1)′ = B−1
(
0 0
0 1
)
(B−1)′ (A.78)
=
1
(σ + δx + κδpi)2
(
δ2pi −δpi(σ + δx)
−δpi(σ + δx) (σ + δx)
2
)
Appendix to Chapter 2 108
and
W˜ =
T∑
k=1
β−k(P k)′Q′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
QP k (A.79)
W˜ satisfies the following matrix equation. Let
D˜ = Q′
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
Q (A.80)
The definition of W˜ then implies
W˜ = β−1P ′D˜P +
T∑
k=2
β−k(P k)′D˜P k (A.81)
= β−1P ′D˜P +
T−1∑
k=1
β−(k+1)(P k+1)′D˜P k+1
= β−1P ′D˜P − β−(T+1)(PT+1)′D˜PT+1 + β−1P ′W˜P
or in compact representation
W˜ = H˜ + β−1P ′W˜P (A.82)
where
H˜ = β−1P ′D˜P − β−(T+1)(PT+1)′D˜PT+1 (A.83)
To solve for W˜ , use the vectorization of a matrix and the Kronecker product of matrices.
Since
vec (β−1P ′W˜P ) = [β−1P ′ ⊗ P ′]vec W˜ (A.84)
we obtain
vec W˜ − [β−1P ′ ⊗ P ′]vec W˜ = vec H˜ (A.85)
with the solution
vec W˜ = [I4×4 − β
−1P ′ ⊗ P ′]−1vec H˜ (A.86)
where
vec H˜ = vec (β−1P ′D˜P )− vec (β−(T+1)(PT+1)′D˜PT+1) (A.87)
=
(
[β−1P ′ ⊗ P ′]− [β−(T+1)(PT+1)′ ⊗ (PT+1)′]
)
vec D˜
and
vec D˜ = Q′ ⊗Q′vec
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
(A.88)
= ([I2×2 − ϕP ]
−1)′ ⊗ ([I2×2 − ϕP ]
−1)′

α2
0
0
α1

Note that vec D˜ equals vec
(
α2 0
0 α1
)
in the special case ϕ = 0. The development of V STR1
as function in T is analogous to the loss function V D1 (T ). Therefore, the total loss function
V STR(T ) = V STR1 (T )+V
STR
2 (T ) has the same properties as the total loss under discretion.
B Appendix to Chapter 3
The Stochastic Case
Assume that νt+1 is an r × 1 vector of independent and identically distributed white noise
disturbances with variance-covariance matrix Σνν = E(νtν
′
t). The i.i.d shocks are, by defi-
nition, unpredictable (τ = 0) and occur at time t = 0. Since Et(νt+1) = 0r×1, equation (3.7)
implies
F · Et
(
w˜t+1
v˜t+1
)
= G
(
w˜t
v˜t
)
(B.1)
The Schur decomposition yields the following system of equations(
S11 S12
0 S22
)
Et
(
z˜t+1
x˜t+1
)
=
(
T11 T12
0 T22
)(
z˜t
x˜t
)
(B.2)
where (
w˜t
v˜t
)
=
(
Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22
)(
z˜t
x˜t
)
(B.3)
and x˜t = 0 for all t ≥ T = 0. Partitioning the matrices A and B in equation (3.1) to conform
with the dimension of wt and vt, i.e.
A =
(
A11 A12
A21 A22
)
, B =
(
B11 B12
B21 B22
)
(B.4)
Equation (3.1) then implies
A11wt+1 +A12 Et vt+1 = B11wt +B12vt + C1ut +D1νt+1 (B.5)
and
A11 Et wt+1 +A12 Et vt+1 = B11wt +B12vt + C1ut (B.6)
where
C =
(
C1
C2
)
, D =
(
D1
D2
)
(B.7)
From (B.5) and (B.6) we get
A11(wt+1 − Et wt+1) = D1νt+1 (B.8)
so that
wt+1 − Et wt+1 = A
−1
11 D1νt+1 (B.9)
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holds (provided A−111 exists). The corresponding equation for the costate vector pv is given
by (Backus and Driffill, 1986)
pv,t+1 − Et pv,t+1 = 0n2×1 (B.10)
Defining w˜t = (w
′
t, p
′
vt)
′ and using equations (B.2) and (B.3) then imply
w˜t+1 − Et w˜t+1 = Z11(z˜t+1 − Et z˜t+1) = Z11(z˜t+1 − S
−1
11 T11z˜t) =
(
A−111 D1νt+1
0n2×1
)
(B.11)
and therefore
z˜t+1 = (S
−1
11 T11)z˜t + Z
−1
11
(
A−111 D1νt+1
0n2×1
)
= (S−111 T11)z˜t + Z
−1
11
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
νt+1 (B.12)
The solution of the VAR(1) process (B.12) has the general form
z˜t = (S
−1
11 T11)
tK +
t−1∑
s=0
(S−111 T11)
t−s−1Z−111
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
νs+1 (B.13)
where
K = z˜0 = Z
−1
11 w˜0 = Z
−1
11
(
w0
0n2×1
)
(B.14)
Since E0 νs+1 = 0 the expected time path of z˜t is given by
E0 z˜t = (S
−1
11 T11)
tZ−111 w˜0 (B.15)
Premultiplying equation (B.12) with Z11 and using w˜t = Z11z˜t to obtain the VAR(1) process
w˜t+1 = Γw˜t +
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
νt+1 (B.16)
where
Γ = Z11(S
−1
11 T11)Z
−1
11 (B.17)
Then
w˜t = Γ
tw˜0 +
t−1∑
s=0
Γt−s−1
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
νs+1 (B.18)
and the expected future path of w˜t is given by
E0 w˜t = Γ
tw˜0 = Γ
t
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
ν0 (B.19)
The solution to the forward-looking vector v˜t follows from
v˜t = Z21z˜t = Z21Z
−1
11 w˜t = Nw˜t (N = Z21Z
−1
11 ) (B.20)
by inserting the solution time path of w˜t.
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In order to determine the minimum value of the loss function J0, set
εt+1 =
(
A−111 D1
0n2×r
)
νt+1 (B.21)
According to (3.48), (3.51), (3.54), and (B.18) we then obtain
J0 =
1
2
E0
∞∑
i=0
λiw˜′iH
∗w˜i
=
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi
{
(Γiw˜0)
′H∗(Γiw˜0) + 2E0(Γ
iw˜0)
′H∗
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
+ E0
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
′
H∗
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)}
=
1
2
w˜′0
( ∞∑
i=0
λiΓi
′
H∗Γi
)
w˜0 +
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi E0
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
′
H∗
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
(B.22)
where we have used E0 εs+1 = 0. V =
∑
∞
i=0 λ
iΓi
′
H∗Γi satisfies the matrix equation (cf.
(3.74))
V = H∗ + λΓ′V Γ (B.23)
and
1
2
w˜′0
( ∞∑
i=0
λiΓi
′
H∗Γi
)
w˜0 =
1
2
w˜′0V w˜0 =
1
2
trace(V w˜0w˜
′
0) (B.24)
To calculate the infinite sum in (B.22) note that
E0
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
′
H∗
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
= E0(Γ
i−1ε1 + Γ
i−2ε2 + ...+ Γ
0εi)
′H∗(Γi−1ε1 + Γ
i−2ε2 + ...+ Γ
0εi)
= E0(Γ
i−1ε1)
′H∗(Γi−1ε1) + E0(Γ
i−2ε2)
′H∗(Γi−2ε2) + ...+ E0(Γ
0εi)
′H∗(Γ0εi)
= E0 ε
′
i(Γ
0′H∗Γ0 + Γ′H∗Γ + ...+ Γi−2
′
H∗Γi−2 + Γi−1
′
H∗Γi−1)εi
= E0 ε
′
i
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1
′
H∗Γi−s−1
)
εi (B.25)
since E0(ε
′
iεj) = 0 for i 6= j. The variance-covariance matrix
E0(εiε
′
i) = E0(εjε
′
j) = Σεε (B.26)
is independent of i and j. We then obtain
1
2
∞∑
i=0
λi E0
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
′
H∗
( i−1∑
s=0
Γi−s−1εs+1
)
=
1
2
λ
1− λ
trace(V Σεε) (B.27)
with V defined as in equation (B.23). The optimal value of the loss function J0 in the
stochastic case (with T = 0) is then given by
J0 =
1
2
trace(V w˜0w˜
′
0) +
1
2
λ
1− λ
trace(V Σεε) (B.28)
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Note that (B.28) is a generalization of equation (3.72) where we have assumed a deterministic
shock in t = 0 (Σεε = 0). The formula (B.28) holds for a discount factor λ with 0 < λ < 1.
1
The right-hand side of (B.28) is not defined in the special case λ = 1. If the discount factor
λ approaches unity we must scale the intertemporal loss function J0 by the factor (1 − λ)
(Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). Equation (B.28) then implies
(1− λ)J0 =
1
2
(1− λ) trace(V w˜0w˜
′
0) +
1
2
λ trace(V Σεε) (B.29)
The scaled intertemporal loss function (1 − λ)J0 converges as λ approaches unity. (B.29)
implies
lim
λ→1
(1− λ)J0 =
1
2
trace(V Σεε) (B.30)
Note that in the case T = 0 and λ = 1 the RHS of (B.30) equals the RHS of (3.72) provided
w0w
′
0 = Σεε. In this special case the stochastic and deterministic case are equivalent. If the
off-diagonal elements of W1 and W2 in the loss function (3.3) are equal to zero, then the
limit value of (1− λ)J0 can be expressed as
lim
λ→1
(1− λ)J0 =
1
2
E(Lt) (B.31)
where E(Lt) is the unconditional mean of the period-loss-function
Lt = (s
′
t, u
′
t)
(
W1 0
0 W2
)(
st
ut
)
=
n3∑
i=1
wii,1s
2
i,t +
m∑
i=1
wii,2u
2
i,t (B.32)
Then
E(Lt) =
n3∑
i=1
wii,1VAR si,t +
m∑
i=1
wii,2VARui,t (B.33)
The period-loss-function can also be written as
Lt = Y
′
tHYt (B.34)
where Y ′t = (k
′
t, u
′
t) and H as defined in (3.49). Then the unconditional period loss also
fulfills
E(Lt) = E(Y
′
tHYt) = trace(HΣY Y ) (B.35)
where ΣY Y is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the vector Y .
1In the deterministic case, where Σεε = 0, (B.28) also holds for λ = 1.
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